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political violence in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, 
which I embarked on in September 2001. This transnational trilogy has 
been concerned with the nature and meaning of the groups Al Qaeda 
and the Islamic State, and the wider contemporary radical Islamist 
movement they belong to. The first volume, Contre-Croisade: Le 11 
Septembre et le Retournement du Monde (the original edition is subtitled 
Origines et Conséquences du 11 Septembre) was written in French (an 
Arabic version was released in 2010 but it remains untranslated in 
English) and published in 2004 as I was in the process of moving from 
Geneva to Boston in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks 
(having previously lived for ten years in New York). That work sought to 
document in as much details as possible the 9/11 attacks and inquire as 
to their significance in the longer-term history of relations between the 
Islamic and Western worlds. The second volume sought to expand the 
investigation from the attacks to the group behind them, widening both 
the scope and lens of the issues at hand. Researched during a second 
stay at Harvard University (the first one was in 1996–7 at the Centre 
for Middle Eastern Studies) at the Programme on Humanitarian Policy 
and Conflict Research, of which I was the associate director in 2004–8, 
and where I led an international research project on Transnational and 
Non-State Armed Groups (TAGs), Understanding Al Qaeda: The Trans-
formation of War came out in 2006 (an expanded second edition was 
released in 2011 and a coda was added in 2013 as a chapter in the book 
An International History of Terrorism co-edited by Jussi Hanhimaki and 
Bernhard Blumenau). Understanding Al Qaeda positioned itself against 
the overemphasis on Al Qaeda’s religiosity, proposing an alternative 
reading anchored in three concepts it sought to introduce, namely Al 
Qaeda’s ‘militarisation of Islamism’, ‘transnationalisation of terrorism’ 
and ‘democratisation of responsibility’ (concepts discussed afresh 
in Chapter 1 in this volume). That work dealt, secondarily, with an 
unpacking of the modus operandi of Al Qaeda (the so-called regional 
franchises and their meaning) and the ‘non-linear’ nature of the group’s 
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The Islamic State and Political Violence 
in the Early Twenty-First Century
Madam, your imperial Majesty gives me life back by killing Turks. 
Voltaire, Letter to Catherine II of Russia, 
Ferney, France, 30 October 1769
Little babies in make-up terrorise the Western world.
Prince, ‘Crystal Ball’ (1986)
What is the Islamic State (IS)? What lies behind this name? From 
whence did it originate and what is its function? What meaning has been 
given to it, and for what purposes? What does the manifestation of this 
phenomenon reveal? What do the narratives built around it say about 
the evolution of international relations in the early twentieth century, 
and not merely about security affairs or counter-terrorism? How is it that 
within a mere three-month period – the summer of 2014 – a previously 
nondescript acronym, ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria), became, so 
rapidly and so globally, an instantly recognisable brand name, at once 
carrying threat for millions of people and appeal for thousands? Where 
did this entity come from and where is it heading?
This book attempts to answer these questions through an examination 
of the place IS occupies in contemporary international history and 
politics. The critical interpretation offered here is a departure from the 
dominant existing literature, which portrays the group primarily as an 
apocalyptic religious entity bent solely on destroying the West. 
Considering the organisation’s declarative religious identity as one of 
adornment, and secondary to its more consequential social and political 
nature, this analysis argues instead that a conceptual geology of IS holds 
the key to its understanding, and is to be found in three related dimensions: 
a continuation of the earlier armed radical Islamist group Al Qaeda and 
that entity’s deeper upstream regional context; degenerated political 
developments in Iraq in the aftermath of the American invasion of that 
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country in March 2003 and later in Syria in 2011; and the wider rise of 
an original type of political violence linked to both the unfinished and 
resurgent practices of the colonial era and more recent problematic 
military interventionism. In reconstructing this complex and interwoven 
genealogy of the group, the analysis similarly situates IS in three different 
and interrelated contexts, constitutive, it is argued, of a transformation 
moment of violence-production in the early twentieth century: post-
colonialism, post-globalisation and post-modernity. As such, the work 
traces the emergence and evolution of the organisation and identifies its 
nature, highlighting an understanding whereby periodisation and 
spatialisation of IS warrant further qualitative expansion, beyond the 
available narrative of mad-terrorist-group-bent-on-destroying-the-West-
and-establishing-a-Caliphate, if they are to be meaningfully accounted 
for historically.
Since its emergence, IS has been studied overwhelmingly under a 
reductionist and sensationalist mainstream journalistic approach and 
through policy-oriented security expertise – the same twofold perspective 
that had been used previously for analysis of Al Qaeda in the aftermath 
of the 11 September 2001 (9/11) attacks on the United States. Focus on 
the group’s extreme violence and its alienating discourse has prevented 
deeper examination of the political and social conditions behind its 
rise. In contradistinction, the present study discusses the IS group from 
a historical and social science perspective, unpacking its dynamics not 
merely in terms of the group’s terrorist nature and its religious rhetoric, 
but with a view to arguing for a reconceptualisation of the production 
of violence by IS – a group this analysis locates at the dawn of a novel 
form of globally privatised, transnationalised, interweaved and hybrid 
insurgent political violence. It is submitted that the cultural mixity and 
multilayered nature of IS inaugurated a revealing moment in both the 
nature and direction of contemporary political violence, while echoing 
its deeper colonial underpinnings. Once expressed only domestically 
or internationally, the new violence now travels back and forth, at once 
impacting periphery and metropolis with equal acuity and consequen-
tial unpredictability, as the full spectrum of the interaction space is 
occupied rather than a single point. ‘Return to sender’ is in effect the 
motto of the violence counter-produced, remixed and shipped back by 
IS to the imperial centres, but also to the group’s immediate domestic 
and regional contexts of states it seeks to reconfigure. In turn further 
deepening the vicious circle, defensive reaction to that beamed violence 
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has led to a renewal of authoritarianism in the Middle East and a 
faltering of democracy in the West, as seen in the rampant, all-purpose 
securitisation and unrestrained Islamophobia rising in the United States 
and Europe.
Close to two decades after the 9/11 attacks conducted in New York 
and Washington by the transnational non-state armed group Al Qaeda, 
and several years into IS’s own saga, the patterns of a transforming form 
of globalised political violence are cementing, and the longer-term 
impact of the Al Qaeda/IS story is vividly perceptible beyond the latest 
episodic ‘crisis’, ‘attack’ or ‘terror’. Although the deeper questions about 
ISIS abound by virtue of the novelty the group carries, they have not 
been asked fully and unpacked scientifically. Captive to a self-imposed 
normative cul-de-sac on the issue of radical Islamism generally, and Al 
Qaeda and IS specifically, social sciences have so far failed to initiate a 
historically contextualised, global (not merely Western or Westernised) 
and nuanced discussion on the phenomena at hand. Such persistent lack 
of deeper analysis is consequential, as a ritual of contorted commentary 
on the international situation ushered in by the two groups has solidified 
in spite of being unconvincing to many. Anchored in the matrix 
developed in the autumn of 2001 following the 9/11 attacks on New 
York and Washington, this zeitgeist-seeking, catastrophising sequence 
is at the heart of both the conceptual misunderstanding of IS and the 
policy impasse, leading to the replay of violence in recent years. For 
every time a new radical Islamism-related attack takes place in New 
York, Washington, London, Paris, Brussels or Berlin, a ritual of denial of 
the deeper political issues plays out in an increasingly familiar fashion. 
The sequence is performed thus: shock gives way to fear followed by 
anger; security experts step up hurriedly in television studios and on 
social media to denounce the lack of preparation by the authorities; 
specialists in radical Islamism (or simply Islam) follow, declaring that IS 
(previously Al Qaeda) has been weakened, is on its way to be defeated 
and is merely lashing out with desperate attacks; Muslim communities 
in Western countries are called out and racist and violent attacks against 
them sometimes take place (hours after the March 2016 attacks in 
Brussels a #stopislam movement started trending, revealing the depth 
of the bias that had come to overtake sectors of the Western world, 
readily associating Islam and terrorism); sympathy movements for the 
victims or city where the attack took place are set up (Je suis Charlie, I 
am Brussels, etc.); calls for tougher legislation (surveillance mechanisms, 
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detention conditions, nationality measures, immigration procedures, 
travel regulations, dress codes, access to pools, prayer sites, etc.) are 
spoken urgently; arrests are made in neighbourhoods where Muslim 
migrants are known to reside and bombing is redoubled in Iraq, Syria, 
Afghanistan, Yemen or Libya.
In such a context, where ethos becomes pathos, and as was the 
case for Al Qaeda in the 2000s, IS became in the 2010s the bogeyman 
of international security – naturally named as a natural threat. Yet as 
Salman Sayyid remarks, ‘the act of naming is an exercise in history-
making … A name is not just a label that can simply be attached to 
something that is already there: it is the means by which heterogeneous 
elements are marshalled together to become the intrinsic features of 
the named entity.’1 That marshalling was the unexamined mainstay of 
what IS heralded for the world, for the Middle East and for the West in 
particular. Above and beyond IS itself, its extremism and violence, such 
evocation has deeper problematic roots. In the contemporary political 
geography, terrorism has been not-so-subtly placed in the middle of 
a canvas that has been painted in the vivid green and black colours of 
Islam. As a result, the notion of terrorism is now in a state of conceptual 
deformation, whereby the elasticity it has been given in recent years 
allows it to serve almost exclusively the purpose of identifying threats 
against Western states and societies as coming primarily from Islam 
and faceless Muslim attackers. To be certain, terrorism suffered by 
other regions is reported regularly, and is portrayed equally as an ill 
of our times to be dealt with urgently. Indeed, according to the Global 
Terrorism Index released annually by the Institute of Economics and 
Peace, the first casualties of terrorism in this period were Iraqis, Afghans 
and Nigerians. However, the core representation of terrorism per se in 
the well-embroidered media and policy drapery is centrally the menace 
it represents to the West. An illustration of this – only partially coded 
– reality is the inconsistent use of the term ‘terrorism’ by mainstream 
media, at once resorting to it reflexively when attacks have Muslims 
associated with them, and opting for another terminology (‘attack’, 
‘shooting’, ‘security incident’, ‘assault’, ‘situation’, etc.) when events of a 
similar nature have different types of perpetrators involved. Hours after 
a gunman had performed terroristically in Munich, Germany, on 22 July 
2016 – killing eight civilians, mostly children and teenagers, in a mall 
– authorities were ‘still considering whether this was a terrorist event’ 
and the main international media outlets (CNN, BBC) were refraining 
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from using the word when video had already surfaced of the masked 
attacker boasting about his murderous actions. In an obvious attempt 
to link the ongoing event to the question of migration from the Middle 
East which has engulfed German and European politics since 2014, the 
first question put by journalists to the Munich chief of police at the press 
briefing that evening was an inquiry as to how long the perpetrator had 
lived in Germany. When, in February 2017, US President Donald Trump 
provided a list of 78 recent terrorist attacks (from September 2014 to 
December 2016), which he claimed misleadingly had not been reported 
by the media, he revealingly overlooked an anti-Muslim terrorist attack 
that had taken place a few days earlier in Canada, which a Republican 
congressman who supported his policies justified. Defending Trump’s 
stance, US Representative Sean Duffy declared to CNN that ‘there is a 
difference’ between terror acts by white people and those committed by 
Muslims.2 When, on 19 June 2017, Darren Osborn drove a van into a 
crowd near the Finsbury Park Mosque in London, re-enacting a terrorist 
modus operandi seen earlier in London, Berlin and Nice, the BBC and 
CNN refrained from using the term terrorism for several hours, initially 
depicting the attack as a ‘collision’.
The primary subtext of the IS discussion is that terrorism is today 
largely serving the purpose of naming Islam as an enemy without 
actually naming it. The Global War on Terror (GWOT) that was declared 
in September 2001 by the George W. Bush administration has almost 
exclusively targeted radical Islamist groups; initially Al Qaeda, then its 
franchises and affiliates, and eventually IS. The power of a hegemonic 
discursive conflict of the sort the GWOT represented was in effect to 
attain a victory of interpretation, ensuring that a particular viewpoint 
triumphed,3 which played out precisely in this fashion. Two logics 
emanating from the Global South itself enabled the furthering and 
perpetuation of this state of affairs. The first was a similar, all-purpose 
delegitimising and criminalising use of the ‘T’ term by authoritarian 
regimes such as Abdel Fattah al Sisi’s in Egypt and Bashar al Assad’s 
in Syria against their political opponents (regardless of the actual use 
of violence by those opponents). The second was the consequential 
propping-up of these authoritarian-clientelist systems by their partners 
in the North, even in the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring, in the name 
of fighting terrorism and under a logic of needed ‘security partners’ 
(as had long been the case with Hosni Mubarak’s regime in Egypt or 
Zein al Abidine Ben Ali’s in Tunisia, among others). Consequentially, 
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and again regardless of the actual terrorism performed by the radical 
groups, a diffuse, intangible, unfathomable ‘terrorism’ endowed with a 
free-floating, independent existence is presented as having taken over 
the world parasitically. Omnipresent, the threat is defined almost only in 
relation to the presence of Islam in its vicinity and of ISIS ostentatiously.
Regularly replayed and patterned in such depoliticised and culturalised 
ways, the contemporary presentation of political violence has not evolved 
significantly beyond this static dimension. The public commentary 
context in which the representation of IS was initiated in earnest in 
mid-2014, when the group emerged publicly, illustrated that powerfully. 
Just as Al Qaeda had been called a formula system, a venture capitalist 
firm, a commissioning editor, a newspaper, a television production, 
a publishing house, a wealthy university, a financial godfather, a 
transnational corporation, a franchise outfit and a multinational 
holding company, IS conjured up a variety of similarly eclectic names: 
revolutionary chameleon, cult, super-gang, proto-state, network, state of 
mind and online Caliphate. Beyond the groups’ objective complexities, the 
proliferation of appellations is indicative of a discomfort in the presence 
of the type of intricate actors that both Al Qaeda and IS represent. Indeed, 
the very action of naming the new group (‘an exercise in history-making’) 
became itself an issue: ISIS, ISIL or Daesh?4 As in the Zapruder film, 
the disconnects between what was seen and what was unseen, hidden or 
imagined, interpreted or reinterpreted, became legion.
Misunderstanding IS
This book examines the history and the historiography of the 
organisation of IS. It argues that the IS phenomenon takes place as neo-
colonialism continued lastingly to define the setting in which the group 
appeared in Iraq; as globalisation5 deepened worldwide, offering further 
opportunities for the organisation to beam its violence internationally; and 
as modernity accelerated, bringing North and South into an ever-closer 
interface, with individual actors on both sides experiencing related, but 
not similar, radical insurgent and violent rebellious urges. It is proposed 
that, above and beyond the important domestic and regional story of the 
evolution of radical Islamism, IS is more importantly the manifestation 
of the persistent dystrophies that have long been playing out politically 
between the West and the Middle East (and, beyond, the Islamic world). 
Furthermore, the book argues that the path embarked on in facing up 
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to the group in the name of the defence of democracy has paradoxically 
fuelled authoritarian patterns in the West itself, as the effect of lingering 
colonial strategies and more recent interventionist outlooks used to 
control distant lands are echoed corruptively in the heart of the Western 
metropolis. These nascent but possibly lasting dimensions are playing out 
in largely unexamined ways, as relates to the discussion of IS. However, 
for the majority of commentators the problematique has remained one 
of ‘terrorism and counter-terrorism’, ‘them against us’, ‘Middle East strife’ 
(a region given only in terms of ‘unreadability’, ‘enigma’ and ‘riddle’) and 
‘Islam and its problem’.6 The actual political archaeology of the group 
has been sidelined,7 displaced by a Pravda-like focus on religion8 and 
rah-rah presentism that is emptying the historical context of its crucial 
backdrop and pinpointable consequences. The radical Islamist group – 
as the titles of most books devoted to it denote in their echoing of the 
policy phraseology – is apprehended as a ‘phoenix’ ‘cult’ of ‘strangers’ 
that has ‘madness and methodology’ in an ‘empire of fear’, setting a ‘trap’, 
with a ‘doomsday vision’ whose ‘brutal’ ‘rise’ is a ‘new threat’ that ‘can’t 
be ignored’ and must be ‘defeated’ in this ‘great war of our time’. The 
larger setting of this call-and-response is the absence of a dispassionate, 
intelligent framework to understanding the question of contemporary 
terrorism and its permutations away from a unilateral, state-centric 
and depoliticised stance.9 Such work has had a direct relationship 
with the contemporary practice of power and the projection of force 
in increasingly culturalised and long-skewed international relations. 
In effect, the uncritical and unreflective mobilisation of prestidigitator 
expertise on terror is today a political process featuring officialdom, 
journalism and their networks. However problematic this may be, it is 
nonetheless of lesser concern here, as it remains a matter or prerogative 
(including in the case of the media per editorial choices). What matters 
more to an academic analysis seeking to conceptualise IS is that such 
practice has resulted in an un-nuanced under-theorisation of one of the 
most important developments of our times. As a result, academia has 
remained captive to a simplified twofold narrative about apocalyptic 
terrorism and theology readings. That horizon-closing narrative has 
not so much found its ways into institutions of higher learning as it has 
stunned them into emollience, since it has not yet been debunked – and 
also because its power derives from the fact that it is the product of a 
mostly Western-based uncritical understanding of societies that are not 
Western but which are beholden to that reading. (For example, Malian 
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newspapers circa 2012 reflexively calling Paris-based terrorism experts 
to seek enlightenment on what was happening up north in their own 
country with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was a tell-tale 
sign of such withdrawal from self-representation and intellectual 
dependence on the former colonial power.)
The wider discussion that has not been tapped into, and was 
indeed kept at bay when it comes to understanding the origins of the 
contemporary transnational violence of IS (and before it Al Qaeda), 
concerns two important ongoing phenomena of our times that have been 
termed respectively the ‘decolonisation of international relations’ and 
the ‘decolonising of war’.10 As concerns the new breed of non-state armed 
groups, these ongoing shifts primarily imply, I argue here, a transnational 
repositioning of violence – precisely what Al Qaeda introduced in the 
1990s and 2000s (see Chapter 2), and what IS deepened in the 2010s (see 
Chapters 3 and 4). Grammatically, colonial war was international. Post-
colonial conflict is, for its part, eminently transnational. Both connect in 
the martial nature of that encounter between actors, times and spaces, 
and if, as Isabel Hull summed it up, imperialism was war,11 then so too 
are Al Qaeda’s and IS’s actions essentially military. Despite the military 
studies and philosophical works at both ends of the spectrum, the 
revolutionary cross-pollination of these strands has not been researched 
with a view to deciphering the situation in relation to its historically 
intertwined dual Muslim and Western context. Instead, starting in 
autumn 2014, the emergence of IS led to the publication of a number of 
works on the group telling its inside story in isolation from those histories 
and contexts.12 As the (self-standing) ‘problem of ISIS’ took shape thus: 
the military-academic network was expanded to the military-academic-
terrorism-expert on this issue and, just as had been the case a decade 
earlier with Al Qaeda, the discussion remained explicitly about mapping 
the defeat of a repellent entity bent on annihilation of the West. When 
present in the analysis, the entanglement of domestic and foreign was 
confined to matters of ‘failed policies’ (in Washington or in Baghdad) 
or of dangers of the spillover of these actors (coming to attack Fortress 
West or returning as ‘foreign fighters’). Commentators in Western 
mainstream media oscillated between the appearance of objectivity and 
the knowingness of the corporate-driven culture of sensationalism, and 
moved ever closely to giving voice solely to the sentiments of an irate 
and frightened public rather than offering sober and contextualised 
analysis, while all the time stressing the religion of the assailants. In time 
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the problem emerged thus: to understand Western terrorists of the 1970s 
such as the German Red Army Faction or the Italian Red Brigades, one 
is invited to examine the societal conditions of post-war Germany and 
Italy, the ambient malaise in these countries 25 years after Nazism and 
fascism, and their relationship with their rebellious youth; to make sense 
of Al Qaeda or IS, one is asked to read the Qur’an.
Such voluntary matriculating in a school for the blind, as Tennessee 
Williams once put it poetically, is arresting and deserves emphasis as 
it is in effect a component of the problem at the root of the question 
of contemporary political violence. The public deployment of tokenism 
expertise on IS is itself a symptom of this lost analysis with at least 
four trends dominating the discourse on IS: impatient journalistic 
accounts, one-dimensional security expertise, ethereal Islamism 
exegesis and short-term think tank analysis. To varying degrees, these 
approaches share the following: the evidence used for the analysis is 
taken unquestionably from often unverifiable governmental statements; 
boastful statements by IS itself or ‘found’ documents are accepted 
at face value (one can only be amazed at the proclivity of these non-
documenting-inclined groups to produce compulsively and lose 
regularly such materials, and indeed at the luck of the counter-terrorists 
in systematically recovering readable self-explanatory materials13); 
emotionalism is worn on the sleeve by analysts who are expected to be 
detached; sensationalism is the mode of communication; and analysis 
knows only two directions, that of rise or fall, victory or defeat, new 
or old. Who’s-up-and-who’s-down scorekeeping accounts of the rise 
of IS are, however, not sufficient to make sense of the incubating, 
asynchronous and dysrhythmic transformation of terrorism taking place 
at the hands of this group. Such ‘rise’ talk also locates explanations of 
violence in the stance of the Western observer who, atop the hill, scans 
the landscape for threats to his dominion. Can the subaltern restrategise 
his or her violence? If he or she actually does, and visits it upon the 
Westerner’s living room, as IS did in the extreme, then surely that larger 
shift in meaning is happening factually. Yet, time and again, willy-nilly, 
analysts and experts take us down the self-satisfied road of elevation 
of religious theatrics or demonisation of identity, with the ways of the 
homo islamicus observed with a magnifying glass, from Raqqa to the 
French suburbs. What matters is solely the materialisation of a religion- 
and identity-driven problem that needs to be seen as disappearing as 
soon as possible. The more this story proceeded monotonically, the 
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more its intellectual contradictions became visible as a matter of political 
violence dealt with minimally and peripherally by historians, political 
scientists and sociologists. In effect, media vigilantism, terrorism expert 
pronouncements and condescending interrogations of Islam and its 
long-awaited aggiornamento have joined hands to produce a non-history 
of one of the dominant forms of contemporary non-state violence.
Locating uncritically, the violence of IS in the religious mantle of the 
movement was the first and often only choice made by many observers. 
No matter how many facts piled up to demonstrate the political nature 
of the violence and the relevance of wider contexts (colonialism, post-
colonialism, interventionism, authoritarianism, rebellion, armed 
conflicts), Muslim studies, or rather studies of Muslims, invariably 
remained the preferred locus of alleged explanation. This rising 
Muslimology (often with roots in works such as Raphael Patai’s racist 
1973 book The Arab Mind) took Orientalism to new dimensions. Beyond 
the imagined Muslim and the extrapolated ins and outs of Islamist 
jurisprudence (what Irfan Ahmad calls ‘an over-legalisation of Islam and 
Shari’a’14) came two new categories: the reformed Muslim and the faux 
Muslim (and so inevitably too the Uncle Tom Muslim). Stunned in this 
way, or allowing themselves to be, international scholars were made to 
understand that thinking on Al Qaeda and IS should be limited to those 
exercises of dutifully, one-dimensionally compiling information and data 
demonstrating the group’s violence, irrationality and dangerousness. Any 
effort to map the groups’ historical significance beyond those confines ran 
the risk of being depicted as an exercise in political thinking – a peculiar 
value-judgement, we should note, seldom applied to work on other 
questions of international affairs. Engagement with the issue beyond 
these given narratives is often near-unrecognisable to many mainstream 
journalists (who need to translate it in the by-now-familiar vernacular 
of reporting on these entities as variably ‘on the rise’, ‘on the retreat’, 
‘adopting new tactics’, ‘developing new ways to finance themselves’, 
‘kidnapping sexual slaves’, ‘using human shields’, ‘expanding foothold’, 
etc.) and stigmatised intellectually or deemed controversial. Soon enough 
coloured as ‘angry’ (particularly if it is voiced from the South), critical 
analyses are next asked to offer solutions, lest their usefulness be lessened. 
Skip the diagnosis (we know it) – solutions please.15 Indeed, if formulated 
– justice, state-building, international reciprocity – these are dismissed 
as unrealistic; the religion of pragmatism overtaking the discussion. Yet 
such side-stepping pronouncements are precisely the reproduction of a 
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controlled process emptying the violence of its meaning and therefore 
enabling its circularity. Evidently ethnocentric and a sleight of hand, such 
disciplining of terrorism and of Muslims is spread paradigmatically, as a 
world religion then becomes regarded as being held by predicaments;16 
trapped, it has to reconcile so as to exit its violence and backwardness, or 
so goes the reading. The narrative next becomes a self-fulfilling reality, 
and watching stories about Muslims and their ‘inclination to terrorism’ 
unpacked by talk-show hosts (such as Bill Maher17), citizens start taking 
matters into their vigilante-like hands and ordering flight attendants to 
de-board individuals deemed ‘suspicious’, or because they feel ‘ill at ease’ 
sitting next to them. As these dispositions are ultimately endorsed in 
official and private business regulations, as they were with the Donald 
Trump administration’s 2017 Muslim ban, the international system drifts 
into irrationality, perpetuating injustice and fuelling the very violence 
it seeks to end. In that context, work on IS is expected to be solely of 
the niche technocratic terrorism expertise kind. Such disciplining of 
political violence away from its political anchoring and into terrorism 
per se has, as noted, produced a form of anti-knowledge.18 Consequently, 
any political militancy or social dissidence that turns violent runs the risk 
of earning the label ‘terrorism’;19 becoming an open-and-shut matter of 
delegitimation, as the assignment of that term ensures the non-discussion 
of the issues raised by the given group. 
The literature on IS is thus dominated by the following recurring 
phraseology: abhorrent, barbaric, threatening, chaoplexic, brutal, savage 
and apocalyptic. Introduced forcefully post-9/11, the terms became 
part of a repertoire dusted off regularly post-Paris, post-Brussels, 
post-Berlin and post-Manchester with each new attack. Foundationally, 
President George W. Bush spoke of the 9/11 attackers as ‘heirs of the 
murderous ideologies of the twentieth century … fascism, Nazism and 
totalitarianism’. Such terminology is indulged without the audience 
learning anything fundamentally new or specific about groups depicted 
as atavistic evil; a species that warrants extermination. These narratives 
have in effect dehistoricised what IS and Al Qaeda represent. Instead, 
the perspectives unpack the nature of the Islamist extremist groups in 
ways that exceptionalise their violence as unique and uniquely evil. The 
criminal sexual exploitation and rape of women captured by IS is, for 
instance, called by one author a specific ‘theology of rape’.20 The crime 
of rape is not sufficient as a category of depiction and must be elevated 
to an additional actor-specific Islamist dimension. Such productions 
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are unscientific, as they are formulaic and seek to allay public fears and 
accompany policy formulation artefactually. The pantomime of stylised 
rituals and storytelling about IS partakes, more importantly, of the 
making of a neo-imperial culture that ascribes irrational barbarity to 
political extreme violence so as to avoid addressing the reasons for that 
violence’s recurrence. With each new attack, the same set of arguments 
is restated tirelessly to establish authoritatively the apocalyptic nature of 
the actor. Arguing that we are missing the point if we delve too much 
into history, such instantly catchy analyses decouple the actors from their 
context to endow them with a maximal dangerousness underwritten by 
an unshakeably evil character displayed by these super-predators. The 
result is not so much advancement of knowledge but emotional release 
and ethical pronouncement. 
The narratives are also provided with grounding through repeated 
references to alleged documents exposing the groups’ cult-like demonic 
ways that would have been produced and read dutifully by all these violent 
actors around the world. In the 2000s, that influence was attributed to the 
Syrian radical Islamist ideologue Mustapha bin Abd al Qadir Setmariam 
Nasar, known as Abu Mus’ab al Suri, who had authored the book Da’wat al 
Muqawama al Islamiya al ‘Alamiya (The Global Islamic Resistance Call). A 
decade later, another book, Idarat al Tawahoush: Akhtar Marhala satamour 
biha al Umma (The Management of Savagery: The Most Dangerous Phase 
the Umma will go Through), written by the Al Qaeda senior operator 
Mohammed Khalil al Hukayma, known as Abu Bakr Naji, was alleged to 
be the primary inspiration for the violent ways of IS. Besides the fact that 
such actors would, in effect (in the latter case), be referring to themselves 
as ‘savages’ (wuhush), or contradictorily praising savagery while claiming 
‘noble’ religious aims, such non-demonstrated alleged inspiration 
proceeds very much from a Mein Kampf-influenced, Western-centric 
perspective, locating agency in a discrete document/actor/ideology whose 
evil nature can then be referred to as a stand-alone reason for the violence 
observed, and thereby excise the political and historical components out 
of that equation. This approach also ends up presenting IS in terms of 
a homogeneity impacted by a single ideology, when again there is no 
evidence to that effect. Indeed, it is arguably quite the opposite, with IS 
fielding a system of continuities and ruptures under a dominant trait of 
hybridity. This is because IS dwells continuously in fluidity: emerging 
from a mutated scene (the emergence of self-empowering militarised 
Islamism in the 1980s and 1990s) it has gone into a further transformed 
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one (the global expansion and atomisation of the transnational groups 
in the 2000s and 2010s). The under-theorisation of IS is then the 
continuation of the under-conceptualisation of Al Qaeda, and treating 
IS as an already-settled question has led to unsatisfactory responses to 
the group’s bewildering actions. The cementing of that pattern is also 
indicative of given narratives, which in classical Orientalising fashion 
claim to know and represent the actor better than himself. A canon of 
Al Qaeda- and IS-customised terrorology is now available and can be 
consulted by students seeking to study these groups. To this can be added 
a latter-day ‘jihadology’ built primarily by a younger group tweeting 
insight (responses to the group on that front have ranged from declaring 
digital war on it to satirising it, as does The Bigh Daddy Show – a series 
of short cartoon videos launched online in July 2016). There is, overall, 
a distinct and by now recognisable one-dimensionalisation of the issues 
that is present in all these works that study ‘ISIS’, merely as an object 
of curiosity, a zoo-located thing that is at once exciting to observe and 
dangerous to touch.
One route to remedying those shortcomings is to upgrade the presence 
of alternative histories, and reintroduce a thoroughgoing political history 
perspective on the question of violence. As noted, thinking about IS 
itself has been led by security-driven Western-centric approaches and 
derivative paradigms gone global (as many think tanks and security 
experts in the South faithfully reproduce those perspectives on their 
own societies). Specifically, what is missed by such readings is the central 
notion that IS functions inherently at multiple levels, and that therefore 
the security lens can only inform on one aspect. At a first level, IS is but 
the continuation of the Al Qaeda saga; formed in its womb, once part of 
its fold and in time seeking to replace it, it does not escape echoing in its 
midst the self-capacitating militarised radical Islamism logic that presided 
over the birth of Al Qaeda and its 1995–2005 heyday. At a second level, 
IS is the result of the societal degeneration of Iraq following the 2003 
US invasion and the large-scale and unceasing brutality that overtook 
that country. Under that same dimension, the group is the result of the 
situation in Syria after 2011, with leaders of IS capitalising on the civil 
war in that neighbouring country to reboot their Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) 
franchise of Al Qaeda into a new, battle-hardened entity also made up 
of the remnants of Saddam Hussein’s military and secular Ba’ath party, 
able to move on two territories and fold them into a larger and more 
ambitious strategy. Finally, at a third level, IS is a global phenomenon 
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whereby some 25,000 to 30,000 individuals (including teenage girls and 
whole families) have flocked to the territory the group controlled in the 
Levant to join this project. The sum total of this construction yields a 
group that must be understood first and foremost in relation to different 
levels and to its epoch. This transformation reveals a matrix of the new 
groups around the world that increasingly behave in such a mode – now 
local, now transnational, all the time repositioning and adapting to 
dynamics of post-globalisation. The absence of a clinical analysis of these 
actors is also an indication of a consequential normative dissociation. 
The removing of the political is a prelude to the acceptability of the 
forceful response, with management techniques rather than knowledge 
and scientific inquiry as a sheet-anchor. This has produced a demand for 
quick solutions, the search for a single response in the face of complexity 
and the constant staging of dichotomous thought applied to anything 
labelled terrorism. From CNN’s Crossfire in the 1990s to RT’s Crosstalk 
in the 2010s, by way of Al Jazeera’s Al Itijah al Mu’akiss in the 2000s and 
the totality of Fox News’ style of reporting, the simplification of current 
affairs to essentialised viewpoints has become a problematic trademark 
that migrated logically to the discussion on IS once the group appeared. 
In effect, IS could not be understood any differently once the Al Qaeda 
demo had been circulated successfully. As a result of such international 
affairs’ socialisation-in-the-making, many policymakers and students 
increasingly approach foreign matters with impatience for history and 
for multilayered and ambiguous phenomena. Instead, they readily search 
‘quick fixes’, ‘overarching concepts’, ‘lead factors’, ‘so-what’s-the-answers’, 
‘cut-to-the-chases’ and ‘bottom lines’. Shortcuts of this type can hardly 
provide helpful – much less valid – responses to the arresting mutation of 
violence playing in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. ‘They 
may have known the plot and salient details of Joseph Conrad’s Heart of 
Darkness, but they were unable to tell you why the story was important’, 
as Chris Hedges remarked about the examination of imperial darkness 
being lost on contemporary students. This is arguably because, as Philip 
Roth noted, ‘when everything is requisitioned for the cause, there is no 
room for … history or science … that is seriously undertaken’.21
Why then did terrorism become war? Why was that war declared 
‘global’, and then ‘long’? The ‘intrinsic endlessness’22 of the GWOT, 
redubbed the ‘Long War’ since 2006, was indeed an indication of its 
downloaded nature as a power exercise, and the pre-determinacy of 
these answers allowing pertinent questions to be avoided. The neglected 
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dimension of the IS discussion is the political one and the historical one. As 
Des Freedman writes: 
It’s worth asking what the point is of 24/7 reporting of terror attacks. 
Is it to provide blanket coverage of despair and horror, which is what 
the attackers are said to want? Is it to construct a ‘national sentiment’, 
to lay the basis for further securitisation? Or should it be to provide 
explanation – or at least some degree of context – to help people 
understand the political circumstances in which terror thrives? This 
last is the approach that is largely missing from the deluge of coverage, 
and is often dismissed as somehow apologising for acts of terror. But 
without a recognition of geopolitical dynamics and recent Western 
military intervention overseas terror attacks come to be seen as entirely 
mysterious, spectral events.23
The straight-jacketing of the terrorism discussion evidences a larger 
problem of the paternalism, chauvinism and Orientalism that sit atop 
security discussions of issues playing out in the Middle East and North 
Africa, and the wider Muslim world and sub-Saharan Africa. It is not 
yet fathomable to many that, beyond the threat conceptualisation, a 
development outside of the West may be able to transform the nature 
of international order, wrestling agency of these matters away from the 
‘centre’ and to the ‘periphery’ (concepts that are themselves problematic).24 
The result of the dominant cultural cantonisation of terrorism is that, at a 
point, it is no longer necessary even to describe or establish the Islamist 
groups’ alleged relationship to a given terrorist event – simply stating it does 
the trick performatively and ubiquitously.25 As Michael Bathia remarks 
about the terrorism phraseology, ‘once assigned, the power of a name is 
such that the process by which the name was selected generally disappears 
and a series of normative associations, motives and characteristics are 
attached to the named’.26 This has been perfected with IS and before that 
with Al Qaeda. Isolated, terrorism is boxed-in reflexively and solely with 
radical Islamism. Such objectification is then unpacked as regards a single 
leading (Islamist) terrorism actor. Discussion of IS takes place in that 
context per an exceptionalising of the ‘barbaric’ violence that plays out in 
such ‘perennially troubled’ spots such as the Middle East. Yet, many who 
are shocked today at the trouble, violence, vengeance, revenge on women 
and children, physical destruction, chaos, thirst for blood and ethnic 
cleansing forget that these are precisely the ills that, for instance, played 
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out in the heart of Europe a few decades ago in the aftermath of World 
War II.27 Properly reading IS is not, however, solely about de-Westernising 
its construct or reminding ourselves of forgotten histories of violence 
elsewhere. Local representations of IS have been equally problematic. 
There, the overall problem is at least twofold. On the one hand, as noted, 
authoritarian states play the terrorism card very well, gaming fragility 
and modulating assistance requests to keep Washington, London and 
Paris constantly in need of their guardianship of these troubled spots from 
where danger brews and swarms against the Western fortress. On the 
other hand, Arab and Muslim conspiracy-minded analysts constantly 
seek answers to the self-serving and misleading questions ‘Who created 
IS?’ and ‘Who created Al Qaeda?’, invariably pointing to the US Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), and in so doing stripping non-state actors 
in their midst of violent agency and contradictorily handing the keys of 
their own history to those imperialists or former colonialists they readily 
denounce. (A revealing moment in the unrestrained instrumentalisation 
of the meaning of IS took place in August 2016, when the leader of the 
Lebanese group Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, echoed US presidential 
candidate Donald Trump’s words that US President Barack Obama was 
‘the leader of IS’.)
Following Edward Said, the literature on Al Qaeda and IS of the past 
20 years can today already be assessed as mostly neo-Orientalist, for just 
as the original nineteenth-century Orientalism was not merely an ex post 
facto rationalisation of colonialism but worked to justify it in parallel, 
the current wave of commentary about ‘Al Qaeda/IS’ serves to normalise 
the acceptance of a narrative that depicts these groups as enemies of 
humanity beyond the pale, foes who need only be exterminated because 
of who they are culturally and religiously, eschewing or minimising larger 
political dynamics and context. The silences in the terrorism text are, 
however, the text – a culturalist, inconsistent and exceptionalist one. What 
has to be left behind at this end-of-the-2010s stage is what has played out 
problematically in the first quarter of the twenty-first century, and which 
Hamid Dabashi captures crisply: 
The recodification of racism … whereby the Jew became the Muslim 
and the Black the brown (or Arab, in a colour-coded register) was 
predicated on a fundamental logical flaw, whereby the criminal acts of 
a band of militant Muslim adventurers was … identified as definitive 
to a world religion and called ‘Islamic Terrorism’. Islam is a world 
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religion; terrorism is a political act, indiscriminately targeting civilian 
populations – examples of which in modern history include the Irgun 
in Palestine, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, the Janjaweed in Darfur. 
The events of 9/11 and other similar incidents are sporadic criminal 
acts – conditioned, of course, by wanton American imperialism around 
the globe.28
The building up of IS as an all-purpose jack-in-the-box and jack of all 
trades allows the disappearance of the political question. It is time to, in 
turn, decouple the respective yet related history of IS and of Al Qaeda 
from the security and securitisation narrative they have been captive to. 
Relocating those histories in a context beyond these tested confines is no 
easy task, so entrenched has that narrative become. Such intellectually 
disobedient rupture can help establish a richer genealogy of the non-state 
armed groups currently projecting themselves beyond states, borders 
and societies. The pluriversal, forward-moving radical project of IS as 
a twenty-first century tech-savvy producer of post-modern globalised 
violence cannot be accounted for by zombie explanations that proceed 
from the hermetic sheet-anchors of Orientalism and securitisation. The 
obvious extreme violence of the group has been used as an easy bulwark 
against asking the larger and pertinent questions regarding why such 
violence has been used and what attempted legitimacy is being pursued.29 
These questions start against an invisible background.
The issue of IS – and that of Al Qaeda before it – is located in the context 
of a riverbed of long-racialised international relations and a larger issue 
of understudied, non-Western insecurities. By the time the discussion of 
‘anarchy’ and ‘intervention’ had gathered steam in the 1990s and was then 
followed in the 2000s by the emergence of the neo-imperial security state, 
discourse about terrorism had already began settling down immutably in 
its negation of the political nature of the questions at the source of the 
manifested violence.30 To open the Pandora’s box of the political nature of 
terrorism instead of dutifully implementing the discourse about identity 
and religion is therefore, by now, to disturb a cemented power sequence. 
As the issues played out towards the 2020s horizon, they were then both 
the culmination of a pre-existing sequence morphing into its crucial 
next stage, and the enabling of a revisionist examination of colonial 
domination whereby that experience was now presented with aplomb as 
benign and orderly – and therefore, in new ways, they irrevocably needed 
to halt things such as Al Qaeda and IS.31 As the two groups emerged amid 
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that dissociation, there has been no genuine erosion of the earlier colonial 
mindset that had presided over the setting up of international relations in 
the early twentieth century.32 Accordingly, the rising groups were looked 
upon logically as evil in the same manner that rebels had been under 
the colonial configuration. Facilitated by the groups’ resort to extreme 
violence, that delegitimation conveys larger dimensions that take us back 
to both the colonial era and the birth of international relations as we have 
come to know them, study and teach them, practice them and all along 
accept their skewed, incestuous framework fatalistically and uncritically.
The (important) study of what IS is must be wrestled from the 
hijacking it has suffered at the hands of reductionist, a-historical and 
culturally chauvinist33 accounts. Tellingly, ‘security’, ‘the international 
community’ and ‘terrorism’ are, in this context, too often coded words 
for an asymmetrical architecture of interaction among nations, terms 
whose nature escapes fundamental questioning and, for now, the 
possibility of redefinition. Security for whom? Threat by whom? Who 
is included empirically in that international community led arbitrarily 
by a group of five self-appointed countries at the outcome of a conflict 
in Europe 70 years ago? What is considered terrorism in a context that 
in effect does not acknowledge state terrorism, except when performed 
by ‘rogue’ nations? As it paradoxically hardens under each new assault, 
this obsolete stucco construction (which gives more formal power to 
France than Germany, Brazil, India or Indonesia) evades the fundamental 
questions about the nature of the order. At the heart of this praxis and 
discourse, however, stands the gnawing question of conflict and political 
violence, which we can also subsume under the generic term of ‘war’. Yet 
the very nature of what that war is (not the one on terrorism), a form of 
counter-violence emerging reactively from the South, has equally been 
hijacked. As Tarak Barkawi notes: ‘The problem is not that the Global 
South and its conflicts are ignored. It is that European histories of war 
provide the (provincial) basis for the putatively universal concepts 
and definitions with which we study war in both the Global South and 
North.’34 The question of IS clearly raises wider questions about the 
current configuration of international affairs, which, as noted, in turn 
highlight the issue of their genesis. Specifically, two problems arise: one 
grammatical, the other behavioural. First, international relations have 
been structured around the pre-eminence of the state and of Western 
discourse about statehood and the nation state. State-initiated, state-
defined, state-owned, state-monitored, state-centric and state-led, 
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international relations as they emerged a century or so ago moved to 
negate all action in the international sphere of that which is not the state, 
or that which is not somehow derivative from that construct. To the 
extent that the then-largely colonised countries of the Global South were 
still undergoing a process of nation formation and state-building, these 
sectors of the world were therefore de facto and de jure excluded from this 
determination, except as objects of that power (e.g. the scramble for Africa, 
the Sykes–Picot treaty). The second difficulty proceeds from the fact 
that, contrary to the narrative given in the now-dominant international 
relations, the previous direct control by major Western powers of most 
of the world was in effect not disappeared after World War II but merely 
reconfigured. The crucial 1940s–1970s period can then be read as one 
in which the different but combined challenge of now-restless colonies 
– in parallel discontent with systemically segregated communities in the 
North, such as African Americans in the US – led to political concessions 
known as decolonisation, which in turn paved the way, 30 years later, 
for global norms such as human rights, global governance and human 
security. At the heart of this sequence, and its unexamined impact on the 
genesis of our mapping of contemporary terrorism, stand the twin pillars 
of racism and dispossession – underwritten by a invisibilised practice 
and sidelined discourse on these issues.35 In The Silent War (1998), Frank 
Furedi addressed the place of race in international relations, arguing that 
the silencing of Western direct colonial control practices was in effect 
tactical and reactive. Racism, which is eminently about control, is then 
among the unspoken elements of the current discussion of that political 
violence known as terrorism and of the groups such as IS that manifested 
it much later on – as seen in the nature of the acts performed to counter 
it, and which often took the form of a dehumanisation that correlated 
with those earlier colonial cultural constructs (see Chapter 2). The over-
elaboration of the terrorism concept in recent years in terrorology, or 
its hollowing out in security studies, are but related ways of escaping 
its primary political driver, namely the stealth racialisation of terrorism 
throughout the past decades, and specifically as regards Islam and the Al 
Qaeda and IS episodes.
To be certain, the discussion of IS sits amid a larger discussion 
where scholarship on issues of national security is complex if one is to 
pursue objective, empirically verifiable truth.36 However, racism itself 
sits – unquestioned – at the heart of that discussion on IS, with the 
violence beamed at Europeans and Americans considered exceptionally 
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unacceptable and particularly heinous; elevated to a stand-alone 
dangerousness, not because of what it is but because of whom it dares 
target. As Philip Lawrence writes: ‘A central element in the real culture of 
modern societies has been racism, and in warfare racism has been crucial 
to generating images of the enemy which justify acute forms of violence … 
[T]his fact is one that is still found to be discomforting and shocking. The 
real racist and imperialist history of Western countries is inconvenient 
to current forms of self-satisfaction.’37 Against that background, the type 
of war that has been practiced since the Napoleonic Wars has worked 
on two standards. The distant killing of the savage was decoupled from 
liberal war reserved for the players in the same club, and made subject to 
international humanitarian law. With violence now shipped back to the 
metropolis courtesy of IS’s avatars, the understanding of that violence of 
the savage has become boxed into a discussion on terrorism that strips it 
of its political nature and moves to discuss anthropologically the Muslim, 
Arab, Brown, Black or Southern perpetrator and the scriptures of their 
nominal religion.
The reification of IS in this racialised manner is linked to the long 
practice of a specific (colonially informed) tradition of power by (Western) 
states and their understanding of external and internal dominion. When 
codified, new war was tilted towards states, particularly powerful ones. 
Indeed, the rules introducing humanity into warfare in the late nineteenth 
century through the early treaties on the laws of war had consistently 
served the already-stronger party of an invading state in unequal wars.38 
This – indeed any – discourse on terrorism ‘carries power … and 
strategically orients a broad set of practices – inflicting punishment, 
disciplining, surveilling’.39 Therefore, bringing colonialism back into the 
terrorism discussion allows for a historicised reconnecting of geopolitics 
and domestic politics. That connection was there in the 1970s (see Chapter 
4), and it came back with acuity and innovation in the 2010s. Having 
been brushed off, their relevance in the security discussion dismissed, 
the ‘C’ and ‘I’ words tend, however, to be generally received with a sense 
of fatigue, as both colonialism and imperialism are widely considered to 
be things of the past. The ‘serious’ policy reader disconnects the moment 
these words are uttered. However, ‘the colonial empires have come to an 
end, all regions of the world have been thoroughly integrated into a global 
economy and a veritable cornucopia of institutions and organisations is 
now dedicated to upholding a dazzling array of human rights. Yet, while 
some things have changed, certain fundamental parameters remain in 
introduction . 21
place, and the unpleasant past described by Conrad continues to haunt the 
present.’40 One of the signs of this important continuity is the systematic 
delegitimising of the counter-violence of the savage that is always shown 
to be solely destructive (and therefore only in need of destruction in turn). 
IS operators, like those of Al Qaeda earlier, are presented as being ‘more 
interested in the spectacle of destruction, in violence for its own sake’.41 
Though it played out in more complex ways than such one-dimensional 
assessments (see Chapter 2), the opposition between the two sides is 
then presented in a Manichean way as that of rationality vs. irrationality, 
calm vs. hysteria, reason vs. emotion and civilisation vs. savagery. ‘Fatally 
interconnected, war and racism fuel each other. Racism feeds war’s 
atrocities, offering us a perverse permission to punish demonised others 
not so much for their actions as for their difference. War, in turn, support’s 
racism’s most dangerous assumptions about that difference, urging that 
our best hope for security lies in eradicating it in any of its guises ... thus 
we generate the very hatred we most resent.’42 Ultimately, as Julian Saurin 
remarks on the larger question connected here to terrorism: ‘[T]he 
problem of decolonising [international relations] will not be resolved by 
ever-greater sensitivity to the multiple histories that are demanded by the 
postcolonial turn in historical and cultural studies – though one can never 
be too intrigued by the varieties of experience and representation. Instead, 
it requires a re-engagement with method, philosophy of science and history 
on the one hand and a political economy of knowledge on the other.’43 
Such historicised methodological re-engagement with international 
relations calls for a refocus on the question of racism and how it impacts 
the current politics of violence.
While I want to insist that IS is a radical Islamist group that takes its 
religious project seriously (more so, for instance, than the Sahelian entity 
AQIM or the West African group Boko Haram, or even the East African 
organisation Al Shabaab), I suggest that (i) such mise-en-scène religious 
self-representation is not sufficient analytically, and that (ii) writing on 
IS against the background of a deeper history that escapes the extreme 
Islamism frame and in the context of open-ended political and societal 
developments in both the Global South and the West allows us to answer 
more fully the larger contemporary questions posed by the movement. Al 
Qaeda reconnected the history of terrorism with the nineteenth-century 
Anarchists. Both were modernity-ushering entities, but IS moves beyond 
that by pointing to the limits of the state, and it does so not by sitting at 
the periphery of world politics but by acting precisely at its centre. Indeed, 
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the new group sought actively to locate itself at that core by attacking 
Paris, London and Brussels, not by remaining concerned solely with 
its management of the cities it had gained control of in Iraq and Syria, 
notably Mosul and Raqqa. IS was also aloof with regard to its domestic 
community, with the so-called enabling environment arguably not key 
as it visited massive violence on those populations it dominated in Iraq 
and Syria. The threatening nature of IS lies, then, not so much in its 
violence (terroristic and obvious) but in the nature of the counter-order it 
is claiming to uphold. The post-modernity it is representing lies at once in 
that aspect, as well as in the pursuit of a state-building logic combined with 
a disseminated appeal to empowered individuals (through both personal 
authority and community roles). The disruption it is introducing in the 
system comes from the symmetrical relationship between the certainty of 
its aims and the uncertainty it reveals on the part of its state enemies (with 
the intelligibility of its political aims more often than not clear to its state 
enemies who nonetheless disingenuously paint them publicly as elusive). 
Ultimately, however, the theoretical underpinnings of the non-mapping 
of IS, and its dominant representation as an apocalyptic movement 
devoid of any political logic that is only meant to be addressed through 
eradication, have their roots in a continuing imperial sequence which 
started in the nineteenth century. Whether on the liberal or conservative 
wings of the political spectrum, many producers and influencers of ideas 
about terrorism have developed a stance whereby the larger production 
of violence in the South is depicted relatedly as impenetrable.
Genealogies of New Violence
If racialist articulations of international relations continued apace, 
normalised and naturalised throughout the modern era (with liberalism 
playing a foundational part in this process),44 the recodification of 
violence at the hands of IS constitutes in and of itself a sea change in the 
history of political violence. Since the early days of modern terrorism, we 
have been accustomed to thinking about the phenomenon in terms of 
sub-state agents. Today, the commodification of the means of syncopated 
warfare by privatised actors on to a global scene and for local purposes, 
constitutes the projection of a new entrepreneurship of independent 
politics and violence. At the dawn of this transformation, we find the 
movements of the 1970s, which were the first to move towards violently 
infiltrating untapped spaces of contestation beyond the underground 
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logic of nineteenth-century Anarchists and Nihilists. In that sense, IS’s 
story is influenced less by the declamatory religious aims of its leaders, but 
more so by the operational wherewithal and rerouted violence dynamics 
introduced by movements such as the Palestinian fedayeen (themselves 
non-religious, indeed mostly secular) during the pivotal years of 1967–75. 
The increased power of those synergistic non-state agents, their expansion 
into and navigation of worldwide revolutionary networks, the counter-
terrorism techniques they inspired and their impact on the post-Cold 
War global security architecture45 preside over what, behaviourally, both 
Al Qaeda and IS would later engage in. This evolution also partakes of a 
historical trajectory that warrants open-ended examination. Of this Ayşe 
Zarakol writes: ‘Increasingly, the international system as a whole becomes 
the subject of revolutionary ire. This is why, with each subsequent wave 
of terrorism since the nineteenth century (and with each expansion of 
the international society), system-threatening variants of terrorism have 
made a stronger comeback, each time less willing to compromise with 
principles of Westphalian legitimacy.’46
In this context what, then, is the genealogy of the violence embarked 
on by Osama Bin Laden in 1989 and pursued by Abu Bakr al Baghdadi 
in 2009? In a nutshell, their brand of post-globalised violence can be 
depicted as having emerged from the more distant colonial experience 
and the subsequent post-colonial one. Those experiences stand at 
the heart of the modern world the radical groups inhabit. From this 
perspective, decolonisation in particular was but a moment, and the 
violence it dealt with was never settled. In this unstable architecture are 
to be found large segments of what drives the subsequent violence visited 
upon societies in the North and in the South by these new armed groups. 
Whereas decolonisation is usually understood as a site-specific event that, 
in fixity and resolution, gave rise to the norm-regulated contemporary 
international system, one can read it differently – particularly as it relates 
to the now-shifting locus of violence. In the pages that follow, we will 
examine the origins and development of IS, starting with its mother 
organisation, Al Qaeda. We will also, more importantly, seek to engage 
with a so-far-absent theory of transnational political violence and invite a 
different type of debate on IS. Ultimately, the recounting of the IS-specific 
story is but a chapter in that ongoing story-in-the-making of a new/old 
type of violence which, it is argued here, is redrawing the boundaries 
of what international politics will increasingly come to mean in the 
twenty-first century. In that sense, the transnational violence introduced 
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by Al Qaeda and IS is not merely a set of disruptive challenges to an 
international system that would have somehow to weather them.47 That is 
no longer possible. The cementing of those pseudo-randomised patterns 
is already beginning to usher in an international system that is a collage of 
old patterns of colonial control projected imperially, and new promiscuous 
encounters at the heart of the post-modern metropolis, which are 
delocalising threats from the distant (and controllable and colonisable) to 
the internal (and unmanageable and colonising). Such embryonic organic 
repatriation of force is currently not visible to many in the West, who 
read terrorism primarily in terms of culturally, ethnically and religiously 
informed violence from specific alien communities threatening them. 
Will the fundamentals of the international system change as a result of 
this new interaction? Not necessarily. Authority, legality and coercion 
remain for the time being with the five permanent members of the United 
Nations (UN). However, the fluidity and release of the disseminated IS 
violence are not merely destabilising and chaos-inducing; they are also 
transformative de facto. More importantly, these characteristics spring 
from a continued reappropriation of the vectors of imperial power. As 
such, their violence is increasingly less derivative and more intrinsic 
to the empire itself. Two ideas of this entrepreneurship also need to be 
addressed. The first is that the IS brand of asymmetry is not defensive 
but offensive. It is not the classical emaciated asymmetry of the weak, but 
rather of the one-seeking-to-rise-to-prominence and endowing himself 
with the extreme ways to do so. Second, IS is, if anything, martial and 
political. Its violence is calculatedly and opportunistically transgressive. 
It beheads (to scare and pressure) just as a state chooses to drop an atomic 
bomb (to intimidate and inhibit). 
In the closing years of the twentieth century and the inception of this 
current century, a critical international security challenge was thrown 
to Western powers. The reaction of those states created the conditions 
of a renewed martiality in international affairs, as explicit calls for 
colonialism in response to terrorism were formulated.48 This founding 
to and fro in turn reinforced the non-state challengers in their belief that 
their violence project was viable, which they then pursued with newfound 
vigour and dramatically augmented lethality. With no real evidence to 
that effect, these insurgent actors became increasingly confident in their 
ability to secure results and effect change. From hopeful to impactful, 
as they portrayed themselves assertively, the self-empowerment of these 
irregulars was nonetheless de facto ascendant, striking the minds of 
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thousands of so-called foreign fighters around the world and, as such, 
benefited greatly from its era’s fetishisation of individual achievement. 
The imagology and connectography of IS places the three dimensions of 
post-colonialism, post-globalisation and post-modernity into a seamless 
narrative with the political discourse and violent actions of IS, which is 
ever-moving on these three planes. If the backstory of IS is Al Qaeda, and 
its frontstory Iraq and Syria, its sidestory is post-colonialism and post-
modernity. In the post-colonial phase, war conducted by Western powers 
was recodified, and it increasingly invisibilised the actions conducted by 
the major powers. The ‘secret wars’ of the 1980s gave way to the ‘dirty 
wars’ of the 2010s, both invisible and all the time playing out far away 
from the metropolis.49 In response, the new armed groups developed 
precisely the opposite, namely an über-visible type of war that would be 
conducted completely in the open and at the heart of the Western capital. 
Modernity was to be disseminated further by the non-state in such a 
fashion (in that sense, IS’s post-modernism should not be mistaken for a 
defence of modernity but could rather also be anti-modern, as a modern 
alternative mode of organisation and contestation). We then witnessed 
the reappropriation of war as it was wrestled from the West – initially by 
Al Qaeda from Arab and Muslim governments, and then by IS. After 9/11, 
it was argued that ‘everything had changed’, including the very concept 
of international law and the recourse to force. With the emergence of 
IS, the same argument was made anew.50 The post-9/11 narrative was, 
however, anchored in a double exercise of denial. On the one hand, it 
rested on a refusal to examine the historical roots of the political violence 
performed by the radical Islamist groups beyond their religious identity. 
On the other, the narrative built a self-sustaining forward momentum, 
refusing to establish the links between the policies and reaction to that 
violence and its continuing nature. As a result, the perspective ended up 
witnessing the rise of a second-generation Al Qaeda, namely IS. That new 
group firmed up what Bin Laden did, writing the mythology of the future 
Iraqi and Syrian (and also Libyan) states and taking us into a post-post-
colonial era, where the question of control is reopened but in a different, 
loosened dominion. 
One of the most powerful myths of the twentieth century was the 
notion that the elimination of colonial administrations amounted to the 
actual decolonisation of the world. This led to the myth of a post-colonial 
world.51 We might ask today, as we link this construct to a discussion of 
IS, whether post-colonialism is still warranted as a category. Has it not 
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been surpassed by a more determinant combination of recolonialism and 
counter-colonialism? The very nature of the post-modern condition is 
based in a circular, violent empowerment of that sort. It is in this sense 
that we can inquire: how is it possible to see in post-modernity a challenge 
to modernity’s intellectual, moral and cultural mastery, while also seeing 
it as a means of exercising that mastery?52 The normalisation, banalisation 
and trivialisation of one-dimensional religious terrorism enabled a faulty 
casting away from these issues, precisely when upgraded scholarship was 
needed. We are therefore possibly at the dawn of a transcendence of the 
binaries centre/periphery, colonised/coloniser and dominated/dominator 
in international relations when it comes to political violence – and this, I 
argue, is seen in the nature and performance of IS violence that is at once 
born and performed in the South and in the West. The overarching and 
fundamental link between terrorism and history is demonstrated by the 
peak of terrorism at the inception of the modern era and its return today 
– all, again, in the context of empire.53 Often described as being opposed 
to modernity,54 IS operators are in point of fact eminently modern. 
Their post-modernity (which, as noted, can also be anti-modern) is 
expressed through decentring and through fragmentation; specifically 
the collapse of categories and resistive politics. And yet their referentials 
are of long ago (al khilafa) and their trigger colonial. Hence, the issues 
are located squarely in the post-colonial moment, whereby post-colony is 
understood, in Achille Mbembe’s terms, as a given historical trajectory – 
that of societies recently emerging from the experience of colonisation and 
the violence which the colonial relationship, par excellence, involves. The 
institutionalisation of derivative representations, and as Mbembe notes 
‘a particular way of fabricating simulacra or re-forming stereotypes’,55 led 
in time to a nascent shift embodied by the brethren IS. With the group’s 
violence featuring brotherhood prominently – actual (the Tsarnaevs 
in Boston, the Kouachis and the Abdeslams in Paris, the Bakraouis in 
Brussels, the Abedis in Manchester), forged or imagined – the links foster 
a promise of community on the basis of that trust that is often absent in 
the impersonal, Blade Runner-esque post-modern society.
The post-modernity of IS – ambivalent, impersonal and ambiguous 
– lies indeed in its self-generated ability to produce and reproduce the 
razzmatazz of its own grand community narrative, an artefact that is also the 
product of manifold micro-narratives about individual stories. Inspiration 
is packaged and the spectacle is cinematic, beamed continuously at the 
individual level of consumption and delivered in daily doses of video. 
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The staging of these transgressions is therefore linked by the group to 
the nature of the times and places its soldiery inhabits. Inasmuch as, by 
the measure of its market-driven demands, modernity is violence-driven, 
with the productive process requiring that a form of soft violence be done 
continuously to segments of society (expelled, rejected, marginalised, 
violated, remaining at the gates), the group connects forcefully with 
a narrative of resistance to such an intimately alienating process. The 
intensification of that sequence since the late twentieth century has led 
to more violent societies ushering the rise of what has been termed a 
savage century – a process IS stands squarely at the centre of today. In the 
context of the IS-dominated world representation, the purging of violence 
becomes a necessity; abroad, through increased new/old-style imperial 
conquest and at home through institutionally channelled, securitised and 
corporate-themed violence. In time, these two distant/local trends meet, 
as it is argued here. To be certain, the largely ethnic underclass lurking, 
zombie-like, in the recesses of the urban Western metropolis was always 
there, but it was envisioned to come out during end-of-the-world-type 
disasters; as expressed in paranoid ways in fictions such as the films The 
Omega Man (1971) or Escape from New York (1981). By contrast, the 
2013 film The Purge now imagines a not-so-distant future in America in 
which, once a year, during a twelve-hour period, any crime is legalised, 
including murder. The revealing success of the film led to two sequels in 
quick succession: The Purge: Anarchy (2014) and The Purge: Election Year 
(2015). ‘[W]hat is happening today, and developmentally, increases the 
possibility for violent discourse. It provides new venues for storytelling, 
myth-making and logical projections. It speaks to the collectivisation of 
individual risk and the creation of symbolic capital among those for whom 
economic capital is hard to come by. It revalidates ethnicity, religion, race, 
language and doctrinal, as ways of redeeming projects, discourses and 
their communities.’56 
The classical post-colonial practice of force was not, however, 
fully modern. Bent on addressing the violence of the coloniser, it was 
backward-looking and had adopted a historical purview on the Global 
South starting and often ending with the colonial era as its sole definer. 
In that sense, it could not be modern as it borrowed its identity and 
located its object of address-redress in the past and in another actor’s 
agency. The violence ushered in by Al Qaeda marked a first rupture 
with that mode of thinking, projecting itself forward and on to the West. 
With IS, the dynamic becomes fully post-modern, and indeed pivotally 
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more post-post-colonial. As noted, we are now in the early stages of the 
longer-term effects of this activity on international affairs. However, it is 
already clear that the rerouting of armed-group violence by Al Qaeda on 
to the international scene in the 1990s, that violence’s embedding into 
transnational patterns of (electronic, cultural, commercial, financial, 
military) exchange during the 2000s and its relocation at the heart of the 
Western metropolis by IS during the 2010s, have impacted profoundly on 
the ways in which political violence will play out from now on.
Theorising IS
Against the above considerations, this book critically interrogates 
the dominant representation of the organisation of IS and lays out an 
alternative argument about its deeper history, labyrinthine identity and 
multifaceted nature. A central concern of the work is the nature of the 
discussion on terrorism, the place IS (and before it Al Qaeda) occupies 
in that debate and the significance of these constructions for the larger 
international order. Specifically, the analysis advances the idea that, in 
the second decade of the twenty-first century, political violence evolved 
as a result of the cumulative revolutionary (as opposed to merely 
evolutionary) ways of Al Qaeda and IS. Diasporised, deregulated and 
dispersed in time and space, this process is visibly on its way towards 
having a lasting impact on the organisation and performance of violence 
in contemporary international affairs – not solely on the geopolitics of 
the regions in which the groups are active, the conflicts playing there or 
the generic security considerations as they relate to the rest of the world.
Tracing the ancestry of IS, Chapter 1 describes how, under the leadership 
of Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al Dhawahiri,57 the organisation known 
as Al Qaeda was set up in the late 1980s to launch a new type of war 
against the US, a country the group held responsible for the trouble 
in the Islamic world and the Middle East specifically. Forged in the 
cruible of the Afghan-Soviet War, this first group holds the key to the 
DNA of IS, as it introduced a particular type of transnational projection 
which IS subsequently amplified. In 1991, after the Gulf War, the battle 
between the US and Al Qaeda began to develop, accelerating in 1998 in 
Afghanistan following Al Qaeda’s attacks on the US embassies in Kenya 
and Tanzania, and emerging fully in 2001 after the 9/11 events, leading 
to a militarisation of the world amid which IS would be born. Similarly, 
as in the second phase of its history, Al Qaeda shifted to taking the form 
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of a decentralised entity, giving birth to so-called franchises – one of 
these offshoots, AQI, became the actual precursor to IS. Parcelling out 
its action, Al Qaeda retreated into Afghanistan and Pakistan (‘Afpak’), 
opening the door to a successor in Syria and Iraq (‘Syraq’) which would 
come from its own womb, AQI. The discussion highlights the fact that IS 
is the result of a project embarked on long ago by Bin Laden, dry-docked 
and soon enough displaced by IS while remaining lastingly coterminous 
with it in important ways.
Chapter 2 deepens the previous discussion by delving into the specifics 
of the key post-9/11 period in which the US’s forays in Afghanistan in 2001 
and especially in Iraq in 2003, following Al Qaeda’s ‘raid on Manhattan’ 
(as Al Qaeda depicts those terrorist attacks in its communication), opened 
the way for the further transformation of Al Qaeda and the maturation of 
its project, laying the ground to the actual emergence of IS after the death 
of AQI’s leader, Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi. It demonstrates that, if Al Qaeda’s 
birth-cry served as an initial propulsive force, IS is, second, in significant 
but neglected ways the product of the US’s policies in the Middle East 
and specifically the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the subsequent brutal 
neo-colonial occupation of that country.
Chapter 3 analyses the manner in which IS came to surpass its begetter, 
Al Qaeda, in ambition and in practice. Examining how AQI, led by Abu 
Bakr al Baghdadi, went on to design a two-pronged strategy to re-establish 
its power in Iraq, following the American withdrawal, and to expand in 
Syria in the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring and subsequent civil war in 
that country, the chapter argues that, thirdly, IS is the product of the 
conflict in Syria. Attention is paid to the ways in which IS diversified and 
transformed Al Qaeda’s project. As such, it is maintained that IS could have 
been a previous offering or a mere reissue of Al Qaeda. It was not, and its 
rebooting was, in that regard, deceptive. Bending the latter’s internal logic 
towards a focus on punishment, it also dramatically expanded the realm of 
its violence, taking it beyond Bin Laden’s democratisation of responsibility 
to a sort of indictment of innocence (domestically and internationally) as 
seen in the patterns of its distinctive personalised violence. The chapter 
also discusses another important change of perspective introduced by IS, 
namely the pursuit of state-building and involvement in regions beyond 
the Levant.
Finally, Chapter 4 dissects the cognitively enhanced, trenchantly 
cadenced and intricately professionalised communication of IS, and the 
group’s incubus-generating relationship with the Western metropolis. 
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Tracing the colonial and post-colonial underpinnings of the unresolved 
violence going back and forth between periphery and centre, and 
incorporating elements of popular culture as manifest influences 
expanding contestation,58 it discusses the importing of nominally distant 
violence into the heart of Europe and the United States by do-it-yourself 
terrorists – in a sort of counter-crusade – and, similarly, the exporting of 
worsening Western societal questions to the theatres of armed conflict in 
the Levant and other Muslim lands. Examining the matrimony between 
these two related yet different experiences, Chapter 4 argues that the 
IS terrorist context also echoes, albeit in far more violent ways, earlier 
domestic rebellion and tension in the West, notably in the 1970s, and 
considers the fact that the current terrorism challenge has generated 
intolerant and undemocratic policy and societal responses.
A concluding chapter synthesises the major themes and analysis from 
the previous chapters and offers an overarching thesis about the meaning 
of contemporary violence as violence shipped back to its exporter. The 
boomerang effect of such violence has led further to the militarisation of 
Western societies, primarily the United States,59 with France, the UK and 
Germany following on. Al Qaeda, IS and their avatars-in-the-making 
emerge, therefore, as symptoms of a larger post-colonial dynamic which 
has been transformed by the patterns offered by globalisation; specifically 
the normalisation of densified and intensified patterns of exchange, 
the routinised expectation regarding global coverage of events, the 
simultaneity of exchanges and the constant circulation and recirculation of 
ideas and actions. In the final analysis, the aesthetics of IS invite an infinite 
number of borrowings and appropriations (from the group Boko Haram 
in Nigeria modelling itself on it, to the likes of Omar Mateen claiming 
affiliation with it after his shooting of club-goers in Orlando in June 2015). 
The theatrical and concise Al Qaeda was replaced by the industrial and 
intricate IS. Both were effective and angular in their distortion of classical 
violence, which they subjected to a journeying crossover. As the study 
of terrorism and political violence increasingly calls for differentiation, 
and points out to the need to apply greater conceptual scrutiny beyond 
the specifics of this or that group,60 efforts at conceptualising IS need to 
link themselves to the wider set of historical contexts in which the group 
is inserted and the actual consequences of those connections. The most 
important of those is that the group’s violence has transformed the global 
order. How did international affairs land on such shores? Where does the 
story start? We turn to these questions in Chapter 1.
1
Al Qaeda’s Matrix
In the emergency, it occurred to me that perhaps the virtue of irregulars 
lay in depth, not in face.
T. E. Lawrence, The Evolution of a Revolt (1920)
I woke up




Steely Dan, ‘Mary Shut the Garden Door’ (2006)
IS cannot be made sense of without properly tracing its lineage to Al 
Qaeda’s saga, spanning some 20-plus years from the late 1980s to the late 
2000s and into the 2010s. Al Qaeda introduced dynamics and established 
patterns which stand at the core of what IS came to be and what it did. 
However, although Al Qaeda is a primary referent for IS, it is more 
than that. Al Qaeda is arguably the most important group so far in the 
history of terrorism. Specifically, three key innovations on the part of Al 
Qaeda – the steadied transnational broadcast of non-state violence, the 
militarisation of radical Islamism and the professionalisation of terrorist 
operations, combined with the dissemination of operational centres of 
gravity and a deft use of information technology – have cumulatively 
set the stage for IS to emerge lethally in the way it has in the wake of 
Al Qaeda’s foundational actions. IS’s subsequent strength resided not 
merely in its behavioural dimensions and its own industrious strategy 
and operations, but equally and fundamentally in the important legacy 
of the violence matrix set by Al Qaeda.
In the longer term, the history of IS is part of that of Al Qaeda, a 
group that underwent a sequence of emergence, expansion, abatement 
and indirect reassertion. The hegemonic maturity of Al Qaeda came 
from internal transcendence, which in time set the stage for a second 
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age occupied by IS. The impact of Al Qaeda on global politics is then 
an affair of long standing. Its inception reaches back decades to the 
contemporary transformation of a non-state armed group, which has 
sought to create unprecedented regional and international dynamics 
anchored in a privatised usage of force for a political purpose. Beyond 
solely triggering domestic or foreign crises, this organisation has aimed, 
in particular, to adapt, achieve and prosper open-endedly as it pursued 
such a novel strategy. It is in that sense that the metamorphosis of Al 
Qaeda can be assessed to have been moving forward all along. From the 
beginning, and arising from its own actions, this evolution was an almost 
inevitable way for the group to ensure its perennation, and set it apart 
from previous (local) and subsequent (regionalised) Islamist factions. 
IS is both a continuation and a departure from the entity that enabled 
such emancipation.
Unleashing Transnational Violence
Up until Al Qaeda, all terrorism was local. Regardless of their ideology or 
context, previous waves of terrorism had all focused on visiting violence 
on a local authority (usually the state, colonial or national) with a view to 
advancing a political perspective that was linked immediately and directly 
to a domestic scene. In the contemporary modern history of terrorism, 
this was the case in Tsarist Russia with the Nihilist groups of the 1870s, 
across Western Europe in the 1890s and 1900s during the Anarchist 
wave and, later, in the first half of the twentieth century throughout the 
decolonisation era, notably in Palestine, Cyprus and Algeria. From the 
late 1960s to the mid-1980s (roughly in the years 1968 to 1986), a number 
of Palestinian (Black September, the Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine, PFLP), German (Red Army Fraction/Baader-Meinhof 
Group), Italian (Red Brigades), Japanese (Japanese Red Brigades), 
French (Action Directe), Belgian (Communist Combatant Cells) and 
Armenian (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, Justice 
Commandos of the Armenian Genocide) groups expanded their realm, 
seeking to establish connections beyond their immediate respective 
societal theatres more clearly. At times, some of these groups – Palestinians 
of Black September and Germans of the Red Army Faction, for instance 
– came together in joint operations or provided support to each other, 
and individual operators such as the Venezuelan Ilyich Ramírez Sánchez 
(known as Carlos the Jackal) or the Nicaraguan Patrick Argüello enjoyed 
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links with a number of different groups from different regions over the 
years (in the case of the Venezuelan, from Western Europe to the Middle 
East to Africa to Eastern Europe). Embryonic transnational influences 
were also present – a small German left-wing group, whose core members 
would later form the Second June Movement and the Red Army Faction, 
had named itself initially the Tupamaros West Berlin after the 1967–72 
Uruguayan urban guerrilla movement; the Japanese Red Army was both 
influenced by the German Red Army Faction and Palestinian groups, as 
it later renamed itself Arabu Sekigun (Arab Red Army) – but they did 
not alter the inherently local anchoring of these movements. The driving 
logic behind each of these organisations remained domestically oriented. 
Making an impact, putting pressure or indeed obtaining concessions 
from the (state) actors of their place of origin, remained, as it had been 
with earlier generations, the primary motivation for them. Palestinians 
kidnapping Israeli athletes in Munich in September 1972 were doing so 
to highlight the plight of their people in occupied Palestine. Germans 
training for operations in Jordan in 1970 were making a point about 
the societal malaise across Germany a generation after the Holocaust. 
In the United States, several radical left-wing, African-American and 
Latino groups were in effect exclusively domestic (Weatherman, Black 
Liberation Army, Symbionese Liberation Army, The Family and the 
United Freedom Front).
The 1970s featured a measure of early transnationalism, but this was 
minimal.1 If more generally the international environment was witnessing 
the opening of spaces for ‘transnational’ dynamics,2 that environment 
was still essentially a bipolar era dominated by intergovernmental 
patterns of exchange. An important shift came with the PFLP (and even 
more so with its offshoot, the PFLP-General Command), which sought 
actively to develop an international presence. As a result, patterns of this 
sort of violence increased, notably in Europe.3 If such an early form of 
transnational terrorism materialised during the heyday of 1970s terrorism, 
it was limited, performative and derivative, facilitated to a large extent by 
the greater ease of international air travel starting in the mid-1960s. The 
local focus was not, however, merely operational; it defined the manner in 
which the terrorist groups conceived of the meaning and direction of their 
violence. Arguably, the 1970s were the pinnacle of what ‘terrorism’ could, 
up until then, manifest historically in its pursuit of destabilisation in a 
given society; mobilisation, spectacular rupture with the rest of society, 
choreography of defiance, hatred for the state and its symbols, and hopes 
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and dreams of a cleansing rebirth by way of violence. Over a period of a 
hundred years, Russian Nihilists at one end, and American and European 
radicals at the other, in effect book-ended the story of terrorism as we 
had come to know it. The permutations all remained true to the original 
animating factors causing consternation and unremittingly promoting 
discord, locally.
A decade and a half later, terrorism would experience a revolution, and 
an Islamist group, Al Qaeda, would introduce a consequential innovation 
in the form of transnational terrorism. Why did Al Qaeda make that move 
and why was it able to? What process inspired Osama Bin Laden and his 
associates to pursue such a qualitatively different project? Most scholarly 
work on Al Qaeda in particular, and terrorist groups in general, has focused 
on causes belonging to a single level of analysis.4 In contradistinction, 
one possible response to these initial questions is that Al Qaeda rode 
a threefold storm: the manifestation of a dead end of the decade-long 
radical Islamist militancy in Arab countries, leading inevitably to such 
geographical transcendence through exile; the materialisation of a 
conflict in Afghanistan that provided the emerging group with a staging 
ground for its violence; and the take-off of globalisation, in which the 
organisation ensconced itself opportunistically and naturally, adopting it 
at once. This three-tiered DNA of Al Qaeda is what would, 20 years later, 
enable its IS heir-cum-offshoot to modulate its own hybridity without full 
contradiction, and indeed a measure of continuity.
The first dimension behind the reorienting of terrorism as introduced 
by Al Qaeda reaches deep, and is concerned with the failed history of state-
building in the Middle East and North Africa. As the Ottoman Empire 
collapsed in the 1910s in the Middle East, and French rule in North Africa 
also started fissuring, the primary vehicle for rebellion on both the Mashreq 
and Maghreb fronts was nationalism, with the first part of the twentieth 
century witnessing a nationalistic struggle for independence playing out 
across the region. In that context, the main driver behind these social and 
political awakenings was pan-Arabism. Politically, the roots of the rising 
movements went back to the time when, in the wake of the Young Turks’ 
1908 revolution in favour of Turkification, Arabs throughout the Ottoman 
Empire began agitating for liberation, distinctly using the identity mode. 
Wataniya (patriotism), qutriya (regionalism), ba’ath (renaissance), nahda 
(awakening), qawma (rising), ‘uruba (Arabhood) and thawra (revolution) 
were prominent in Arab minds during these decades, and would remain 
so for most of the twentieth century. Islamism was present, but as a 
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runner-up to the dominant nationalist mode of political expression. 
At times, the two strands met and indeed enjoyed mutual and uneasy 
support, as they shared a common goal of emancipating the colonised 
Arab and Muslim lands, but their driving logic remained different. In 
Arabia, in 1916–18 the Hashemites blended their religious legitimacy as 
direct heirs of the Prophet Mohammad with a British-inspired regional 
pan-Arab political ambition to establish an ‘Arab kingdom’ linking the 
Gulf with the Levant – one that would eventually be thwarted by other 
simultaneous contradictory British commitments (the secret Sykes–Picot 
agreement of May 1916 to divide the Levant between Britain and France, 
and the Balfour Declaration of November 1917 promising to set up a 
Jewish homeland in Palestine). In Libya, Qur’anic school teacher Omar al 
Mukhtar led a nationwide movement against the brutal Italian occupation 
for 20 years, from 1911 until his death in 1931. (Libyan leader Muammar 
Gaddafi would later partly finance the film Lion of the Desert, directed 
by Hollywood filmmaker Mustapha al Akkad in 1981, depicting that 
struggle.) In Algeria, Muslim scholar Abdelhamid Ben Badis founded 
the Jamiyat al ‘Ulama (Association of the Ulama), which throughout 
the 1930s laid the groundwork for the national liberation movement 
that would emerge more formally the following decade and the war for 
independence that lasted until 1962.
Decolonisation turned to be anticlimactic. Everywhere across the 
region, the new states, imbued with nationalism and led forcefully by young 
army officers promising modernisation and sovereignty, squandered in 
no time their popular mandate and betrayed their nations’ hopes for 
independence by settling for authoritarianism. In effect replaying the 
colonial sequence of dispossession and arbitrariness, the leadership of 
these self-described ‘revolutionary councils’ and ‘national commands’ – 
also speaking similarly a narrative of ‘progress’ and ‘advancement’, as the 
British and French had – took note immediately of the threat that political 
Islam would come to represent to their regimes. Such a trajectory was best 
illustrated by the evolution of the relationship between the Egyptian Free 
Officers – who, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, conducted the nationalistic 
1952 coup against the corrupt, British-supported monarchy of King 
Farouk – and the Muslim Brotherhood, which initially went along with 
the army’s project under a logic of alliance, before being cast aside by 
Nasser and his colleagues. By the mid to late 1960s, political Islam had 
become the nemesis of the post-colonial Arab state. As the regimes in 
Iraq, Syria, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Jordan adopted varying 
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degrees of military-led rule, with paramilitary intelligence services 
(mukhabarat) and police investigative units (istikhbarat) swelling, 
and as repression, introduced as a lasting dissent-control mechanism, 
increased, resistance to authoritarianism lodged itself naturally within 
those sectors of society that had once been contenders to lead the struggle 
for independence. Without much difficulty, Islamism found a dual 
justification for its existence: battling the corrupt and corrupting state 
and offering a promise of genuine independence to Arab societies under 
a perspective now stressing not so much identity but faith. ‘That in which 
you believe’ rather than ‘that which you are’ was the Islamist promise. 
The more the Arab states illustrated their failure – military in the face 
of Israel, economic in not engineering modernisation and geostrategic 
in remaining subservient to major powers – the more the formula al 
Islam houa al hal (Islam is the solution) grasped minds and gathered 
momentum and appeal. Gradually, the different Islamist-inclined student 
associations, community organisations, trade unions and political parties 
(often banned) came to see the limits of their action on their societies, 
as the regimes, younger and tougher then, unleashed their might and 
violence against these groups – many of which had started resorting to 
violence themselves in the early 1970s. Throughout the Arab world – 
in Egypt, Algeria, Iraq and Syria – prisons filled up with Islamists. By 
the end of that decade – with civil war playing out in Lebanon, and 
American support to Israel increasing in the aftermath of its incursions 
in southern Lebanon in 1978 and 1982 – the Islamists had in effect lost 
the domestic battle to ruthless regimes unconcerned with the effect of 
their brutalisation of their societies and determined to show that the Shi’a 
Islamic revolution that had taken place in Iran in 1979 would not be 
replicated in their Sunni countries. The spectacular (particularly because 
it was public and filmed) assassination of Egyptian President Anwar al 
Sadat during a parade in October 1981 by the group Al Jihad al Islami al 
Masri (Egyptian Islamic Jihad), which had infiltrated the lower ranks of 
the Egyptian military, indicated paradoxically that the regimes’ repression 
campaigns were hurting the movements; as would, in Syria four months 
later, the massacre of thousands of Islamists in the city of Hama, besieged 
for 27 days by the army of Hafez al Assad, and indeed later, in October 
1988, the brutal clamping down by the authorities on demonstrators in 
Algeria, with some 500 killed in Martyrs’ Square in Algiers during those 
three-day riots.
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Abdallah Yusuf al ‘Azzam, Ayman al Dhawahiri and Osama Bin Laden 
lived through these years, respectively in Palestine, Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia (as school teacher, surgeon and millionaire), experiencing a sense 
of powerlessness. Gradually, these radical militants started reading their 
domestic scenes as closed ones, and their ability to reform them (through 
underground social militancy, religious proselytising by way of audiotapes 
circulated underground and, in time, violence) limited. The link to the 
external reasons for their domestic conditions became more pronounced, 
and resentment started being displaced from the local authorities to their 
perceived Western backers. Years later, Bin Laden, sending a message to 
the American people and expressing surprise – as he saw it – as to their 
reluctance to fathom the reasons for his campaign against their country, 
would explain that what led him on a path of violent opposition to the 
United States was that country’s support for Israeli crimes in Lebanon 
in 1982:
I am amazed at you. Even though we are in the fourth year after 
the events of 11 September, [US President George W.] Bush is still 
engaged in distortion, deception and hiding from you the real causes. 
And thus, the reasons are still there for a repeat of what occurred. So 
I shall talk to you about the story behind those [11 September 2001] 
events and shall tell you truthfully about the moments in which the 
decision was taken, for you to consider. I say to you, God knows that 
it had never occurred to us to strike the [Twin] Towers. But after it 
became unbearable and we witnessed the oppression and tyranny of 
the American-Israeli coalition against our people in Palestine and 
Lebanon, the idea came to my mind. The events that affected my soul 
in a direct way started in 1982 when America permitted the Israelis to 
invade Lebanon and the American Sixth Fleet helped them in that. This 
bombardment began and many were killed and injured and others were 
terrorised and displaced. I could not forget those moving scenes, blood 
and severed limbs, women and children sprawled everywhere. Houses 
destroyed along with their occupants and high-rises demolished over 
their residents, rockets raining down on our home without mercy … 
In those difficult moments, many hard-to-describe ideas bubbled in 
my soul but in the end they produced an intense feeling of rejection of 
tyranny, and gave birth to a strong resolve to punish the oppressors. 
And as I looked at those demolished towers in Lebanon, it entered 
my mind that we should punish the oppressor in kind and that we 
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should destroy towers in America in order that they taste some of what 
we tasted and so that they be deterred from killing our women and 
children. And that day, it was confirmed to me that oppression and 
the intentional killing of innocent women and children is a deliberate 
American policy. Destruction is [depicted as] freedom and democracy, 
while resistance is [presented as] terrorism and intolerance.5
Unable to reform or take over domestic systems from the inside, reifying 
their experience of political powerlessness in this way and motivated 
by radical revenge, Bin Laden and his cohort chose to make a break 
with their local scene and developed a form of exile militancy – ‘radical 
rebellion as export’, as it were – which was ripe for launching when the 
Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on 24 December 1979. In that sense, 
Al Qaeda’s action was something akin to a statement that there is nothing 
inevitable about the vulnerabilities of the Arab and Muslim states; that 
their governance conditions were but products of a specific colonial and 
post-colonial history and as such could be remedied similarly, and, more 
revolutionarily, that violence itself – including offensive international 
force – was not solely a state prerogative but could be hijacked by a 
non-state actor beyond moments of terrorist attacks. Thus, by usurping 
authority which traditionally accrued to the state, and by offering a 
prescriptive agenda unacceptable internationally, Al Qaeda was from the 
very beginning immune to statist deterrence, and in so doing laid the 
foundations of IS’s alternative state-building project.
Whereas the start of the war between Iraq and Iran on 22 September 
1980 had generated little impact among Islamists in the Arab world, who 
read that conflict as a geopolitical contest between two regimes which 
in their respective ways could not muster any support on the part of 
Sunni Islamists, Moscow’s ill-fated crossing into Afghanistan in 1979 was 
immediately regarded by Islamists across the Muslim world as a casus belli 
and therefore ground for jihad (religious struggle). The first layer of the 
Al Qaeda tapestry was therefore a complex combination of resignation, 
resolve and pragmatism in the face of gnawing militancy conditions 
domestically, and the opportunity provided by the Soviet decision. The 
ten-year period between 24 December 1979 and 15 February 1989, when 
the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was completed (it had started in 
May 1988) constituted the formative years of the transnational radical 
Islamist movement. As early as 1980, radical Islamist militants started 
moving from different Arab countries (from the Gulf, the Levant and the 
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Maghreb), converging on Afghanistan to support the Afghan resistance 
to the Soviet invasion. By 1981, different waves of these actors, soon to be 
known collectively as ‘Arab Afghans’, had become substantial and regular 
enough that the Palestinian former school teacher, ‘Azzam, took the 
initiative to set up a liaison office to welcome and facilitate their travels 
to Afghanistan. Located in Peshawar, Pakistan, and dubbed Maktab al 
Khadamat lil Mujahideen (office of work for the combatants) or Maktab 
al Diyafa (office of hospitality), this unit or way station was in effect the 
first physical and conceptual incarnation of what Al Qaeda would become 
later on; literally a base (qaeda), headquarters or replenishing centre for 
combat.
The first-generation Arab Afghans, mostly from the Gulf, was 
composed of seasoned militants who had already gained experience 
in battling their respective Arab governments and, in some cases, 
been imprisoned. The frustrations they brought along as a result of the 
domestic stalemate combined with religious fervour, which they linked 
with the Afghan national liberation cause (redefined religiously as jihad). 
The rapidly materialising asymmetrical warfare quagmire the Soviets fell 
into spelled a series of early victories for the irregulars, which earned 
the Arabs both the admiration and trust of the Afghan armed groups’ 
leaders and inspired a second wave of fighters coming from North 
Africa. In effect initiating the radical Islamist movement’s investment in 
communication technology, ‘Azzam capitalised on such momentum and 
launched a publication, Al Bunyan al Marsous (the Solid Edifice, published 
in Arabic and in Urdu), and recorded a series of audiotapes in which 
he called for such backup in the form of military migration as fard ‘ayn 
(personal obligation). He declared that: ‘Whoever can, from among the 
Arabs, fight jihad in Palestine, then he must start there. And, if he is not 
capable, then he must set out for Afghanistan.’6 Osama Bin Laden was 
among the individuals who heeded that call and travelled to Afghanistan, 
arriving there sometime in the mid-1980s. As Bin Laden – who brought 
along important sums of money he had inherited as one of the 24 sons 
of the successful Saudi (of Yemeni origin) entrepreneur Mohammed 
Awad Bin Laden – started making local connections in Afghanistan and 
established himself as a key mover, he came to constitute, with ‘Azzam and 
al Dhawahiri, a de facto troika leading the Arab Afghan component of the 
fight against the Soviets. By 1987, the conflict had turned in favour of the 
insurgency and the Soviet invasion’s failure was a foregone conclusion. As 
they found themselves managing the political benefits of that impending 
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victory, being careful not to step on the local groups’ sensitivities, and 
supervising their contingent which had swelled anew following the 
inclusion of new militants from the Balkans and a handful of individuals 
from Western Europe and the United States, Bin Laden and his associates 
began reflecting on how to perpetuate their movement. If one superpower 
could be defeated, couldn’t the other one, and wasn’t it more involved 
in the trouble in the Islamic part of the world? Around this time, in the 
key 1988–9 period, these radical Islamists’ ‘chatter’ (as Western counter-
terrorism agencies would later call such loose talk among terrorists) 
started focusing on the creation of a dedicated, larger organisation that 
would go beyond the operational purpose of the Maktab al Khadamat, 
and indeed beyond the confines of the Afghan-Soviet conflict itself.
Enter Al Qaeda. Referred to in early documents as Al Jaish al Islami 
(the Islamic Army), Sijil al Qaeda (the base’s registry) or Al Qaeda al 
‘Askariya (the military base), Al Qaeda was born in Khost, Afghanistan 
on 11 August 1988. In the ten years during which it had emerged, in 
slow motion but insistently, almost inevitably, the entity was already 
becoming a potentially formidable force.7 Forged in combat (rather than 
underground political meetings or social uprising), rewarded doggedly 
with victory over a military superpower (rather than a regional state) 
and to an extent already internationalised (with Asians and Europeans 
in addition to the core Arab component), the new organisation could 
also field three different profiles. Whereas the first group brought 
commitment and energy in 1981, and the second added numbers and 
dedication in the mid-1980s, a third group injected renewal and focus at 
a crucial phase in 1988–9. As the ‘Azzam–Bin Laden–al Dhawahiri troika 
turned bicephalous, with Bin Laden and al Dhawahiri in the driving seat 
following the assassination of ‘Azzam on 24 November 1989, the concept 
and purpose of the armed group was refined further. Al Qaeda would 
pursue a new type of objective, redirecting its oppositional priorities 
‘from the near enemy to the far enemy’ (min al ‘adou al qareeb ila al ‘adou 
al ba’eed) – with one main objective in mind: to attack that mightiest of 
far enemies, the United States, in an unprecedented transnational way. 
Importantly, this configuration was the first full-fledged incarnation 
of a militarised form of transnational terrorism. In ushering in such a 
transformation, Al Qaeda was also ahead of state militaries who would 
in effect be sucked into extra-territorial operations much later – precisely 
ten years later – with the first such response ordered by US President 
Bill Clinton in August 1998 authorising the bombing of Al Qaeda’s 
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camps in Afghanistan, following the group’s attacks on US embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania earlier that month. In so doing, the United States, 
and later many other states, were forced to adapt and improvise in 
the face of an unexpected challenge to their historical construction of 
legitimate violence in warfare.8 Whereas traditional Islamist groups began 
establishing themselves historically through a combination of religious 
preaching, political discourse and networks of domestic social services, 
Al Qaeda’s first embodiment was to serve as a welfare service provider 
originating in the rentier state Arabian Gulf, but one whose action was 
oriented outwardly and militarily with the jihad campaign against the 
Soviet Union in the 1980s and with little emphasis on religion per se. In 
a 2014 interview, the son-in-law of ‘Azzam, Abdulla Anas, who had taken 
part in the fight in Afghanistan, noted in that regard that ‘Osama [Bin 
Laden] never thought he was a religious sheikh … [He] never led prayers 
or gave sermons.’9 In sum, in such a context of failed Arab and Islamic 
state-building, Al Qaeda sprang forth as a politico-religious project 
foregrounding the relocation of authority, the circumventing of the state 
and the militaristic empowerment of a non-state actor.
The revolutionary newness of Al Qaeda lay in these key aspects, but 
it was its argumentative force that stood out as an overpowering and 
purposive mythology. The group did not consider struggle against the 
local dictators as a rite of passage or a goal, and sought to mark a rupture, 
not so much from resistance but towards conquest. As Bin Laden and 
al Dhawahiri saw it, the ‘perversity’ they were battling was only partly 
local. In the group ‘asabiya (solidarity) they developed, local militancy 
was portrayed as ultimately zero sum, and derivative problematically 
from the state’s actions, whereas foreign conquest was more pragmatic 
and original, also allowing for unexpected initiative. The predicament 
of the underground rebel held little appeal for the well-off revolutionary 
that Bin Laden was, and indeed later on the man would not waste 
much time on instilling a sense of asala (authenticity) and community 
in his organisation, something that partly explains his kindred spirit al 
Dhawahiri’s difficulties in keeping the organisation cohesive once Bin 
Laden disappeared. Was it clear to Bin Laden, however, that upon landing 
in Afghanistan he would start such a global movement? Hardly. The 
symphonic disorder he would orchestrate during the next two decades 
developed arguably through a slow observation of the Afghan atonal 
concerto he had initially become involved in. However improvised in 
situ, Al Qaeda’s stance owed much to what Bin Laden and al Dhawahiri 
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brought with them in terms of divorce from local militantism. Despite all 
his speeches denouncing its leadership, Bin Laden had not, for instance, 
been in maximal opposition to the House of Saud initially. What he 
sought was the empowering nature of a full-fledged struggle, not the 
limiting confines of insurrection – and the invasion of Afghanistan by the 
Soviets provided him with that opportunity. The man could in effect buy 
a state, or rent portions of it as he did in Afghanistan, so why seek merely 
to unseat a group of already faltering regimes in the Middle East? The 
only time one of these regimes appealed to him, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq 
circa 1991, was when that country’s conflict with the United States offered 
him a chance to join the battle with that world power.10 Beyond defiance 
and on to reprisal, Bin Laden’s ambition was always to elevate himself 
to an autonomous position of punishing decision-maker. That stance is 
what would, much later, enable Abu Bakr al Baghdadi to deliver his iconic 
sermon as a statesman-like figure in 2014 announcing IS’s Caliphate, but 
only after Bin Laden had initiated that divorce process. Al Qaeda then 
turned upside down what, referring to contemporary states, Bertrand 
Badie termed ‘the powerlessness of power’.11 In empowering weakness, the 
armed group had in effect broken the mould. For all this innovation, Bin 
Laden’s 2001 attacks on the United States are presented in the classical 
terrorology canon as a gross miscalculation, when the operation provided 
strategic dividends beyond what Al Qaeda probably calculated itself. 
Overnight Al Qaeda became the global actor of international insecurity, 
making the jump over those regional states it had sought to discredit and 
sideline. Previously, Arab and Islamist terrorism had been hopeful, almost 
desperate in the enactment of its strategy, and in effect, as Bin Laden saw 
it, lacking the conviction that would give it impact and results.
Ultimately, Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda project was the result of several 
strands, but one in which the 1990–1 Gulf War was a key moment. When, 
on 7 August 1990, the United States decided to move militarily into the 
Middle East, following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait five days earlier, things 
changed. As the former assistant secretary of state for politico-military 
affairs during the George W. Bush administration, Richard A. Clarke, 
remarked 25 years later: 
The rise of Al Qaeda in the 1990s, the [2001] US invasion of 
Afghanistan, the second US war with Iraq [2003], the rise of ISIS, all 
followed that August 1990 decision to deploy large US forces to the 
Gulf. There were many social and political pressures that contributed 
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to the upheaval in the Arab and Islamic world, but the continued US 
military presence in the region and the way those US forces were used, 
were major contributors. This chain of events also contributed to the 
Arab Spring and the creation of failed states in Iraq, Yemen, Libya and 
Syria. Taken together, these events caused the deaths of hundreds of 
thousands, turned millions of people into refugees and cost trillions 
of dollars.12 
In effect, the then-derided and since then commercially repackaged 
phrase that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein uttered days ahead of the 
conflict with the United States depicting the clash as ‘the mother of all 
battles’ (um al ma’arek) was accurate, as the conflicts that materialised 
subsequently in the region all derived in important ways from that first 
military engagement between the United States and an Arab country.
The defining feature of Al Qaeda was then its transnational nature, and 
this became a marked feature of fin de siècle terrorism, whereby terrorist 
movements increasingly demonstrated a ‘purer form of transnational 
interaction in the relationship they form with each other’,13 and in time 
this became one of the dominant traits of contemporary terroristic 
violence. Equally, however, the simultaneity of Bin Laden’s project with the 
larger technological, social-cultural and socio-economic transformation 
playing out internationally, namely globalisation, was just as important 
for the structure and patterns of the new group. Though he may have 
been motivated primarily by regional dynamics, the fact is that Bin Laden 
benefited both from the end of the Cold War and the materialisation of 
globalisation. It is in this dual context that the acuity of his displacement 
project must be understood. James Rosenau captured the initial context 
of global fragmentation which sheds light on this phenomenon: ‘The 
combination of internal and external dynamics at work in all societies 
generates simultaneous tendencies towards globalisation and localisation, 
towards more extensive integration across national boundaries and 
more pervasive fragmentation within national boundaries, towards a 
relocation of authority “outward” to transnational entities and “inward” 
to subnational groups.’14 Bin Laden independently conceptualised such a 
disobedient and illegitimate relocation of authority, but could only do so 
because globalisation allowed him to make it a reality beyond his design, 
and because the Cold War was in any event passing away, thus objectively 
opening a new phase. The singular identity of domestic opposition 
(local radical Islamists of old) was shed, boundaries were redrawn (the 
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Caliphate became a notional reference) and the emancipatory logic 
of the group’s agenda ended up respatialising its violence beyond the 
confines of the Arab or Muslim region. Aspirational Caliphate references 
notwithstanding, the a-territoriality of Bin Laden’s project was indicative 
of the fact that his construct was intrinsically contra the state – his 
was expanded war, temporally and spatially, through which he sought 
to mobilise soldiery and gather resources (political and operational). 
Through this interaction between state and non-state emerged a new 
order built on offensive asymmetry, as the response to became the essence 
of. The centrality of warfare in this method, which Al Qaeda pioneered 
and IS perpetuated, cannot be underestimated.
Osama Bin Laden was a ‘dreamer of the day’, in the sense T. E. Lawrence 
spoke of regarding the dangerousness of such men who are able to act 
their dreams with open eyes.15 He regarded himself as a warrior, in the 
traditional historical sense given to that status in Arab tribal mythology. 
As he displayed that aspect of the leadership he sought to bring to Al 
Qaeda – explicitly orchestrating his terrorism that way and benefitting 
from globalisation – Bin Laden made use of the lingering impasse of 
the Arab state system. With Al Qaeda rising in the 1990s, the question 
of the legitimate monopoly of force had still not been solved by the 
Arab states several decades into national independence. As noted, the 
struggle for decolonisation had provided a platform for two competing 
movements – nationalists vs. Islamists – who contended for power, 
without, in either case, giving much thought to resilient and accountable 
state-building, one in which the question of force would be normalised 
under legitimate institutions. Winning the first couple of rounds of that 
bout, the nationalists regarded authoritarianism, repressive military and 
coup d’états as natural outcomes of the defence of the dawla (state) and 
their nidham (regime). As Islamism next rose to unseat them, it played 
that game on their very terms and turf; moving underground, conspiring 
in secret societies, remaining unreadable to the citizenry and in effect 
performing as a self-appointed revolutionary vanguard. Importantly, the 
radical Islamist challenge demonstrated that, well into the 1980s, and for 
all its bombast and repertoire of repression, the Arab state could more 
often than not appear as but one contender among other local powers 
wielding force. The supposedly mighty Algerian army, which had ruled 
Algeria with an iron fist since 1962, was thus shaken to its inner core by 
an impromptu street riot that played out for a few days in October 1988, 
leading in short order to the rapid rise of an Islamic Salvation Front, 
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which proceeded to win the first round of parliamentary elections in 
December 1991 – a democratic contest that was interrupted abruptly 
by the Algerian military state for fear of losing it. Such dead ends for 
authority would be reached more fully by 2011 with the Arab Spring, but 
in 1988 it was already perceptible as such: 
Middle Eastern state-makers have been burdened with certain problems 
which their Western European counterparts did not have to confront 
at a similar stage in their political development. One of these is the 
need for state-makers in the Middle East to attempt to consolidate 
their power through the development of political institutions while 
simultaneously attempting to justify the existence of their various states 
and regimes to populations for whom the very idea of the territorial 
nation-state, the specific boundaries of existing states and the concept 
of secular authority lack legitimacy.16
Al Qaeda reconnected with a third site of power in the Arab Islamic 
tradition that had remained untapped by insurgents during most of the 
twentieth century: the warrior rebellion. As the early twentieth century 
witnessed a lot of uncertainty and repositioning of identities in the region, 
the portrayed parables of (Arab) nationalism and (Islamic) religion played 
out alongside other types of tribal and warrior mobilisation, both with 
equally deep roots in the region’s longer history. In that respect, the type 
of Al Qaeda-inherited leadership provided by IS years later is defined not 
so much by the group’s discursive pronouncements about evocative plans 
for a Caliphate, but more by its raw, blunt and gut-level ability to act out 
its design in a way that convincingly portrayed to the average Islamist 
militant an image of order that does not doubt its legitimacy (in the sense 
that it does not see the state as one to be ‘toppled’, but as an inherently 
illegitimate and ineffectual entity that merely needs to be disposed of, so 
as to focus on the fundamentals of war as represented by the group). To 
be certain, the agency of non-state actors in the deployment of coercive 
force is not inconsistent with the classical tradition of jihad (which locates 
the decision of offensive war with the ruler),17 and historically there has 
often been delegation of operations to mid-level leaders that later rose to 
significant political prominence (Khaled Ibn al Walid and Salah al Din, 
most iconically), but the issue of leadership itself has remained central. 
Indeed, the Great Arab Revolt of 1916 was thus sanctioned formally by 
Sharif Hussein Bin Ali of Mecca and Medina, but led by a combination 
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of his sons and lieutenants allied with different tribes from the jazeera 
and with Britain. Around the same time, a first important militarisation 
of Islamist movements took place with the Ikhwan movement (1908–30) 
which, in the 1920s, enabled the expansion of the Saudi state beyond 
the central Arabian region of Najd, helping it topple the Hashemites and 
reaching into Transjordan, before rebelling against it. Never fully tamed, 
and its remnants in effect subsequently integrated into the Saudi National 
Guard (al Harass al Watani) in 1955,18 the Ikhwan left an important 
imprint on the socio-genesis and paradigm of Al Qaeda. These actors 
remained present in Saudi society – and, beyond, in radical Islamists 
circles – as an undercurrent of avant la lettre dormant insurgency, which 
was linked organically to the establishment of the monarchy itself. 
Though they did not emerge visibly beyond underground militancy, 
sporadic local disobedience or the nationwide circulation of audiotaped 
sermons critical of the authorities, their importance was revealed by 
one significant episode in 1979. On 20 November that year (five weeks 
before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), several hundred militants led 
by a Saudi preacher from the Najd region, Juhayman al Otaybi, invaded 
the Great Mosque in Mecca and occupied it, trapping thousands of 
worshipers, until 4 December when the Saudi Arabian army (assisted by 
French and Pakistani special forces) stormed the compound to reclaim 
it. Al Otaybi’s grandfather and other members of his family had been 
members of the Ikhwan.19
In launching Al Qaeda in 1988, Bin Laden was starting an original 
project but also reactivating a tradition of elite, aristocratic engagement 
in violence present in Arab and Muslim history.20 The seventh-century 
Muslim conquests had been led by the nobility among the Arabs of the 
jazeera, and most episodes told (and reimagined) about victory feature 
fiercely independent warriors whose feats would owe as much to their 
prowess on the field as to their going against the system. Bin Laden was a 
contemporary offshoot of that tradition and that imaginary, combining 
ascetic, monastic and violent ideals. Away from the underground, almost 
Marxist-like Islamist militant phraseology of the 1970s – prevalent among 
Egyptian Islamists and at times detectable in Ayman al Dhawahiri’s 
messages in post-Bin Laden Al Qaeda – the Saudi businessman’s language 
highlighted instead the role of the shurafa (noblemen). The warrior type, 
fighting unselfishly for the umma (community), had long constituted 
one of the most important social-communal expressions of the Muslim 
martial ethic. Seen as characterised by the temporal bravery and sacrifice 
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of a mujahid (fighter) or munadhil (combatant) proceeding on a sacred 
path (salab), that actor’s behaviour was not historically regarded as naked 
violence (‘unf) but rather a way (tareeq) into transformation. As he started 
reintroducing such discourse in October 2001, the tone adopted by Bin 
Laden in his communication to the West and to his soldiery highlights 
a break with the previous militancy. The romanticising idiom began to 
persist and display influence (on 11 September 2003, at the occasion 
of the second anniversary of the attacks, a Britain-based group calling 
itself Al Muhajiroun organised a conference on ‘The Magnificent 19’ to 
commemorate the actions of the 19 perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks). This 
approach also represented a further element for dismissal of the state, as 
the notion of al qaed al badeel (the substitute leader) becomes an element 
of central authority and an option as regards the use of violence above 
and beyond the formal state. The logic of ‘substitution in warfare’,21 as 
it would also be normalised under IS, sprang from this specific warrior 
lineage. Whereas the Palestinian fedai was a figure depicted more on a 
platoon soldier level, giving way later to the logic of kataeb (brigades), this 
different theological warrior discourse stresses a dimension of journey, 
which by virtue of being personal, elevating and communal connects 
more powerfully with the jihad concept as elaborated on by ‘Azzam and 
his followers. In time, it looked to the Al Qaeda militants that a figure 
like Bin Laden could ‘legitimately’ build up an army. In a ‘the stories are 
true’ kind of self-mythologising process – which also occurred in the 
early days of the anti-colonial struggle, as in the case of Abdelhamid Ben 
Badis in Algeria or Omar al Mukhtar in Libya – military-political force in 
the service of faith is a tradition that among radical Islamists transcends 
modern statehood. In its claim on the monopoly of violence, Bin Laden’s 
Al Qaeda was also novel in this way, and this allowed for a logic whereby 
the militants could see the possibility of not merely serving a larger cause 
(e.g. Palestine) as a good soldier would, but entertained the writing of 
their own saga, carving a personal space in the larger mythology of the 
Islamist warrior. The profiles of militants – many of whom were coming 
from Europe or the United States – that IS would feature in its glossy 
magazines (see Chapter 4) a quarter of century later were derived from 
this construct.
What such Saladinisation of Islamist violence indicates is that there was 
always more to the war of Al Qaeda than simply its immediate terroristic 
outcome. The new mythology was framed around the contemporary 
actions of these ‘murabitoun ulama warriors’, as Ayman al Dhawahiri 
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referred to them in a 2007 speech (e.g. Abdallah ‘Azzam, Abd al Rashid 
al Ghazi, Mullah Daddulah, Abu Omar al Sayf, Abdallahi al Rashood, 
Hamoud Al ‘Uqla, himself implicitly and, of course, Osama Bin Laden). 
What was, we might then ask, Al Qaeda ultimately ‘the base’ for, in that 
regard? A platform for better, more efficient, transnationalised, against-
the-far-enemy warfare (Al Qaeda al Askariya and Al Jaish al Islami were its 
first names), or a stage from which to redefine the meaning and practice 
of statehood in the Muslim polity by linking it to an earlier era where 
leadership was defined by individual achievements in the name of the 
umma? Bin Laden, the terror-advocating warrior aristocrat, would in time 
be supplanted by commoners from within his own ranks, best embodied 
successively in ruffian Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi and roughneck Abu Bakr 
al Baghdadi (see Chapter 3). Indeed, the story of IS is in many regards 
one of Bin Laden successfully establishing a pattern which al Zarqawi 
furthered and al Baghdadi sought imperfectly to replicate but modernised 
successfully by clothing it in street toughness and unrestrained maximised 
violence. What IS 1.0 (that is, Al Qaeda) achieved through Bin Laden’s 
influential and consensual authority, Al Qaeda 2.0 (that is, IS) won 
through force and armed quelling of dissent. Old warrior representation 
notwithstanding, Arabhood must not be seen in the context of supplanting 
the wider Muslim dimension of Islamism. Indeed, there has often been an 
Arab imperial, and at times racist, extension of that ethnic aspect which, 
besides alienating other Muslims, confuses the picture as to what drove an 
Islamist organisation such as IS. As Mahmood Mamdani notes: ‘Like the 
history of Western civilisation, the history of Arabs is linked to particular 
agendas. At times, such a history doubles as a history of “Islam,” just as the 
history of “the West,” often doubles as the history of “Christianity.” Here, 
too, the tendency is for cultural identities to get politicised and to take on 
identities defined by the law.’22 In effect, for all his personal Arab tribal 
warrior lineage, Bin Laden sought to shape the new Muslim way of war 
more than the Arab one, and this was taking place at a time when his own 
Arab identity and culture were being reaffirmed. With some difficulty, IS 
would deal with this dual and unsettled aspect.
It may appear peculiar that Bin Laden built a bridge into modernity 
through a harkening back to the long-gone, quaint days of Islamic 
history. It is, however, the pursuit of a ‘purer’ form of a warrior spirit, 
‘untouched’ by the corrupt nature of the post-colonial Arab state, that 
gave him both self-sustaining strength of conviction and appeal in the 
eyes of all those radical Islamist militants looking for a new ‘base’ from 
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which to launch their struggle. Such skipping, indeed dismissing of the 
preceding nationalist historical phase, functioned to create a forward-
looking momentum, which precisely matched the modernity of the new 
generation, embodied later on by the Al Qaeda franchises and by IS. 
As the examples of Bin Laden, Al Qaeda and the 11 September terrorists 
demonstrate, Islamism is not a cry of distress from ‘the wretched of 
the earth’. It is an implacable summons to war, issued by globetrotting 
middle-class Muslims, many of them extremely wealthy and most of 
them sufficiently well-versed in Western civilisation and its benefits 
to be able to exploit the modern world to the full. These Muslims are 
the product of the globalising process, and Western civilisation has so 
amplified their message that it travels with them around the world.23 
Such transcendence and amplification were possible because in effect 
– as opposed to IS – Bin Laden, the ‘civilisational revolutionary’,24 was 
interested in neither replacement nor punishment of the Arab and 
Muslim states. This point needs to be underscored – ‘what is noteworthy 
about Al Qaeda is that as an organisation it is not interested in replacing 
any particular regime in any one particular country, even if it supports 
its local affiliates in such quests’25 – as the lasting appeal of Al Qaeda in 
Islamist circles and as its influence on IS attest.
Revenge of the ‘Agitated Muslims’
A second component of the matrix introduced by Al Qaeda that can help 
us inform IS’s history is captured in the actual battle plan set in motion by 
Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al Dhawahiri in 1989, immediately after the 
end of the Afghanistan war and the Soviet Union’s withdrawal. In setting 
up their organisation, the two men were in effect making a statement akin 
to ‘we defeated one superpower; let us take on another – more important 
– one’. If the militarisation and professionalisation that Al Qaeda had been 
pursuing since the early 1990s saw its culmination eleven years later in 
the 9/11 operation (rehearsed in different configurations since 1996), 
and if the leader of those commandos, Mohamed Atta, and his team 
performed like ‘perfect soldiers’,26 it is because this militarised perspective 
was introduced as a long-term approach that was meant to last and to 
empower a generation of ‘warriors’, not merely to conduct short-lived 
moments of attack (as was the case with 1970s and 1980s terrorism). It is 
50 . a theory of isis
also surprising that Bin Laden did not seek to expand his dominion over 
local Afghan actors. His money and leadership aura combined with their 
internecine division could have allowed him to seek a position of arbiter, 
which his Meccan lineage would always forcefully legitimise. Rather, 
Bin Laden was pragmatic regarding the limits of what the Arab Afghans 
could do locally. The first international jihad was over, fought and won. 
As the Taliban became occupied and preoccupied with local politics,27 
he struck a deal with them that in effect provided him with a ‘rented’ 
part of their territory from which he would develop, build, train and 
unleash an army to, as he had promised himself a decade earlier, ‘punish 
the oppressor in kind’. In that sense, conceptually, Bin Laden introduced 
and enacted in his terroristic violence what I have observed elsewhere as 
the ‘democratisation of responsibility’, namely the conscious erasing of 
the lines of responsibility that separate the Western executive political 
decision-maker from the Western-ruled civilian, whom Bin Laden 
regarded as an active accomplice of the violence visited upon Muslims by 
his or her government by virtue of passively tolerating or merely electing 
such decision-makers and allowing them to persist with such policies.
The issue at the core of the relationship between the state and the 
materialisation of (any) political violence is, objectively, indeed intimately, 
bound up with the manner in which governments and citizens carry 
out their respective and distinct responsibilities towards one another as 
regards the licence to kill (extended only to the representatives of the 
state).28 Under that generic rubric, the singular counter-proposition that 
Al Qaeda developed came to be adapted shrewdly for the purposes of its 
brand of terrorism, particularly in terms of its appeal for radical Islamist 
militants seeking violent non-state agency at both local and global levels.29 
Although this reinterpretation of the production and direction of violence 
is where an important part of Al Qaeda’s influence lies, that aspect was 
not recognised by many analysts of Al Qaeda, who often carried self-
referentialism and paternalistic overtones that blinded their analyses by 
constantly linking them to Western definitions of the terms of exchange. 
Analyses in this vein often start thus: ‘The problem with Al Qaeda/ISIS 
is that … ’, with the reader given a single, all-explaining key with which 
to make sense of the group in the mode of a shortcoming linked to the 
radicals’ stance vis-à-vis others. Slavoj Žižek, for instance, writes that 
the problem with terrorist fundamentalists is not that we consider 
them inferior to us, but, rather, that they themselves secretly consider 
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themselves inferior. This is why our condescending, political correct 
assurances that we feel no superiority towards them only makes them 
more furious and feeds their resentment. The problem is not cultural 
difference (their effort to preserve their identity), but the opposite 
fact that they have already internalised our standards and measure 
themselves by them.30 
Documentarily, Al Qaeda did precisely the opposite of what Žižek assesses. 
Everything in Bin Laden’s actions and speeches, and subsequently with IS, 
evidences an explicitly conceptualised, agency-wrestling and consciously 
acted radical rupture, whereby the new groups were independently 
advocating radical violence, claiming ownership of their narrative of 
rupture and ‘judging’ their own regional governments as well as the 
West, dismissing the irrelevance of the first and pursuing the latter’s 
‘punishment’ through extreme terrorism.
Illustrating the policy-academe impasse on these issues, such a logic 
of dismissal is not surprising, as it has deep roots. In a 16 December 
1998 interview with French magazine Le Nouvel Observateur, in which 
he discussed the controversial covert US support of insurgents in 
Afghanistan opposed to the pro-Soviet Afghan government, former US 
National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski had remarked: ‘[What] is 
most important to the history of the world? The Taliban or the collapse 
of the Soviet Empire? Some agitated Muslims or the liberation of Central 
Europe and the end of the Cold War.’31 Setting aside the Western-centric 
nature of such a perspective on global security, it emerged that within three 
years of that statement, these ‘agitated Muslims’ had led a military-style 
commando operation on the defence ministry of the most powerful state 
in the world, simultaneously killing close to 3,000 people in its economic 
capital. A few years later, their organisation would be regarded as the 
number one international security threat to that country – as noted in 
the 2002 and 2006 editions of the White House-issued National Security 
Strategy of the United States. Fifteen years after that strategically blind 
statement, an offshoot of that dismissed group of disquieted actors would 
take that level of dangerousness a step higher.
The initial terrorist campaign by Al Qaeda had taken the form of two 
strands of action which were always constitutive of a dual approach; 
on the one hand attracting local operators who would be trained as 
members of this new army and, on the other, developing leads and forays 
to prepare the penetration of Western centres (thus setting up the logic 
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of secret cells). These two tracks would remain a legacy that IS would 
come to replay years later. Possibly the opening salvo of this dual-layered 
campaign was the 1993 attack on the CIA. On the morning of 25 January 
that year, Quetta-born Pakistani national Aimal Khan Kansi (also known 
as Mir Aimal Kansi) shot and killed two CIA employees at the entrance 
of the CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. Kansi, who had entered 
the United States in 1991, managed to escape. He was later apprehended 
in 1997 by a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) team in coordination 
with Pakistani authorities in the Punjab region, transferred to the United 
States, and executed in 2002. Although he had once attended a meeting 
led by Bin Laden in Kandahar and met with him, it is not clear whether 
Kansi had had actual operational links with Al Qaeda in preparing that 
specific attack on the CIA, or whether he had simply been influenced 
by the declarations that Bin Laden had begun issuing around that time. 
However, the gunman’s subsequent statement that he ‘was real angry 
with the policy of the US government in the Middle East, particularly 
toward the Palestinian people’32 echoed the political messages the group, 
and Bin Laden himself had made explicit in reference to US foreign 
policy in the Middle East. Indeed, a month after that shooting, on 26 
February, a first attempt at attacking the World Trade Centre took place, 
killing six individuals. The principal perpetrator, Ramzi Youssef, had 
been trained in an Al Qaeda camp in Afghanistan, and his uncle, Khaled 
Sheikh Mohammed, was the first to have proposed the 9/11 operation 
to Bin Laden.
As the outsized influence of Bin Laden began gaining authority and 
appeal among Islamist networks internationally, Al Qaeda refined these 
first attempts and sought to introduce a more sophisticated, professional 
type of operator, eventually best embodied in the Egyptian national 
Mohamed Atta, leader of the Hamburg Cell: well educated, technology-
savvy33 and cosmopolitan. An important harbinger of this trajectory 
was, earlier, another Egyptian operator, Ali Mohamed (whose full 
name is Ali Abdul Saoud Mohamed). Connected to Al Jihad al Islami 
al Masri (the Egyptian Islamic Jihad), a group active in Egypt since the 
1970s that would fold itself into Al Qaeda in 2002, Mohamed, a first-
generation Arab Afghan who had been active in training the fighters, 
had developed links with Ayman al Dhawahiri in Afghanistan, and then 
during the latter’s visit to the United States in 1995, where Bin Laden’s 
deputy had raised funds in several religious centres across California (in 
Santa Clara, Stockton and Sacramento). In close coordination with Bin 
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Laden since 1988, and under the influence of al Dhawahiri, for whom he 
served as translator during that visit to the US, Mohamed had become a 
US citizen in 1989 (after being admitted into the United States in 1985 
under a special visa programme controlled by the CIA’s clandestine 
service, following a first posting in Hamburg, Germany), and joined 
the US Army as a drill instructor and support sergeant. He then acted 
as a triple agent, pretending to gather intelligence about terrorist cells 
in Afghanistan for the CIA and serving as a US Army sergeant, all the 
while helping Al Qaeda’s senior management conceive and unleash its 
first batch of high-profile operations against the United States. Mohamed 
played an important role in the development of Al Qaeda’s strategic 
infrastructure and, revealingly, this was done as he occupied an eminently 
transnational position and in effect belonged deeply to two worlds. In 
addition to providing physical training to Bin Laden’s new generation 
of fighters gathered in the Afghan camps, he helped the group increase 
its understanding of intelligence warfare techniques and communication 
cipher technologies through data he had privileged access to in the United 
States, notably at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Centre and School 
in Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Most importantly, he demoed, in Somalia, 
Tanzania and Kenya, the cell structure that would be used to prepare 
attacks, preparing the ground for the subsequent franchise model. In 
effect, courtesy of Mohamed, US Army maps and training manuals were 
used to develop Al Qaeda’s training guide. His by-the-book, duty-driven, 
transnational criss-crossing between Europe, the US, Asia and Africa 
came to a halt when, in the aftermath of the August 1998 bombings in 
Kenya and Tanzania, he came under suspicion and his apartment was 
searched by FBI agents, who uncovered materials linked to Al Qaeda that 
led to his arrest. A plea bargain deal was struck between Mohamed and 
the United States in 2000, and he subsequently assisted the United States 
in its efforts against Al Qaeda.34
As its soldiery was assembled in such a transnational fashion round 
the world and at a dozen or so camps throughout Afghanistan, supported 
by a guild of senior operators (led by Abu Ubaida al Banshiri, Abu Hafs 
al Masri and Abu Zubayda), Al Qaeda put in motion in the mid-1990s 
its battle plan. Over the next ten years, its new form of terrorism would 
impact the generation being born in an indelible way. Although the larger 
strategy of Al Qaeda is commonly understood as having been expanded 
in the writings of Ayman al Dhawahiri and Abu Mus’ab al Suri in the 
mid-2000s,35 it is arguably the earlier period, in which the military actions 
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of Al Qaeda were engineered by the likes of Ali Mohamed, that gives rise 
to its larger plan and influence. Unbeknown to most observers, including 
Middle Eastern and Western intelligence services, Al Qaeda was then well 
on its way to becoming a transnational non-state armed group of a new 
calibre. As such, the organisation had become an entity that could attack 
within and across state boundaries, based on sophisticated networks 
of communication and information, and empowered by globalisation 
and information-age technologies. In effect, Al Qaeda was pushing war 
forward more innovatively than its opponents.36 That should not come 
as a complete surprise, for, as Hew Strachan reminds us, ‘War is not a 
one-sided activity, but assumes resistance’. Indeed, as he goes on citing 
Carl Von Clausewitz, ‘martial agency’, as we can term it here, is possibly 
a fundamentally reactive activity: 
Clausewitz is helpful on this point: war, he observed, begins with 
defence not attack. The invader might be only too pleased to gain his 
objectives without fighting; it is the defender who resorts to war to 
oppose the invader’s intentions. Even when the invader uses force, if 
there is no response, the result will be not a war but a massacre. This 
element of reciprocity is critical to any definition of war and to all 
that follows.37 
What followed on the part of Al Qaeda was a reinvention of terrorism as 
war (Table 1.1).
Al Qaeda started as an Arab-dominated group set up outside an Arab 
country in an Asian context, with a radical Islamist agenda designed 
principally to counter perceived Western, specifically American, 
hegemony in Muslim lands, and to respond to that dominion through 
the use of force targeted at the United States – at home and abroad – and 
its allies. With Bin Laden taking up residency in Afghanistan in May 1996, 
following his time in Sudan (1991–6), the operational implementation of 
Al Qaeda’s battle plan was accelerated. In November 1995 and June 1996, 
two key centres of US military activity in Saudi Arabia were targeted, killing 
26 soldiers and servicemen. These first two attacks were characterised by 
a familiar approach in which the group had clearly stepped up a gear, 
with their smuggled explosives and truck bomb modus operandi still in 
effect akin to earlier attacks against United States’ interests in the Middle 
East, notably the October 1983 suicide attack in Beirut, Lebanon on US 
Marines and French paratroopers. The attacks were also indicative of 
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the fact that Bin Laden had not yet refocused his attention fully on the 
‘far enemy’, still indulging his desire to punish ‘the near one’. Indeed, the 
November 1995 attack on the Saudi National Guard location followed the 
issuance, in August of that year, of an open letter addressed by Bin Laden 
to the King of Saudi Arabia, Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, in which Bin 
Laden criticised the nature of the kingdom’s relationship with the United 
Stated, and stated: 
Was it not the American President [Bill] Clinton on a visit to the 
country who refused to visit you in Riyadh? Did he not insist that you 
submissively and humiliatingly go to meet him in the American bases 
in Hafr-al-Batin? With that kind of behaviour, the American president 
Table 1.1 Al Qaeda’s major transnational operations, 1995–2005
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wanted to prove two points: First, to emphasise that the nature of his 
visit was basically to inspect his forces stationed in those bases. Second: 
to teach you a lesson in abjectness and scorn so that you are aware 
that he is your true guardian even in your alleged kingdom which, in 
reality, is nothing else but an American protectorate governed by the 
American Constitution.38 
An indication of the importance given by Bin Laden to military matters 
is provided in his comment in the same letter that: 
There is no justification for leaving the nation’s army to experience 
a state of incapacitation and negligence whereas it was supposed to 
safeguard the land of the Muslims and defend their causes in addition 
to protecting the holy lands. It is not reasonable to keep one’s silence 
about transforming the nation to an American protectorate to be 
defiled by the soldiers of the Cross with their soiled feet in order to 
protect your crumbling throne and the preservation of the oilfields in 
the kingdom.
A year later, following the Khobar Towers attack in June that also struck at 
US interests in Saudi Arabia, on 23 August 1996 Bin Laden issued a first 
declaration of war on the United States. The very nature of that document 
– ‘Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Holy Lands’ 
(i.e. the cities of Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia) – encapsulated the 
shift-in-the-making, with Al Qaeda’s rerouting of its violence and the 
reordering of its priorities. A second declaration of war would be issued 
on 23 February 1998 at the occasion of Bin Laden’s meeting with three 
Islamist leaders – Abu Yasir al Rifai Ahmad Taha (Egypt), Sheikh Mir 
Hamza (Pakistan) and Fazlul Rahman (Bangladesh) – to set up a World 
Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders (Al Jabha al 
Islamiya al ‘Alamiya li Qital al Yahud wal Salibiyin).
From that point forward, and although pressure would continue on 
the local Middle Eastern powers, and although Al Qaeda qua Al Qaeda 
was still being assembled, the group led by Bin Laden would turn its 
attention to what it considered the main event, namely engagement 
with the United States on a global scale. On 7 August 1998, the group 
conducted a simultaneous attack comprising two coordinated operations 
on the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 
killing a total of 242 people. The near-instantaneity, multiple-site lethality, 
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lengthy preparation and military-style nature of the attacks confirmed the 
movement towards professional operations as well as Al Qaeda’s growing 
stature as the main Islamist group worldwide – one able to ‘take on’ the 
world’s superpower in contrast to other regional radical Islamist groups. 
That orientation and martial nature of the Al Qaeda plan was confirmed 
two and half years later when, in October 2000, the organisation led 
a speedboat suicide attack on a US destroyer, the USS Cole, killing 17 
American sailors and injuring 39. The sequence would culminate in 
the 9/11 attacks, the ultimate transnational manifestation of a then-new 
type of violence produced and beamed by a non-state armed group on 
to a state power. The multiple temporalities of dissent – Bin Laden’s 
recriminations to King Fahd and to the United States – encapsulated into 
that attack also spoke of an expanded spatiality of action, as the attacks 
had been designed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; supervised from Khost, 
Afghanistan; planned in Hamburg, Germany; financed from Abu Dhabi, 
the United Arab Emirates; rehearsed in Tarragona, Spain; and launched 
on two cities in the United States from three airports, in under two hours, 
involving 19 individuals from four nationalities.
The McDonaldisation of Terrorism
The third and final way in which Al Qaeda heralded the emergence of 
IS was the manner in which, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, it enabled 
the autonomisation of force in its own midst. Instead of indulging the 
time-tested tendency of terrorist leaders to centralise all decision-making 
around their person and demand loyalty and submissiveness, Bin Laden 
embraced independence of action on the part of his followers. In so 
doing, he set the stage for the emergence of a number of subgroups, 
offshoots and so-called franchises round the world, which in time grew 
into their own important entities. Eventually, IS would become the 
most important, transcending the legacy of Al Qaeda. This strategy of 
corporate dissemination on the part of Al Qaeda’s leadership also owed 
a lot to the manner in which the group made innovative and creative use 
of the information technology revolution.
As 9/11 affected the US leadership (as late as 18 October 2001, six 
weeks after the attack, the US senior leadership was still edgy and prone 
to fear of further attacks),39 the legend behind Al Qaeda developed rapidly 
among radical Islamists around the world. The nature of the blow dealt to 
the United States in the heart of its capital, and the extensive global media 
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coverage of the event, combined to provide the group with unexpected 
international publicity. In time, when the George W. Bush administration 
decided to invade Iraq in March 2003, misleadingly linking that war with 
the attacks of 9/11, Al Qaeda would be provided with the next phase of 
its modus operandi, and would use that territory to plan new attacks – 
much as it had done in Afghanistan two decades earlier to rally troops in 
its jihad against the Soviet troops. However, the immediate aftermath of 
the 9/11 attacks was not so obvious for Al Qaeda, which in many ways 
became a victim of its own success. Its 9/11 operation was simply too big, 
triggering events too large and a sequence that played out too rapidly. The 
manner in which Al Qaeda managed the aftermath of what it referred to 
in its literature as the ‘raid on Manhattan’ (ghazzou Manhattan) gave it 
the keys to survival, opened the door to sustenance and prepared the way 
for its eventual replacement by IS. 
For all its earlier consequential proactive planning, Al Qaeda found 
itself having to improvise after its attacks in the US. The group had sought 
to build a base from which to launch its war. Now it had, with one main 
operation, engineered a result it could not realistically top. With New 
York ‘castrated’ and Washington ‘on its knees’ – ‘Here is America’, uttered 
Bin Laden slowly and in guarded satisfaction, yet quite theatrically, in his 
first message five weeks after the attacks, as if to let his followers know that 
he had delivered on his promise – the group could plan a second wave of 
attacks, while attending to its survival in Afghanistan following the launch 
of the US invasion of that country on 7 October. Once it managed, with 
great difficulty, to survive the US assault, and though it had lost a few 
key operators – killed (notably military chief Mohammed Atef, known as 
Abu Hafs al Masri, hit during a US airstrike near Kabul on 16 November 
2001) or arrested (in particular Ramzi Bin al Shaiba and Khaled Sheikh 
Mohammed, respectively coordinator and organiser of the 9/11 attacks 
on New York and Washington, detained on 11 September 2002 in Karachi 
and on 1 March 2003 in Rawalpindi, Pakistan; and Zein al Abidin 
Mohammad Hussein, known as Abu Zubayda, senior chief of operations, 
captured in Faisalabad, Pakistan on 28 March 2002) – the organisation 
pursued a new course of action that sought to spread its enemy under 
a logic of dispersion. Dissolving its physical, pinpointable presence, Al 
Qaeda rendered its centre of gravity fluid and itself evanescent. In so 
doing, it frustrated the advancing US special forces in Afghanistan from 
a fight which they had been bracing themselves for, luring them into a 
more difficult cat-and-mouse game. Bin Laden and al Dhawahiri then 
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opted to forestall and relocate their attacks on US allies round the world. 
Accordingly, the group conducted six mid-scale operations in Karachi, 
Pakistan in May and June 2002; Sana’a, Yemen in October 2002; Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia in May and November 2003; Casablanca, Morocco in 
May 2003; Istanbul, Turkey in November 2003; and Amman, Jordan in 
November 2005. These attacks were paralleled by two major operations 
in Madrid on 11 March 2004 and in London on 7 July 2005. The years 
between 2002 and 2006 thus constituted the final moment in which the 
group Bin Laden set up in 1988 was pushing its agenda. Terrorism in 
effect became the dominant issue of our times around this period, with 
the world engulfed in a violence that was playing out daily and descending 
to levels of mutual hostility unprecedented in the contemporary history 
of Western and Muslim relations; torture and humiliation begetting 
beheadings, in turn generating further killing – on both sides, a spiral of 
hatred and mayhem. The generation that would become IS grew up in 
these (de)formative years.
As Bin Laden began seeing the limits of what his ‘base’ could achieve 
operationally, and as he sought to morph himself into a statesman-like 
figure talking de tú a tú to Western leaders and addressing their societies 
in a series of messages meant to influence their domestic debates and 
electoral decisions, he introduced another important innovation that 
would characterise the history of his movement, namely the franchising 
system. While concentrating on the Iraq conflict, in effect treating it as a 
second Afghanistan (see Chapter 2), his organisation saw merit in formally 
embracing the decentralisation it was inevitably moving towards. To be 
certain, the assertiveness of the movement in that phase, which allowed 
it to take a back seat, sprang primarily from its battle-hardened status. Al 
Qaeda’s leadership decision was not, however, wholly fatalistic, flippant or 
opportunistic. It was more adaptive, in the sense that, above and beyond 
its inability to oversee operations as it had done earlier, upping the ante 
by cloning the group and multiplying its centres of gravity could both 
confuse and put its enemies on the defensive in a larger number of spots 
around the world. Such orchestrating of different strata kept to the group’s 
globalisation-influenced mindset. Al Qaeda is, in that respect, arguably 
more the child of globalisation than it is the product of the evolution 
of radical armed Islamism. In bottling his concept of transnationalised 
and militarised professional terrorism visited upon the states and citizens 
of the West in the heart of their metropolises, in retaliation for their 
governments’ foreign policies, Bin Laden had achieved his goals. His 
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ultimate disappearance (much later as it turned out, in May 2011) was 
in effect already a foregone conclusion of planned obsolescence. Such 
Che Guevarasation of Bin Laden was prefigured, however, by a final step, 
namely the transformation of Al Qaeda into a mass-market commodity.
Between 2004 and 2008, the central Al Qaeda organisation I have 
referred to as Al Qaeda al Oum, or the ‘mother Al Qaeda’, developed, 
inspired or welcomed into its fold several other organisations. One of 
those would go on to top it and become IS. Accordingly, in a span of four 
years (2003–7), Al Qaeda established the following six official branches: 
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP, Tandhim al Qaeda fi Jazirat al 
‘Arab), the Secret Organisation of Al Qaeda in Europe (Jama’at al Tandhim 
al Sirri li Munadhamat Qaedat al Jihad fi Europa), AQI (Tandhim Qaedat 
al Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn), Al Qaeda in Egypt (Tandhim al Qaeda fi 
Misr), AQIM (Tandhim Al Qaeda fi Bilad al Maghrib Al Islami) and Al 
Qaeda in Afghanistan (Tandhim al Qaeda fi Khorasan). In November 
2011 and in September 2014, in a different context and as a reaction to 
the growing emergence of IS, two more branches, Al Qaeda in the Sinai 
Peninsula (Tandhim al Qaeda fi al Sinai) and Al Qaeda in the Indian 
Subcontinent (Tandhim Qa‘edat al Jihad fi Shibh al Qarra al Hindiya), 
were added (Table 1.2).
These different entities displayed the same modus operandi as Al 
Qaeda, with high-profile and coordinated attacks against symbolic 
targets, lengthy preparations and studied timing as well as an active use 
of the media. A key development in this phase was the use of technology 
and communication. Al Qaeda had long been preoccupied with 
communication matters, and as early as 1996 Bin Laden had convened 
a press conference at which he and their leaders announced the set-up 
of their organisation. Later, he welcomed a number of journalists for 
one-on-one interviews (John Miller, Scott MacLeod, Peter Bergen, 
Rahimullah Yusufzay, Robert Fisk, Ahmad Zaidan, Hamid Mir and Abdel 
Bari Atwan). After the 9/11 attacks, the organisation took that effort one 
step further, introducing a dimension that would be expanded fully by 
IS later on. In October 2001, as US and UK troops initiated their assault 
on Afghanistan, Bin Laden and al Dhawahiri appeared in a video aired 
on Al Jazeera. From that point on, regular pronouncements by the two 
men, and in time their lieutenants (such as Oregon-born Adam Gadahn), 
would be released, as would the videotaped ‘wills’ of the members of 
the 9/11 commandos (IS would top that technique with near-live videos 
of attack perpetrators minutes before initiating their suicide operations, 
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uploaded online within hours). Al Qaeda was also the first terrorist 
organisation to create an official media branch, Moussassat al Sihab (the 
clouds’ organisation). In the 1970s, a number of groups had published 
statements or manifestos, or produced regular magazines (such as the 
PFLP’s Bulletin), but none set up a fully fledged parallel entity devoted 
solely to producing and disseminating ‘news’ about the group’s activities. 
Indicative of both the mimetism that Al Qaeda inspired, and things to 
come later with IS, Moussassat al Sihab influenced AQIM, which set up 
its media branch, Al Andalus. In turn, AQIM’s offshoot, Al Murabitun, 
created its own agency, Ribat. Al Qaeda also pioneered the use of regular 
video releases (from short videotaped messages in 2001 by its leaders, 
to hour-long online documentaries displaying graphs and computer 
simulations in 2005), peaking at 67 video messages released in 2007. 
The development of a dedicated Al Qaeda magazine was an important 
element in this phase. Upon its release, that magazine, entitled Inspire and 
developed by the American citizen Anwar al ‘Awlaki, was indicative of a 
turn whereby the organisation was inviting individual operators to take 
matters of violence into their hands (see Chapter 4).40
By the time the aggrieved and ruminative Bin Laden (talking history 
and issuing truces) was replaced in 2014 in the public imagery of radical 
Islamist terrorism by the cocksure and menacing Jihadi John (beheading 
Western prisoners), the matrix Al Qaeda had introduced long ago had 
been cemented and transcended, occupying the period between 1988 and 
2011. After the death of Bin Laden – whose persona and charisma had 
nonetheless been routinised41 – the group that survived and continued 
to exist gradually became secondary to the actions of the several regional 
subgroups it has spawned; one of which, AQI, soon to be known as IS, 
superseded it. Twenty-two years after it was set up in Afghanistan, and 
ten years after it had conducted its most lethal operation in New York 
and Washington, Al Qaeda had mutated into a movement that no longer 
resembled its original form. From a hierarchical and centralised group 
led by the bicephalous leadership of Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al 
Dhawahiri, it had become a regionalised and decentralised organisation 
with several competing leaders following the death of Bin Laden in May 
2011. By the end of its run, Al Qaeda had been successful in its offensive 
asymmetrical combat mode and was influencing its enemy’s way of war. 
As the agility-focused strategic modes of the US and Al Qaeda began 
increasingly to mirror each other,42 the net result was in favour of the 
armed group which, in effect, managed to proto-‘statify’ its military 
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capacity. Such a dynamic was not wasted on the many armed groups 
observing this self-empowerment through a different type of mobilisation. 
Among the first to capitalise on such professionalisation was the Lebanese 
armed group Hezbollah, which had itself been growing in sophistication, 
as demonstrated by its military defeat of Israel in the July–August 2006 
conflict. Al Qaeda’s influence over Hezbollah was visible particularly in 
the course of that conflict, with ‘Hezbollah react[ing] not as a culturally-
captive, but as an evolving, adaptive force. The July [2006] war has been 
interpreted as a signpost conflict for the future, pointing towards a 
post-modern, hybrid and ever more complex environment.’43
Mainstream journalism, terrorism expertise and policy accounts often 
present the history of Al Qaeda as an organisation that had been decimated 
by US military efforts, when arguably the group objectively achieved its 
goals (to serve as a base for a radical Islamist war against its Western 
enemy states, principally the US) and went out through studied mutation. 
Contradicting themselves, these analyses speak of a process whereby the 
group had metastasised, although Al Qaeda has not technically ended 
even 30 years after its formal creation. The early successes of Al Qaeda 
masked, however, a self-inflicted structural defeat. If initially the rapid 
proliferation of the regional representations of Al Qaeda were arguably 
an added indication of the organisation’s impressive global reach (in 
Europe, the Nile Valley, the Levant, the Maghreb and the Gulf) and its 
ability to operate transnationally years after the War on Terror had been 
launched against it, it gradually emerged that the regional entities differed 
significantly and their relationship to the mother Al Qaeda was now, at 
best, tenuous (with offshoots of offshoots multiplying, as in the notable 
case of AQIM).44 Whereas in its first 15 years Al Qaeda had been able 
to advance globally, cumulatively and against important odds – for each 
tactical loss, Al Qaeda came to earn strategic gain: retreat in Afghanistan 
but advance in Iraq; confined leadership but proliferating cells; curtailed 
physical movement but global, transnational impact; additional enemies 
but expanding recruits – during 2006–11 its leadership had morphed 
into a meta-commandment ultimately offering only politico-religious 
and military-strategic commentary, not operational direction. All in 
all, what can be read as a regionalisation strategy of Al Qaeda ended 
up confusing the global picture of the organisation for its militants. The 
necessary elasticity the group adopted – partly voluntarily, partly as a 
way to adapt to the international counter-terrorism campaign – created 
an ever-growing distance with already independent units. The aesthetic 
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authority of Al Qaeda was now merely anthemic for its anticipatory 
milieu. Woven in the fabric of its disruption of global affairs was, more 
importantly, a lasting matrix for radical political action that IS would, in 
time, come to inherit and build on.
As a terrorist military initiative, Al Qaeda peaked with the London 
July 2005 attack, itself a mini-replay of 9/11. Operationally, in leaving 
the protean sophistication of its violence there, it created a situation to 
be picked up by the franchises and the operatives in Western societies. 
An open-source Al Qaeda was born. Politically, the peak was reached 
a bit earlier, in November 2004, with Bin Laden’s speech three days 
before the US presidential election of that year, which led to the second 
mandate of George W. Bush. Simultaneously resolved and resigned, Bin 
Laden expressed a muted turmoil in a way that sought to reverse the 
interrogation in his region and towards the West. His statement in that 
speech to Americans that their security was in their hands not their 
leaders’, was an indication of a changed logic as to how the violence would 
play out in the next phase – while in effect closing his own chapter eight 
years before he was declared dead by the US.45 Bin Laden’s disappearance 
from Al Qaeda and the War on Terror scene marked the end of an era for 
the original group set up in Afghanistan. It opened a new phase in which 
the regional franchises would further enact their existing independence, 
and in so doing endow the larger conflict with a novel configuration by 
stretching the centre of gravity of transnational terrorism. Though the 
franchising exercise was complex and not fully mapped out by Al Qaeda, 
everything in that story had stayed in lockstep, as IS could next logically 
reinvent Al Qaeda, proving its mettle without necessarily differentiating 
itself from it. So much so indeed, that IS could claim Al Qaeda’s legacy 
without being explicitly tacked on to it. This is the subject of Chapters 2–4.
2
Apocalypse Iraq
We’ll have to work sort of the dark side, if you will.
Dick Cheney (2001)
To not understand the mythic underpinnings of our response to 
9/11 is, in a fundamental way, to not understand ourselves, to be so 
unknowing about the way we inhabit our cultural roles that we are 
stunned, insensible, when confronted by a moment that requires our 
full awareness.
Susan Faludi, The Terror Dream (2007)
If the first layer of understanding IS is to be located in its Al Qaeda 
lineage, and how IS came to be profoundly impacted by that indelible 
experience, the second level rests in the legacy of what the United States 
acted out in Iraq after 2003. There is no overstating the harm done by the 
American invasion to that country, to the region’s geostrategic balance 
and, more generally, to international affairs. The actions performed by 
the George W. Bush administration and the new Iraqi authorities they 
installed in Baghdad bear a direct correlation with the birth of IS, and 
the brutality the new group came to display in Iraq and other places. 
Beyond the grammatical legacy of what Al Qaeda introduced as a 
modus operandi, the type of terrorism, force patterns and transnational 
dissemination, there is, similarly, an important parallel to be established 
between the earlier ‘AfPak’ (Afghanistan-Pakistan) and the subsequent 
‘Syraq’ (Syria-Iraq) theatres of conflict, and the connection with the rise 
of Al Qaeda and that of IS. Both Al Qaeda and IS partake in key ways 
in geopolitical dynamics that have, at different periods, moulded them 
into the entities they are. Specifically, war, occupation, destruction and 
violations by external actors and corrupt local regimes have contributed 
to both the rise of the groups and the fuelling of their radical agendas. In 
deciphering the nature of such continuities, we are able to see the deeper 
logics of recurring violence at the hands of such extreme groups, and in 
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this case the further radicalisation of a new generation within an existing 
radical organisation.
Al Qaeda’s September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States 
unleashed, two years later, an imperial reaction in Iraq on the part of 
America, which in turn gave birth, ten years later, to IS. The challenge 
to the United States by Al Qaeda had led to the reassertion of American 
imperial might, in turn leading to a second armed group rising in the form 
of IS. Specifically, the degenerated sequence at the end of which an entity 
like IS could emerge with the violence that would come to characterise it, 
played out in relation to three key dimensions, namely: the dispossession 
and alienation consequences of the reinvention of colonialism under the 
guise of an international trusteeship to rebuild and democratise Iraq; the 
brutalisation of Iraqi society in the context of that episode in ways that 
left deep psychological and physical scars constitutive of societal trauma; 
which birthed a new generation of radicals fuelling their explicit desire of 
revenge through the use of upgraded terrorism. 
Colonialism Redesigned
Reflecting on the reasons for which many US policymakers often choose 
to ignore the links between US foreign policy and violent reactions to it, 
Jon Schwarz reminds us1 that the very official 9/11 Commission admitted 
in its report about the 2001 terrorist attacks on US soil that: ‘America’s 
policy choices have consequences. Right or wrong, it is simply a fact that 
American policy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and American 
actions in Iraq are dominant staples of popular commentary across the 
Arab and Muslim world.’2 That remark was made in reference to the 
long-standing American support of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian 
lands, and the US prosecution of the 1991 war in Iraq to dislodge 
Saddam Hussein’s army from its occupation of Kuwait and subsequent 
international embargo imposed on Iraq (which lasted from 6 August 1990 
to 22 May 2003, and until 15 December 2010 as concerned US and UK 
control of Iraq’s oil revenue). In the middle of that sequence, in May 1996, 
the United States ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, was asked 
by the CBS television programme 60 Minutes whether containment of 
Hussein’s Iraq was worth the lives of half a million children. She replied: 
‘I think this is a very hard choice, but the price, we think, the price is 
worth it’. Those policy choices and those specific initial US actions in Iraq 
were referred to by Bin Laden as reasons for his attacks on the United 
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States. Extensively documented, the economic privations during these 
years impacted a full generation of Iraqis, who were born in conditions 
of malnutrition and grew up amid a war-torn country.3 The control of 
Iraq by an international community led by the United States during 
this period was extensive and unprecedented. Between May 1991 and 
December 1998, 3,845 disarmament inspectors were deployed in Iraq in 
the context of 276 UN inspection missions, during which 392,000 visits 
took place using 2,957 helicopters flights and 140 surveillance cameras 
placed in 29 sites (in addition to 434 U2 spy plane overflights). During 
these years, 1,378 Iraqi officials and technicians were interrogated for 
2,359 hours, on nine kilometres of microfilm. These, however, were acts 
of instrumentalisation of international law and abuse of norms – as they 
went beyond the letter of the resolutions – to force the government of 
Saddam Hussein, which had not been defeated militarily in 1991 but 
merely compelled to withdraw from Kuwait, to bend to the will of the 
United States and its allies, be humiliated and ultimately collapse. The 
strategy pursued by the United States was explicitly about regime change, 
and all three US administrations (those of George H. Bush, Bill Clinton 
and George W. Bush) throughout those years provided support to the 
Iraqi opposition and sponsored coup attempts against Hussein’s regime 
(notably in 1994 and 1996, with action taken by US special forces in 2002 
to target the Iraqi president).
What took place when the United States established direct control of 
Iraq in April 2003, after it had launched a military invasion on 20 March, 
with the support of the United Kingdom and without the authorisation of 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), was of a different order and 
magnitude and constituted in effect an update of earlier colonial practices. 
The United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003 rebooted colonialism and, in 
addition to the independent legacy of Al Qaeda, set the stage (due to its 
brutality) for the birth of IS. The US invasion was illegal and the actions 
performed there criminal. The invasion was motivated by national and 
personal emotions, led by political calculations and constituted a strategic 
blunder. It followed explicit calls for colonising Muslim lands that had 
come less than a month after the 9/11 attacks, voiced in the columns of 
one of the most influential newspapers in the United States: ‘America 
may have to accept long-term political obligations … America and 
her allies may find themselves, temporarily at least, not just occupying 
with troops but administering obdurate terrorist states … These may 
eventually include not only Afghanistan but Iraq, Sudan, Libya, Iran 
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and Syria. Democratic regimes willing to abide by international law will 
be implanted where possible, but a Western political presence seems 
unavoidable in some cases.’4 Importantly, the invasion is directly related 
to the birth of IS. A video released by IS on 18 April 2017, entitled The 
War Recorded, presented a history of the group that starts with the US 
invasion in 2003, kicking off the narrated story with images of US tanks 
rolling victoriously into Baghdad.
The Iraq War, as it has come to be known, is generally regarded as 
a failure. The conflict is depicted in terms of ‘incompetence’, a ‘defeat’ 
and a ‘fiasco’, ‘unraveling’ with ‘no end in sight’, a ‘hell’ that has left the 
country in ‘fragments’.5 The war is denounced as not having worked, 
but the discussion remains for the most part at a level where what is 
essentially being criticised is the prosecution of the war, and what is being 
regretted is that it failed to accomplish its goals.6 In other words, from 
that perspective, had a better job been done at seeing it through, the war 
would have been acceptable. Discussion of the US invasion of Iraq is, in 
that sense, further marked by two traits, namely a tendency to focus on 
the tactical and military aspects and a desire to ‘move on’. The analysis 
proceeds from criticism of the management rather than the nature of the 
actions. ‘Missed opportunities’, ‘adventure’, ‘why we lost’, ‘why we couldn’t 
win’, all of it lamento for a scene where the travails of the US platoons are 
presented as ‘epic’ and ‘tragic’,7 just as those of the Centurions in French 
Algeria were, with such celebration of SEALs in Iraq continuing the 
tradition and imagery of The Green Berets (1968) in Vietnam and Black 
Hawk Down (2001) in Somalia.
As attested to by the Pentagon’s showing of The Battle of Algiers – 
the 1966 Gillo Pontecorvo film depicting French paratroopers battling 
Algerian independence fighters in French Algeria in 1957 – to its officers 
in 2003,8 the GWOT’s counter-insurgency matrix was eminently imperial 
in design and explicitly colonial in reference.9 In spite of the illegality 
of the Iraq War that came to be linked to the GWOT, the nature of 
that enterprise as a de facto modern-day, proto-colonial exercise is not 
registered as such. Yet it is precisely this aspect which holds the second 
key to the birth of the IS phenomenon. Specifically, the Iraq question 
was unrelated to the 9/11 attacks, Iraq was not a terrorism menace to 
the United States (as the CIA noted before the invasion),10 the Saddam 
Hussein regime did not hold nuclear weapons and the UNSC did not 
authorise the use of force by any member state in relation to that issue. 
Regardless, the United States, with the support of the United Kingdom: 
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invaded the country; arrested its president; took over its political, military 
and civilian administration; installed a government it had hand-picked; 
altered the laws of the nation; secured control over its resources; positioned 
thousands of troops throughout the land from March 2003 to December 
2011 (with 73 per cent of all active US soldiers having been deployed 
there or Afghanistan)11 and dispatched them anew since 2014; and built 
the largest embassy in the world in the heart of the country’s capital. 
According to the organisation Iraq Body Count, 268,000 violent deaths 
occurred as a result of these actions since 2003, out of which 190,000 were 
civilian deaths. With sound reason, Ralph Wilde concludes: 
To be sure, colonialism had never gone away in some places, … but 
Iraq perhaps marked the first time in the unipolar era that something 
new was criticised in mainstream commentary via direct colonial 
comparisons; the imperial hyper-power had shifted into an activity with 
echoes of post-Renaissance European colonialism, not only toppling a 
local government, but also administering the territory and attempting 
to profoundly reorient its economic, political and cultural system.12
The rapid fall of the Ba’ath regime – with its leadership reduced trivially 
to a set of playing cards (known as Personality Identification Player 
Cards) circulated by the US military to help its soldiers recognise and 
detain the most-wanted members – gave way to a lawlessness that has 
not disappeared since, 15 years later. Nir Rosen describes the mood as it 
materialised in the chaos-founding mid-2000s: 
The atmosphere of lawlessness that pervaded the country in those 
first few days and weeks never went away. Eventually, it allowed for 
criminals, gangs and mafias to take over; it replaced the totalitarian 
state and the fear it had imposed with complete indifference to the idea 
of a state. It was a shock from which Iraqis did not recover. In Baghdad, 
the dominant man in any area was called a shaqi. He was normally 
a thug who would sometimes engage in extortion and other small 
crimes; after the war these shaqis were recruited into armed groups 
and even religious militias.13 
Such societal drift was institutionalised per an instrumentalisation of 
international law that was neither surprising nor anomalous. Rather, 
what took place was part of ‘a long history of the uneven application 
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of international law in situations of colonial and imperial conquest 
and the routine disregard and subordination of non-European peoples 
to the interests of European powers’.14 Indeed, to a large extent the 
US administration replayed, after 2003, the sequence which had been 
pursued by the British in the 1920s. The so-called de-Ba’athification – 
whereby in May 2003 the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority ordered 
the removal of all Ba’ath party officials from the Iraqi political system 
– was not so different from the disbanding of the Ottoman structures 
that had ruled the provinces of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra in the late 
1910s and early 1920s. Following the fall of Baghdad in March 1917, the 
British had initially opted for a sharp increase in direct rule. Considering 
the Iraqis incapable of managing their own country, they had abolished 
Ottoman governing institutions (such as the elected municipal councils) 
and installed British political officers in their stead.15 Similarly, the 
British put together an Iraqi army in the 1920s that was essentially an 
amalgamation of conscripts, who were initially needed as support troops 
to quell the 1920 revolt against their rule. The problematic nature of that 
hodgepodge military force nonetheless gave it too strong a role in the 
early formation of the political structures of the country, leading in time 
to a series of coups as early as 1936. Sixty-seven years later, the rebuilding 
of the Iraqi army envisioned by Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and 
Doug Feith at the Pentagon was similarly done in a way that inevitably 
invited further trouble. The remilitarisation of Iraqi society since 2003 
was, for instance, reflected in the total number of people employed by the 
security forces, who, by 2012, came to equal 8 per cent of the country’s 
entire workforce and 12 per cent of the total population of adult males.16 
Finally, just as would happen later, the first resistance movements to the 
British takeover were of the Islamist kind – the Society of Islamic Revival 
had been formed in Najaf and Karbala in late 1918 – and the tribal one.
If the US occupation of Iraq holds some of the crucial keys to the rise of 
IS, it is because it created a new type of colonialism anchored in the past, 
but also embedded in a contemporary and persistent dispossession, which 
maintains the appearance of legality and the pretence of sovereignty. 
‘Liberated’, ‘democratised’ and ‘self-ruling’ Iraq was a message beamed 
(to Iraq, to the US and to the world) to conceal the backstage control 
of the actors and the dispossessing nature of the process. As in the old 
colonial days and under British influence, Iraqi culture now became 
Americanised. The country was ethnicised – the Iraqi Governing 
Council, which the US set up in July 2003, was the first entity in Iraq’s 
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contemporary history in which people were selected on the basis of their 
sectarian identity – and remade from afar, and a new flag designed for it 
(which was subsequently dropped).17 Yet precisely in the same manner 
as it did under classical colonialism, the might of the new colonial 
power and its control of the lands and processes yielded a type of violent 
resistance – what the United States called ‘the insurgency’ – which was 
nothing but the mirror image of the imperial power’s actions. Noting ‘the 
similarities between US direct imperialism in the late nineteenth century 
with the late twentieth century’, Julian Go highlights this replayed to and 
fro between centre and periphery: ‘For both the declining hegemon and 
the rising contenders, direct imperial aggression becomes the tactic of 
choice; a means of warding off rivals, tempering the challenge from 
competitors if not undercutting them and securing position in the field. 
In this way, global competitive field breeds imperial aggression.’18 This 
was a back and forth between foes that was not lost on some of the actors 
themselves. In a November 2004 interview with Walter Russell Mead for 
Esquire magazine, profiling US Vice President Dick Cheney, a senior US 
administration official established the link between the original 1991 US 
intervention in Iraq, the reaction by Bin Laden, the 9/11 attacks and the 
price of empire: 
But what were the real reasons for going into Iraq? I’d asked a senior 
administration official ... And the connection between containment 
and Al Qaeda? I asked. Between our Iraq policy and 11 September? 
The official pointed out fatwas from Osama that cited the effects of 
sanctions on Iraqi children and the presence of US troops as a sacrilege 
that justified his jihad. In a real sense, 11 September was part of the 
cost of containing Saddam. No containment, no US troops in Saudi 
Arabia. No US troops there, then Bin Laden might still be redecorating 
mosques and boring friends with stories of his mujahedeen days in the 
Khyber Pass.19 
At the heart of all colonialism, we find a push to reaction which is triggered 
once the occupied reaches the dead end of powerlessness. As Claudine 
Haroche explains: ‘All colonisations are more or less violent, more or 
less brutal, open or insidious, extended or restrained, but all go back to 
absence, privation, denial of autonomy and of self-worth of the colonised, 
and as such are about humiliation; all generate the feeling, the sentiment, 
72 . a theory of isis
and consequently the conscience of oppression, alienation, enslavement, 
dependency and ultimately powerlessness.’20
There is also a striking similarity between the violence that took place 
in the context of the Vietnam War and that of the Iraq War. The state 
violence perpetrated in Iraq was a direct continuation of the tradition 
pioneered in Vietnam, with a similar systemic logic at play. What Nick 
Turse identified in relation to Vietnam applies to American Iraq: 
[T]he stunning scale of civilian suffering in Vietnam is far beyond 
anything that can be explained as merely the work of some ‘bad apples’, 
however numerous. Murder, torture, rape, abuse, forced displacement, 
home burnings, specious arrests, imprisonment without due process – 
such occurrences were virtually a daily fact of life throughout the years 
of the American presence in Vietnam … [T]hey were no aberration. 
Rather, they were the inevitable outcome of deliberate policies, dictated 
at the highest levels of the military.21 
The role of the CIA is a case in point. After it was launched in 1965, 
its Phoenix Programme became part of the Civil Operations and 
Revolutionary Development Support programme in 1967, headed by 
William Colby (who served as CIA director from 1973 to 1976). The 
extrajudicial assassination nature of the programme, as well as its reliance 
on modern-day ‘mercenaries’, became characteristic of a pattern that 
would be updated anew in the 2000s. As Harlan Ullman, who in 1996 
developed the rapid dominance military doctrine known as ‘Shock and 
Awe’ that was adopted in 2003 during the invasion of Iraq, writes: 
Phoenix operatives were a mix of CIA, US and Australian Special 
Forces and South Vietnamese personnel and mercenaries. Until it 
ended in 1972, Phoenix ‘neutralised’ some 80,000 NLF [National 
Liberation Front] and Viet Cong of which about 30,000 were killed. In 
many cases, assassination was too kind a term and torture and barbaric 
interrogation practices were part of the standard operating procedure. 
Compared with Phoenix, enemy combatants killed so far by drone 
strikes have been a miniscule percentage as technology bypassed the 
need for ‘terminating with prejudice’ at close range.22
The pattern in Iraq also provided an eerie parallel to the well-documented 
human rights abuses committed by US-advised and -funded paramilitary 
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squads in Central America in the 1980s.23 Iraq bridged these different 
types of extrajudicial killing, collapsing the physical and virtual.
The process initiated by the US in 2003 has been playing out since 
with a grammar of degenerated conflicts that echoed from one country to 
another on a mimetic mode; the so-called ‘Lebanonisation of Iraq’ leading 
to the ‘Iraqification of the Middle East’.24 This took place in the context of 
a history of the Iraqi state which has fundamentally been one of resistance 
adopted by various groups of Iraqis trying to come to terms with the 
force, whatever force, the state represented.25 That Iraqi state has been 
captured frequently by distinct, usually unrepresentative groups, and it 
has generally been incapable of socialising the population into accepting 
the ruler’s vision of society and history other than by resorting to naked 
forms of coercion.26 There has also been a defining historical measure of 
transnationalism at the heart of Iraq, which informed the nature of the 
subsequent radical Islamist groups (see Chapter 3), notably with actors 
coming from the Arabian Peninsula. What, however, gave further impetus 
to the violence unleashed in 2003 is that the previous Iraqi generation had 
itself been born in the midst of unceasing violence since 1980. As Faleh 
Abdel Jabar notes on the differentia specifica of that group: 
The generation who fought the eight-year Iran-Iraq War had to fight 
two more devastating wars in 1991 and 2003 … During the war years, 
several age groups were drawn into the war zone. Those who were at 
the age of four in 1977 were fit for recruitment in 1991 […] Hence, 
we [can] use the term ‘generation of war’ in two temporal senses: as 
young age groups across the national space, which developed under 
the impact of the Iran-Iraq War and those who were recruited before 
they could enjoy the fruits of civilian life in adulthood. … While some 
other age groups shared this experience, the war generation had the 
misfortune of confronting it while on the verge of beginning what other 
age groups had already achieved: self-realisation, education, career-
building, family-building and so on … [W]ar became an obstacle to 
the normal development of careers at the very beginning of active life.27 
To this history were added the more immediate brashness of the US 
control effort, the tensions between the new Iraqi ministries (notably 
defence and interior), the ferocity of the Shi’a victors’ justice, the bypassing 
of parliamentary oversight by Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki, bureaucratic 
inefficiency, poor strategic planning, extensive and widespread corruption 
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at all levels, and more importantly the nature of the violence introduced 
by the American occupier, which, within a year, had produced a genuine 
‘barbarisation’ of the country.28
The United States went into Iraq in 1991 to wash away the ‘Vietnam 
syndrome’, and in 2003 ended up creating an ‘Iraq syndrome’ of a different 
nature. By 2016, one analyst could note that: 
The United States had a great window into its past with the Vietnam 
War, and although there were a number of differences between 
intervention in a Southeast Asian civil war and the occupation of an 
Arab country, anyone who bothered to look through that window 
could have forecasted much of the folly and fatality of Iraq. Instead, 
Americans boarded the window, tied yellow ribbons around their eyes 
and proved the accuracy of Gore Vidal’s assessment of the country as 
the ‘United States of Amnesia’.29 
In such an important context for the creation of IS, the early twenty-first 
century then marked a reimagining of colonialism and a renewed form 
of imperialism ushered in by the US decision to invade and take control 
of Iraq. Violence by US stormtroopers against civilians in Iraq (and in 
Afghanistan) took place repeatedly and with impunity. Colonial-type 
violence (e.g. trophies taken by bone- and finger-collecting US kill teams, 
desecrations of bodies, flushing and burning of Qur’ans) was manifested 
regularly – ‘such news reports, though a recurring feature of contemporary 
life, trace a predictable arc in and out of public consciousness … Even 
a cursory reflection on the available facts, however, shows that these 
atrocities were not aberrations committed in a political vacuum’30 – and was 
therefore revealing in terms of its inevitable time-delayed consequence on 
the colonised. The brutality of domination was also unpacked by the Iraqi 
Shi’a on their fellow Sunni citizens. Signs of the arrogant Americanised 
Arab military and police were already familiar in Jordan and Egypt, but 
in Iraq a new man was created; walking, talking and behaving like the 
colonial actor that violently moulded him in his image. Crucially for the 
IS story, many an Iraqi came to internalise their observations of torture 
performed by American soldiers, and replay them later on.31
Monstering in American Iraq
The control which the United States had secured over Iraq allowed it 
initially to achieve two unspoken goals that nonetheless stood at the heart 
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of the motivations for the American war effort, namely closure of the 
1991 Gulf War and revenge for 9/11. On the one hand, George W. Bush 
sought to achieve that which his father could not and had been criticised 
for, namely bringing down Saddam Hussein and delivering a clear victory 
to the US in the face of a ‘defiant’ Third World leader in the Middle 
East. (Shortly before the 20 March 2003 US invasion, the situation had 
acquired almost Shakespearean or Greek tragedy accents, with the son 
of a president, now president himself, issuing a 48-hour ultimatum to 
another president – who had fought the former’s father – to step down 
along with his two sons.) On the other hand, the United States, which had 
been at war in Afghanistan since October 2001 in pursuit of Bin Laden 
and the rest of Al Qaeda’s leadership, sought to demonstrate that they had 
punished Islamists and Arabs and taken control of their lands (regardless 
of the fact that Iraq had nothing to do with 9/11). A third, more insidious, 
less visible objective, but arguably even more relevant to the origin of IS, 
would be introduced subsequently, namely the torture and humiliation 
of Iraqis suspected of being part of the insurgency. In the immediate 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the United States had embarked on a course 
in which human rights violations rapidly took place in the name of 
fighting terrorism. Within a year after 9/11 (September 2001–September 
2002), the US-based Lawyers Committee for Human Rights was in a 
position to document that first batch of violations in the United States.32 
Among many in the United States, a dramatically expanded resentment 
towards Arabs and Muslims combined with limited knowledge of foreign 
affairs to allow for perceptions of ‘the Iraq matter’ as being related to 
the 9/11 attacks. Tellingly, an American citizen whose son had died in 
the 9/11 attacks contacted the Pentagon to ask that the name of his son 
be inscribed on one of the bombs to be dropped on Iraqis in 2003. The 
Department of Defense later informed him that this had been done and 
had been a ‘one-hundred per cent success’.33 Whereas the Afghanistan 
conflict – which had started on 7 October, less than a month after the 
New York and Washington events – could be linked to the terrorist 
attacks, since Al Qaeda was enjoying sanctuary in that country, the issue 
of Iraq that had lingered since 1991 and throughout the embargo years 
was instrumentalised to assert the United States’ new global stance once 
it had been attacked on its own soil. The George W. Bush administration 
therefore consciously – with the support of the governments of Tony Blair 
(UK), José Maria Aznar (Spain), Silvio Berlusconi (Italy), Nicolas Sarkozy 
(France) and Hosni Mubarak (Egypt) – pursued a plan to take control of 
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Iraq both to give an appearance of dealing with the Muslim perpetrators 
of 9/11 to the none-too-regarding US population, and to send a global 
message about its willingness to be extreme in retaliating against those 
that dared conspire against it. In so doing, however, the US gave birth to 
a generation more brutal than the previous one, which is itself willing to 
pursue extreme violence to exact revenge on the United States.
This consequential US policy path was illustrated specifically and most 
problematically by the illegal, illegitimate and counterproductive usage of 
torture, notably between 2002 and 2005. As time and public inattention 
have gone by, responsibility for what took place has become murky and 
the issue of torture in Iraq is referred to metaphorically, generically casting 
the discussion in vague geostrategic, security or legal terms. The extent 
of the torture has, however, been well researched, documented34 and 
reported by several insiders,35 although not all the information has been 
released yet. A reconstruction of the events reveals that a political decision 
was taken at the highest levels of the US government to subject Arab and 
Muslim suspects in Iraq to methods unacceptable in a democracy. To the 
extent that, as it is argued here, such treatment sowed the seeds for the IS 
generation’s brutality, it is important to review the facts in detail. Three 
days after the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush signed a military 
order, the ‘Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain 
Terrorist Attacks’, by which he declared a national emergency in the United 
States. Shortly thereafter, that same month, he asked the CIA to ‘capture 
or kill’ all the leaders of Al Qaeda around the world. On 19 January 2002, 
US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wrote a memorandum to the 
joint chiefs of staff, entitled ‘Status of Taliban and Al Qaeda’, in which he 
‘determine[d] that Al Qaeda and Taliban individuals under the control 
of the Department of Defense were not entitled to prisoner of war status 
for purposes of the Geneva Conventions of 1949’. The next month, on 7 
February, President Bush wrote a memorandum to Vice President Dick 
Cheney, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and the heads of the intelligence 
agencies, in which he declared that the United States would not be bound 
by the Geneva Conventions’ protections for prisoners of war when it 
came to Al Qaeda. Four months later, the head of the Office of the Legal 
Counsel of the Department of Justice, Jay Bybee, wrote a memorandum 
to Alberto Gonzales, counsel to President Bush, in which he noted that, 
specifically ‘in the context of interrogations outside of the United States’, 
torture can be considered in a restrictive manner; ‘[W]hile many of these 
techniques [defined as torture in the Convention] may amount to cruel, 
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inhuman or degrading treatment, they do not produce pain or suffering 
of the necessary intensity to meet the definition of torture. From these 
decisions, we conclude that there is a wide range of such techniques that 
will not rise to the level of torture.’36 The same day, in a heavily redacted 
memorandum to the CIA (ten of the 18 pages released are blacked out 
fully), Jay Bybee noted that ‘to violate the statute, an individual must have 
the specific intent to inflict severe pain or suffering. … [W]e believe those 
carrying out these procedures would not have the specific intent to inflict 
severe pain or suffering.’
Following a series of related memoranda detailing that ‘harsh’ 
measures could be used,37 the US Department of Defense asked – as a 
May 2007 Pentagon report would later admit – the Survival, Evasion, 
Resistance, Escape programme of the US Army to look into ‘aggressive 
interrogation techniques’ (sleep deprivation, stress positions, sensory 
overload, mock executions) which could be used to interrogate the 
apprehended suspected Al Qaeda members and ‘break’ them. On 2 
December 2002, Donald Rumsfeld approved a memorandum authorising 
the use of these aggressive measures (including nudity and use of dogs), 
annotating it personally and sending copies to the heads of the prisoners’ 
camps in Guantánamo Bay and Afghanistan. Rumsfeld then dispatched 
Deputy-Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Lieutenant-
General William Boykin, to Guantánamo Bay, where he met the head of 
Camp X-Ray, Geoffrey Miller, who was instructed to travel to Iraq and 
implement there the interrogation techniques developed in Guantánamo 
Bay. Accordingly, in early 2003, a special missions unit in Iraq wrote up 
a protocol for prisoner interrogation based on the techniques used by 
US forces in Afghanistan; a document which the commander of the 
coalition forces in Iraq, Lieutenant-General Ricardo Sanchez, adopted on 
14 September. A few months later, on 13 January 2004, a young military 
police officer, Joseph Darby, assigned to the Abu Ghraib prison on the 
outskirts of Baghdad, reported to the Criminal Investigations Division of 
the US Army that abuse of prisoners was ongoing at that facility. Darby 
sent a computer disc with pictures and videos of sexual abuse, including 
the humiliation of an Iraqi man and his son. On 16 January, a report 
was sent to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld who informed President Bush 
of the situation.38 The same month, Major-General Antonio Taguba 
launched an internal investigation which assigned responsibility to 
elements within the US Army, as well as the CIA, as regards the actions 
committed in Abu Ghraib. Taguba noted that, before the initiative taken 
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independently by MP Darby, Lieutenant-General Sanchez was already 
aware of what had been taking place in Abu Ghraib since 2003, and that 
Geoffrey Miller had been sent to set up a torture model similar to the one 
used in Guantánamo Bay.
On 28 April 2004, the CBS News programme 60 Minutes II aired some 
of the pictures of the acts committed in Abu Ghraib, which were also 
published online, two days later, by the New Yorker. On 6 May, Taguba was 
called in by Rumsfeld who, in the presence of Paul Wolfowitz, complained 
of not having been informed of the situation in Abu Ghraib. The next 
day, under oath, Rumsfeld denied any knowledge of what was happening 
in Abu Ghraib before the US Senate, and the nature of the actions that 
had been reported to him on 16 January. In December, in the wake of 
the leaking of a confidential report by the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) that mentioned ‘practices equivalent to torture’ 
by the United States in Iraq,39 the Department of Justice termed torture 
‘abhorrent’ and appeared to bring an end to the practices adopted since 
2002. However, in February 2005, under Alberto Gonzales, a new secret 
memorandum was drafted explicitly authorising a series of psychological 
and physical measures, including waterboarding. Eventually, in June 2006, 
the US Supreme Court decided that Common Article 3 of the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 applied to all US detainees. However, on 17 October 
of that year, the US Congress adopted a Military Commissions Act, which 
authorised the US president to determine the specific interrogation 
techniques to be used, and nine months later President Bush authorised 
the CIA, by presidential order, to use interrogation methods prohibited to 
the military. According to US soldier Michael Keller, who was posted in 
Abu Ghraib, resort to torture was persisting in the facility one year after 
the revelations had been made.40 As late as 2009, the US administration 
was using secret prisons in so-called ‘black sites’.41
The Guantánamoisation of Abu Ghraib clearly took place. Explicitly 
and bureaucratically. Though this was later officially denied by US 
authorities, methods of torture used initially on prisoners at Guantánamo 
Bay42 (most of whom had been captured in Afghanistan from the autumn 
of 2001 onwards, or ‘rendered’ by countries cooperating secretly with the 
United States) were exported (‘migrated’ to use Pentagon phraseology) to 
the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. As the Taguba report also revealed, several 
agents of private military contractors (CACI and TITAN) were ‘directly or 
indirectly’ involved in the violations. In a 14 February 2007 confidential 
report, the ICRC noted that the United States also used torture on suspects 
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in other sites kept secret and operated by the CIA. In spite of these 
violations, and the eventual release by the US Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence, on 9 December 2014, of a 514-page report on torture 
(The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study 
of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program), 
Abu Ghraib has in effect been whitewashed and ‘swept under the carpet’,43 
erased from the American collective memory, and beyond. As was the 
case with Vietnam, the crimes that were committed there went largely 
unpunished and the visceral horrors that took place have not all been 
revealed. More than 60 children may have been interned at Abu Ghraib. 
Some of them may have been tortured and at least one child may have 
been abused while a woman took pictures.44 Abuse of women, related to 
prisoners or prisoners themselves, contained cases of bestiality.45 Indeed, 
according to those present, like US Army Military Intelligence Sergeant 
Sam Provance, who was involved in the acts committed, ‘Abu Ghraib was 
Apocalypse Now meets The Shining’.46
Lied about, reported euphemistically (‘in 2004, in the aftermath of 
revelations that the Bush administration was waterboarding terrorist 
suspects, … The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, USA Today 
and The Wall Street Journal almost never referred to waterboarding as 
torture’),47 portrayed as the action of bad apples, whitewashed within 
the US Army (years after the crimes, stories kept surfacing, often with 
irresolution and impunity)48 and forgotten quickly only to be reintroduced 
later (‘it’s quite an astonishing thing: torture, which used to be illegal, 
which used to be anathema, has now become a policy choice’ remarked 
Mark Danner in 2014),49 the partially disclosed crimes of human 
experimentation50 at Abu Ghraib left an indelible imprint on the Iraqis 
who experienced them directly – those who were lucky to escape them 
– or indirectly, and those others observing with shock and revulsion. 
Accusations of similar actions were levelled at the United Kingdom. 
Though on a smaller scale, British authorities were accused of engaging in 
a systemic practice of torture in Iraq throughout the years 2003–8.51 Abu 
Ghraib was a formal staging post for a level of atrocity, authorised at the 
highest levels of US defence officialdom,52 which purposefully meant to 
impart to those insurgents fighting the United States that the gloves were 
off and that extreme prejudice would be pursued to bring them down 
by way of an ubiquitous system of suffering and humiliation. Healthcare 
professionals, physicians and psychologists assisted in the development 
of so-called ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’,53 which were explicitly 
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‘culturalised’ to humiliate Arabs and Muslims in ways perceived by these 
professionals as most effective in a Middle Eastern environment. Inspired 
by Raphael Patai’s Lombrosian phrenology-flavoured 1973 book The Arab 
Mind, a secret Pentagon programme known as ‘Copper Green’, designed 
to physically coerce and sexually humiliate prisoners, was developed 
by the US authorities in the aftermath of 9/11. Culturally informed 
interrogation techniques were introduced among some 24 methods 
used by the Department of Defense – these included two known as ‘Fear 
Up Harsh’ and ‘Pride and Ego Down’. Upping the ante, with a view to 
both exorcise the 9/11 syndrome and punish those it chose to associate 
culturally with the attacks of 2001, the United States’ leadership unleashed 
a fury which did not immediately step out to exact revenge in turn, but 
rather, and more problematically for the United States, grew slowly into 
a ‘monstered’ form of extreme radicalism. ‘The relentlessness, day in day 
out, of these techniques – walling, close-confinement, water-dousing, 
water-boarding … rectal re-hydration and various other disgusting and 
depraved things – and the totality of their effect when taken together is 
… revolting.’54 Abu Ghraib – which formed a pattern with Camp X in 
Guantánamo Bay, Bagram in Afghanistan and the black sites operated 
secretly around the world (considered as an option to be continued in 
2017)55 – was hardly an isolated scene of violence in Iraq, since at least 
two massacres of civilians imputable to US forces took place in March 
2005 in Haditha and in March 2006 in Mahmoudia, with respectively 15 
and 24 civilians killed.
As the United States processed 9/11, it experienced a combination of 
fear and desire for revenge, which fed the very cruelty that was displayed 
in this systemic fashion in Iraq. Whereas the crimes in Vietnam had 
been born in the context of a conflict evolving gradually over three 
administrations, in which US soldiers would operate with increased 
impunity as their government raised the political and military stakes, 
Iraq was an invented conflict to allow for immediate societal venting. 
It lent itself both to policy planning specifically designed to target the 
Islamist enemy that had conducted a terror attack in the metropolis, and, 
in terms of communication, to that segment of the US citizenry that only 
half-candidly went along with the misleading Iraq-as-an-international-
nuclear-threat hoax, seduced by the unspeakable punishing mission. 
Unsurprisingly, and simultaneously with these torture practices, the 
2000s witnessed a popular cultural revival of the horror films in the US 
that had first arisen during the 1970s Vietnam era (The Texas Chainsaw 
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Massacre, The Exorcist, Halloween). In a reflection of the Iraq War context, 
these new productions combined primal fear of the unknown with more 
straightforwardly sadistic illustrations such as Saw (the fastest franchise 
in film history, with seven releases in six years between 2004 and 2010), 
Hostel (2005) and Torturer (2008), the tag line of which was ‘In a post-
September 11 world, no one can hear you cry’. At times, it was almost 
hard to distinguish the trailer for the new Saw film and news footage of 
the latest leaked pictures from Abu Ghraib; real-life cases of Apocalypse 
Now meeting The Shining indeed.56 Fear also manifested itself through 
the return of paranoid conspiracy political thrillers, just as they had 
featured prominently in the 1970s (The Conversation, The Parallax View, 
Three Days of the Condor, All the President’s Men), as post-9/11 malaise 
replaced post-Watergate confusion, with productions such as Bug (2006), 
Body of Lies (2008), State of Play (2009) and Duplicity (2009). In Munich 
(2005), Steven Spielberg established a direct analogy between 1972 
Black September terrorists and 2001 Al Qaeda operatives, and between 
the Israeli hunt of Palestinian operators across Europe throughout the 
1970s and the United States’ international pursuit of Bin Laden and his 
men. The manner in which these extra-legal issues were affecting the 
public debate, arts and life generally in the United States – with apathy 
nonetheless dominant57 – was suffusing Americana in a striking way. 
Not even the popular, modern-day fairy tale Star Wars escaped those 
gloomy days where authoritarianism took the guise of righteousness, 
with Episodes II (2002) and III (2005) of that saga not-so-subtly echoing 
the ambient ethical dissonance in the face of terrorism, and the fall of a 
republic succumbing to the corruption of its ideals by the rise of obscure 
and unseen manipulative forces fighting rebels in the name of democracy. 
‘So this is how liberty dies, with thunderous applause’, registers a distraught 
Queen Padmé Amidala (Natalie Portman). ‘If you are not with me, 
you are my enemy’, declares Anakin Skywalker (Hayden Christensen), 
already falling to the dark side, with director George Lucas near-explicitly 
denouncing George W. Bush’s State of the Union phrase uttered in January 
2002: ‘Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.’ The full-circle 
sequence from Vietnam to Iraq by way of Hollywood would, however, be 
closed by the filmmaker Brian de Palma, who in 2006 shot Redacted, a 
modern vérité-style remake of his own 1989 Casualties of War, in which 
a young Iraqi girl, now replacing a young Vietnamese girl, is raped and 
killed by US soldiers (denounced by a whistle-blower but covered by their 
superiors) – both cases inspired by true events.
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In the aftermath of 9/11, the United States engaged in the practice 
of torture. With overwhelming evidence of cases in Iraq, Guantánamo 
Bay, Afghanistan and elsewhere,58 that practice was ordered at the highest 
levels of the state and was designed to function in a systemic way. In 
spite of its celebration, with scenes of waterboarding in television series 
such as 24, Homeland, Sleeper Cell, and The Grid, or films like Zero Dark 
Thirty (2012), torture did not work. Many detainees had nothing to do 
with terrorism, and indeed many of them went into terrorism after their 
torture experience at the hands of the US forces. Torture continued after 
the matter was allegedly closed in 2006. The Army Field Manual on Inter-
rogation, amended that year, still allowed for sleep deprivation, separation 
and stress positions to be used in interrogation:
Detainees were shackled in painful positions, locked in boxes the size 
of coffins, kept awake for over one hundred hours at a time and forced 
to inhale water in a process known as water-boarding. Interrogators 
sometimes went far beyond what Washington had authorised, 
sodomising detainees with blunt objects, threatening to sexually abuse 
their family members and, on at least one occasion, freezing a suspect 
to death by chaining him to an ice-cold floor overnight.59 
In truth, the extent of the horrors in which US soldiers and private 
contractors casually engaged in Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantánamo Bay and 
several secret sites around the world, may never be known (particularly as 
some embedded American journalists who witnessed extrajudicial killing 
by US troops, including women and children, did not report it).60 The 
crimes are likely to be much worse than acknowledged. Crimes have been 
left unpunished and hidden, and of little concern to the authorities which 
half-authorised them in the first place. In effect, the abuse of Iraqis took 
place with impunity for several years – few trials were brought up and 
most cases have been dismissed.61 Ultimately, then, the militarisation of 
American society – increasingly fearful, paranoid, violent and insensitive 
to the brutality that its actions abroad were triggering62 – can be looked 
upon as the expression of the trauma of 9/11, and a desire for revenge which 
gave birth to a type of cruelty that manifested itself in the midst of the US 
military. Indeed, during the autumn 2001 campaign in Afghanistan, a US 
soldier had suggested ‘monstering’ an Afghan prisoner.63 The physical and 
psychological punishment, the normalisation of torture and the adoption 
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of such practices by the Iraqis themselves vis-à-vis each other64 helped 
create Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). 
‘I will see you in New York’
IS is derivative terrorism. The violent simulacra and the weaponisation of 
images it famously staged in the videos featuring ‘Jihadi John’ and others, 
followed Al Qaeda’s actions and was inspired by the torturers of Abu Ghraib 
in the context of the modern subjugation of Iraq. Al Qaeda’s radicalism 
had not, however, stepped into the level of barbarity that IS would come 
to perform regularly. The invasion of Iraq and the dehumanising torture 
acts committed in that context opened the road to a hellish new type of 
extreme radicalisation, which was different from the group Bin Laden had 
set up to pursue what could be termed ‘political warfare terrorism’. Still, 
as discussed, the martiality of Al Qaeda was the first step in a process of 
IS’s inception. By ushering in a new age of more proactive, battle-tested, 
non-state armed groups, Al Qaeda made available a functional matrix of 
self-empowered rebellion, which the Iraqi insurgency was immediately 
able to seize upon when it materialised between the spring and early 
summer of 2003 to face the US invader. The transformation of Al Qaeda 
that began with the US invasion of Iraq, and therefore the arguably 
inevitable passing of the baton to IS, is in fact an accidental development 
that owes as much to the actions and choices of the US as it does to the 
ones taken by Al Qaeda itself. For it is not at all evident – and indeed 
questionable – that had the invasion of Iraq not taken place, a similarly 
ultra-violent Al Qaeda offshoot would have materialised in the Levant 
or somewhere else. Al Qaeda had packed and left the Middle Eastern 
environment, in which its (Palestinian, Egyptian and Saudi) founders 
had developed their political views and underground radical militancy, 
to join a resistance movement in Asia, in the name of religious solidarity. 
At the close of the first chapter – the Afghan-Soviet war – and on the 
strength of its ‘victory’ over one superpower, Al Qaeda used its theatre of 
operation and experience as a jumping-off point to create a ‘base’ from 
which to attack another superpower (the sole remaining one by then). 
In effect, therefore, 9/11 was the culmination of that effort. The logical 
next step could only be envisioned, from Al Qaeda’s viewpoint, as a series 
of further attacks on the United States on its soil. Yet a so-called second 
wave of attacks in the US did not materialise in late 2001 and 2002. Was 
it planned and could not be launched? It is not at all clear (arrested before 
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the 9/11 attacks for a visa overstay violation, Zacarias Moussaoui was in 
all likelihood the original twentieth hijacker and not a sleeper accomplice 
planning more operations). Two small-scale operations were the work 
of copycats – on 2 December 2001, a Sudanese national fired a Stinger 
missile on a US military plane at the Prince Sultan airbase in Saudi Arabia, 
and on 22 December 2001, on board a London–Miami American Airlines 
flight, a British citizen of Sri Lankan origin, Richard Reid, attempted to 
detonate C-4 explosives hidden in his shoes. The logic of Bin Laden’s ‘to 
the far enemy’ type of war had, it seemed, reached an impasse with the 
unexpected magnitude of the fall of the Twin Towers, the collapse of one 
wing of the Pentagon and the killing of close to 3,000 Americans. The 
subsequent moves on the part of Al Qaeda’s leadership indicated that its 
mindset was still wedded to the displacement strategy. As both a rejoinder 
to the US response to the 9/11 attacks first in Afghanistan and later in 
Iraq, Al Qaeda struck once more at the larger territory of the ‘far enemy’, 
this time in Spain and in the United Kingdom. Although linked explicitly 
by Bin Laden and al Dhawahiri (in their speeches of, respectively, 15 
April 2004 and 1 September 2005) to the support of the Aznar and Blair 
governments for the US invasion of Iraq, the attacks were essentially a 
variation on the 9/11 from-here-to-there mode. They also represented 
the last large-scale ‘war’ acts the group would conduct, and in effect the 
year 2005 closed the chapter on the group – again several years before the 
death of Bin Laden – as the strategy designed in Khost in August 1988 had 
reached its conceptual and operational limits. In invading Afghanistan in 
October 2001 and Iraq in 2003, the United States wrestled the initiative 
from Bin Laden. Tactically, he could and did respond lethally in Madrid 
and in London, but strategically the arrival of the ‘far enemy’ on his ‘near’ 
territory altered the game.
This mid-2000s juncture marked precisely the point at which the logic 
of an ‘Islamic State’ could emerge. More so than the Afghanistan conflict, 
which featured a wider set of actors (the international coalition, the 
Taliban), the occupation of Iraq brought back the perfected Al Qaeda 
modus operandi to inform the birth of a local insurgency, which would 
both borrow that method and develop its own narrative. The military 
influence of Al Qaeda on the local Iraqi actors was perceptible even 
before the Iraq insurgency started to form in mid-2003, and before 
that influence reached state actors themselves. Thus, whereas in 1991 
Saddam Hussein’s regime had prepared for classical state-on-state third-
generation warfare by fronting its Republican Guard divisions, in 2003, 
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as the battle was looming with the US, it shifted to asymmetrical fourth-
generation warfare.65 A special group known as Saddam’s Fedayeen was 
set up, which in effect sought to replicate the partisan type of war that Al 
Qaeda had made its distinguishing feature in Afghanistan (while echoing 
nationalist-secular Palestinian terminology of the 1970s). A group of 
suicide bombers even emerged, and at least one woman was arrested as 
she was about to carry out an operation. The days in late March and early 
April 2003 during which the Iraqi army in effect refused to fight – some 
of its leadership reportedly striking deals with the US forces, the lower 
ranks defecting – opened the door to the formal emergence of a rebellion 
across the country. By June, what came to pass was a second consequence 
of Al Qaeda’s 2001 attacks on the United States that Bin Laden did not 
envision nor could control.
The social make-up of that first generation of Iraqi insurgents featured 
a number of strands, which continued to coexist in the following years as 
the rebellion evolved and took on different forms; soldiers, local Islamists, 
tribesmen, average citizens and regional operators (again, mostly Islamists 
from the Gulf). Internationally, Al Qaeda was witnessing the Iraq War 
alter the nature of its operation. Besides the two small-scale attempts in 
December 2001 and the conflict raging in Afghanistan, the following 
two years saw stepped-up regional and international attacks by Islamist 
groups that increasingly escaped Al Qaeda’s control – Jerba, Tunisia on 
11 April 2002; Karachi, Pakistan on 14 June 2002; Sana’a, Yemen on 6 
October 2002; Bali, Indonesia on 12 October 2002; Moscow, Russia 
on 23 October 2002; Mombasa, Kenya on 23 November 2002; Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia on 12 May 2003; Casablanca, Morocco on 16 May 2002; 
Jakarta, Indonesia on 5 August 2003; Riyadh, Saudi Arabia again on 8 
November 2003; and Istanbul, Turkey on 15 and 20 November 2003. This 
international sequence ran parallel with the events in Iraq, where the first 
two major operations of the insurgency took place in 2003, on 7 and 15 
August, with the respective bombings of the Jordanian embassy and the 
UN compound. The year closed with the arrest of Saddam Hussein on 
14 December, and his execution three years later on 30 December 2006. 
The hanging of Saddam Hussein on a day of Muslim religious 
celebration, Eid al Adha, was a key moment in the degeneration of politics 
in Iraq and an accelerator of the radicalisation of the soldiery-to-be of 
IS. The videoed execution – grainy, snuff movie-like footage leaked by a 
high-ranking Shi’a official present at the event – was internalised by many 
Sunni Iraqis as the ultimate expression of their brethren’s humiliation, the 
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colonisation of their consciousness and a confessional war now in full 
swing, pitting them against vengeful segments of the Shi’a community. 
Present in the room were many Shi’a taunting Hussein as he was about 
to be hanged with shouts of ‘Long live Imam Mohammad Baqr al Sadr!’ 
and ‘Muqtada! Muqtada!’, in reference to Shi’a political leader Muqtada 
al Sadr. Eight years later, in June 2014, IS would, among its first acts as 
IS, seek out the judge who sentenced Hussein, Raouf Abdul Rahman, 
and kill him. For many radicalised Sunnis, the choreographed violence 
functioned from thereon both as an explicit motivator and as a trauma-like 
repressed memory, whose responsibility they laid at the feet of the new 
Iraqi authorities and the United States. The former Iraqi national security 
advisor who oversaw the execution, Mowaffak al Rubaie, recalled how 
the decision to hang Hussein was taken: ‘Saddam’s execution was set in 
motion after a video conference between [then Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri 
al] Maliki and then-US President George Bush, who asked the Iraqi prime 
minister: “What are you going to do with this criminal?” Maliki replied: 
“We hang him.” Bush gave him a thumbs up, signalling his approval.’66 The 
years of war in the 1980s and the sanctions of the 1990s had gradually led 
to an Islamisation of the Ba’ath party. The process started as the rhetoric 
of religion was increasingly introduced into the political communication 
of the party, and this continued in 1991 as the words Allahu Akbar (God 
is Great) were added to the Iraqi flag a few days before the start of the US 
operation on 15 January 1991. What had started as a tactic, and became 
a strategy after the Kuwait matter and the Shi’a revolt in April 1991, 
turned into an element of the identity of latter-day Ba’athism. The death 
of Hussein sealed the sequence by sacralising that add-on religiosity. The 
future IS leadership took this predisposition with it.
One man who lived through this period of Iraq’s degenerated descent 
into violence and hatred, absorbing it all, was Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al 
Badri. Upon his release in September 2009 from Camp Bucca (an inmate 
site named after a New York Fire Department marshal, Ronald Bucca, 
killed in the 9/11 attacks), the prison in Iraq where he had been held 
for the previous three years since his capture in Fallujah on 9 December 
2006, the man turned to his captors and reportedly uttered the following 
words: ‘I will see you in New York, guys’. He allegedly went on to become 
the leader of IS, as Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. US Army Colonel Kenneth 
King later recalled the words67 as coming from an inmate who was not 
even among the more radical in the prison (who were quarantined in a 
special section). There is a lingering lack of clarity on the matter, and al 
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Baghdadi is also reported to have been released from prison much earlier, 
in December 2004, having been held there since the previous February. 
In effect, the man released in 2009 may not have been al Baghdadi at all 
but another Al Qaeda militant. Regardless, the symbolic nature of such a 
statement metaphorically closed the circle on Bin Laden’s promise to visit 
violence on the United States, 20 years later. That resolve, however, had 
now come from a different place and it would first play out locally, then 
regionally and ultimately internationally.
3
From Qaedat al Jihad  
to Al Dawla al Islamiya
Beware of pursuing savage speech in your quest for eloquence. 
Abdullah Ibn al Muqaffa, Al Adab al Saghir (750)
Spirits that I’ve called, my commands ignore. 
Goethe, The Sorcerer’s Apprentice (1797)
Al Qaeda was once the mightiest radical Islamist group, revolutionising 
terrorism in the 1990s and 2000s and introducing novel patterns 
of transnational force projection. In the aftermath of the American 
occupation of Iraq, led in response to the attacks Al Qaeda had 
conducted in the United States in 2001, one of the group’s own offshoots, 
IS, dislodged it between 2011 and 2014 and went on to acquire greater 
capability and impact. The evolution, within the same movement, of an 
entity stressing its ‘base’ (qaeda) nature to one seeking to become a ‘state’ 
(dawla) was an important marker of the shape and direction things were 
taking – within months, in 2011, the Arab Spring broke out, Bin Laden 
died and the United States left Iraq. As we have seen, Al Qaeda’s push-
and-pull extremism had come to represent a strategic reorientation of 
contemporary political violence, which owed its fundamental nature to 
globalisation. Whereas earlier generations of terrorism had sought to 
destroy (Nihilists and Anarchists of the late nineteenth century), capture 
(nationalists of the 1950s and 1960s) or usurp (left-wing revolutionaries 
of the 1970s) statehood, Al Qaeda had moved to declaring the Arab and 
Muslim states’ military function obsolete, stressing its own militarised 
might and reach. Such self-capacitation met with success for a while, but 
in spawning franchises it paradoxically held the keys to the end of its own 
meticulous planning. The more Al Qaeda invited its subgroups to act 
independently and assert themselves regionally, the more it was hollowing 
out its core and rendering itself irrelevant, and not merely operationally. 
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Evanescence and hybridity came logically to take over a sequence closed 
neatly by the death of Bin Laden in May 2011.
The United States’ withdrawal from Iraq on 18 December 2011 (the 
process had started in December 2007) opened the way for the local Al 
Qaeda franchise, AQI – which had already renamed itself Islamic State 
in Iraq (ISI) five years earlier, in October 2006 – to occupy that space by 
stepping up its insurgency in Iraq, but also, in time, growing to harbour 
wider and more consequential ambitions. Those aspirations would match 
the global plans once envisioned by Bin Laden, turning them into the 
reality of a transnational army, but they would also remap the strategic 
landscape his group had dominated for two decades by merging the 
original Al Qaeda logic with a centralised statehood aim which Al Qaeda 
had explicitly avoided. The shift from Qaedat al Jihad (the Base of Jihad), 
as Al Qaeda officially referred to itself, to al Dawla al Islamiya (Islamic 
State), as the new group would, in time, formally label itself, was a shift of 
lasting consequence, as IS eventually broke ranks publicly with Al Qaeda 
and declared it finished. How and why did that shift occur? What were 
the implications of IS’s replacement of Al Qaeda? Towards which horizons 
was IS moving and for what discernible purpose? As the sequence played 
out during the first half of the 2010s, three dimensions, indicative of the 
nature of the emerging group, manifested themselves. First, whereas Al 
Qaeda had privileged the export of rebellion, IS engineered a refocusing 
on the local, specifically in Iraq in the wake of the change of political 
guard from US occupation forces to the Shi’a government of Nuri al 
Maliki. Second, IS seized on an unexpected opportunity afforded by the 
Syrian civil war, which started in March 2011, to assert itself regionally 
and pursue a complex Levantine expansion meant to widen its scope, 
power and performativity. Finally, the displacement of Al Qaeda – which 
IS would partly achieve violently and unstintingly, but also by passively 
observing Al Qaeda’s drift into extraneousness – spelled the introduction 
of a state-building project. As IS achieved these three aims, it shifted to 
capture and pursue Al Qaeda’s transnational dynamic, but doing so in a 
manner replacing franchises with regions, as part of an organic rather 
than a decentralised entity, with a deft use of information technology. 
Understanding the complex tapestry of the genealogy of IS holds the key 
to its multifaceted nature, and points to the different influences in its 
midst. Ultimately, was IS primarily an Iraqi story? Or was it an Iraqi story 
evolved into a Syrian one and a regional one? Or, as the original Bin Laden 
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association would indicate, was it a project that always harboured a global 
dimension? The group is more accurately understood as all of the above.
Mesopotamian Recentring
IS was born six times: in 1999 as Jama’at al Tawhid wal Jihad (the Group 
of Unity and Jihad); in 2004 as AQI; in 2006 as Majliss al Shura al 
Mujahideen (the Council of the Assembly of the Fighters); again in late 
2006 as ISI; in 2013 as ISIS; and, finally, in 2014 as IS (see Table 3.1). 
When, on the afternoon of 4 July 2014, its eventual dominant leader Abu 
Bakr al Baghdadi (announced dead by Russian authorities on 16 June 
2017, but unconfirmed at time of writing) climbed the stairs of the Imam’s 
minbar (pulpit) – pacing himself one step at a time – to deliver the sermon 
of the Friday prayers at the Great Mosque in Mosul, Iraq, an important 
moment in the saga initiated by Al Qaeda in 1988 and transformed by IS 
played out. A few days earlier, on 29 June, the spokesman for ISIS, Abu 
Mohammad al ‘Adnani, had announced (in a statement released in Arabic, 
English, French, German and Russian) the birth of an ‘Islamic State’, with al 
Baghdadi (identified per an extended lineage meant to establish religious 
credentials and nobility pedigree: Ibrahim ibn Awad ibn Ibrahim ibn Ali 
Table 3.1 Evolution of IS
Configuration Period Leader




Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi
Al Qaeda fi Bilad al 
Rafidayn
17 October 2004–15 
January 2006
Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi (killed 
on 7 June 2006)
Majliss al Shura al 
Mujahideen
15 January 2006–15 
October 2006
Abu Ayyub al Masri (also 
known as Abu Hamza al 
Muhajir)
Islamic State in Iraq 15 October 2006–9 April 
2013
Abu Ayyub al Masri (killed on 
18 April 2010) 
Abu Omar al Baghdadi (killed 
on 18 April 2010)
Abu Bakr al Baghdadi
Islamic State in Iraq 
and al Shaam
9 April 2013–29 June 
2014
Abu Bakr al Baghdadi
Islamic State 29 June 2014–present Abu Bakr al Baghdadi 
(reportedly killed on 28 May 
2017)
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ibn Mohammad al Badri al Hashimi al Husayni al Qoraishi) as ‘leader 
Caliph Ibrahim’. On 1 July, al Baghdadi himself had issued a ‘Message to 
the Islamic Umma’ calling on Muslims from around the world to migrate 
to the new Caliphate. The coincidence of al Baghdadi’s sermon in Mosul 
– a city his group had captured three weeks earlier – with the first Friday 
in Ramadan and with the United States’ independence day, was hardly 
fortuitous, and such timing was indicative of the flaunt-it-if-you-have-it 
theatricality that the group would continue to use in pursuit of its own 
domestic, regional and international marketisation.
To understand the full significance of that mid-2014 episode, which 
reveals the accelerated rise of a bellicose group that would later boast 
thousands of fighters and control a vast territory over two countries, 
is, first and foremost, to register how the organisation that had been 
established in Iraq in 2004 as a franchise of Al Qaeda moved to recentre 
itself in Iraq, temporarily dropping the transnational aspects of Al Qaeda’s 
fight in order to focus primarily on the post-US fast-changing situation 
in that country. Between 2004 and 2011, the AQI group had seesawed 
between the two dimensions of the local vs. transnational struggle, as 
the Iraqi group would experience a difficult relationship with Al Qaeda. 
To be certain, IS’s exceptionalism within Al Qaeda’s trajectory had a long 
history, and it was arguably just a matter of time before the derivative 
group sought its full emancipation from the mother organisation. In 
point of fact, the entity that would become ISIS, and later IS, predated 
Al Qaeda’s mid-2000s franchising model, which it joined in 2004 while 
constantly chipping away at Al Qaeda’s influence and retaining the very 
functional independence that was subsequently played out.
A few months after the creation of Al Qaeda, in winter 1989, a 
24-year-old Jordanian known as Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi (Ahmed Fadil 
Nazzal al Khalayla), from the Jordanian city of Zarqa, travelled to 
Afghanistan where he took part in the last phase of the insurgency against 
the Soviet Union and met with Bin Laden. A year later, Zarqawi returned 
to Jordan and set up a militant Islamist group named Junud al Shaam 
(the Soldiers of the Levant). Shortly thereafter he was arrested and jailed 
by the Jordanian authorities, and on his release in 1999 he returned to 
Afghanistan, where he met with Bin Laden again and secured the latter’s 
support for a new radical Islamist group named Jama’at al Tawhid wal 
Jihad (the Group of Unity and Jihad). In May 2002, that organisation 
moved to northern Iraq, where it remained underground until the United 
States’ invasion in March 2003, at which time Jama’at al Tawhid wal Jihad 
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became the first organised group to lead insurgency operations against 
US and UK troops, as well as the UN mission. Al Zarqawi then gained 
an international profile – he was featured in a 5 February 2003 UNSC 
briefing, during which US Secretary of State Colin Powell presented 
him as a leading emergent threat – and became of operational interest 
to Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda, after the attacks he conducted that year on the 
Jordanian embassy in Baghdad on 7 August and on the UN compound 
on 19 August. Of key importance was that al Zarqawi’s Afghan experience 
was subsequent to and separate from that of Bin Laden. Coming out of 
prison in Jordan, Al Zarqawi had moved late to Afghanistan. Setting up 
his own small-scale group in the Western province of Herat where he 
led and trained around a hundred Jordanians and Palestinians, away 
from Bin Laden’s camps in Kandahar, he was already making a power 
statement about independence, as he had done earlier with his religious 
mentor in Jordan, Mohammad al Maqdisi, from whom he had eventually 
become estranged. For all intents and purposes, al Zarqawi was in effect 
the first brand of ‘street Al Qaeda’. Less disciplined, more violent and often 
terroristically more efficient, al Zarqawi opened space for new groups 
under Al Qaeda owing to his ‘rep.’ among militants. His high-profile 
operations (notably the attacks on the Jordanian embassy and on the UN 
office) enabled his rapid, spectacular and ultimately ill-fated rise.1 This 
also signalled the onset of Al Qaeda’s faltering control of key battlegrounds 
such as Iraq, Afghanistan and the Sahel.
Following contacts established with Al Qaeda’s number two, Ayman 
al Dhawahiri, and in the context of the group’s mid-2000s franchising 
strategy, Al Zarqawi announced on 17 October 2004 that his Jama’at al 
Tawhid wal Jihad was folding itself into Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda and becoming 
Tandhim Al Qaeda fi Bilad al Rafidayn (the Organisation of Al Qaeda in 
the Land of the Two Rivers, known as AQI). This second incarnation of 
what would ultimately become IS was important but relatively short-lived 
when compared to other franchises such as AQIM or AQAP. AQI was 
associated essentially with al Zarqawi’s high-profile staccato attacks in 
Iraq in 2004–5. Al Zarqawi also distinguished himself from Al Qaeda 
by introducing two key elements which remained important in this 
context in the following years, namely his intra-Islam factionalist attacks 
on the Shi’a and his brutality (encapsulated in the videotaped beheading 
of US citizen Nicholas Berg on 7 May 2004, whom he dressed in the 
orange prisoner suit worn in Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay, starting 
a referential trend IS would replay ten years later). Al Zarqawi’s story and 
from qaedat al jihad to al dawla al islamiya . 93
his late association with Al Qaeda is important and complex. It highlights 
the perennial conundrum posed to a central organisation that constantly 
needs to project its force and implement a global vision while having to 
rely on local actors who bring in their specific concerns, and often their 
ambiguous relations with their immediate environment, including friend 
and foe.
Al Zarqawi was killed by a US air raid on 7 June 2006, north of Baqubah 
in Iraq. With his disappearance the local Iraqi link to the global project of 
Al Qaeda started declining. In an audiotaped message released on 1 July 
2006, Bin Laden would pay posthumous homage to the ‘fallen soldier’. 
Four months later, on 15 October, ISI was created, overtaking AQI. 
Importantly, the first mention of the project of setting up an ‘Islamic State’ 
had come from al Zarqawi himself in his last videotaped message, aired 
on 21 April 2006. Earlier, on 15 January, the first umbrella organisation 
to which AQI had adhered, Majliss al Shura al Mujahideen, had been 
set up briefly and its head, Abu Abdulla Rashid al Baghdadi, had been 
the first to release a formal statement on al Zarqawi’s death, on 16 June. 
Led successively by Abu Hamza al Muhajir (also known as Abu Ayyub 
al Masri), Abu Omar al Baghdadi (Hamid Daoud Mohammed Khalil 
al Zawi) and Abu Bakr al Baghdadi (also known then as Abu Du’a), ISI 
remained the dominant radical Sunni extremist group in Iraq until that 
third and lengthy phase – it lasted six and a half years – was reworked, 
for a fourth time, on 9 April 2013 into an expansion of ISI under the 
name of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, al Dawla al Islamiya 
fil Iraq wal Shaam, or ISIS for Islamic State in Iraq and Syria). Finally, on 
29 June 2014, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, who had remained at the helm of 
the different incarnations of the group since May 2010, announced the 
creation of IS as the re-establishment of the Islamic Caliphate with himself 
as new ‘Caliph’ under the name Ibrahim.
In the immediate aftermath of the American withdrawal from Iraq in 
2011, the Nuri al Maliki regime led a widespread repression of Sunnis, 
with thousands arrested across the country and hundreds killed in 
near-daily extrajudicial executions committed by several Shi’a militias. 
The relationship between the Sunni and Shi’a communities had already 
degenerated dramatically after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime 
in the spring of 2003, and, over the next few years, the communal 
violence had reached unprecedented levels in the country’s modern 
history. However, the events in late 2011 and early 2012 brought another 
dimension, and a logic of accelerated purging of Sunnis was discernible 
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as al Maliki drove this plan forward. In addition to the individual killings, 
which were particularly intense in and around the greater Baghdad area, 
the Sunni tribes were alienated politically and kept out of the power-
sharing bargaining. Two elements then helped al Baghdadi’s reinvention 
of the AQI project: first, al Maliki’s increasingly brutal repression – 
notably in Ramadi in January–March 2013, in Hawija in April 2013 
against approximately 300 Sunni protestors and in December against 
senior Sunni parliamentarians – leading to extended large-scale Sunni 
demonstrations (supported financially by Iraqi businessmen such 
as Khamis al Khanjar); and second, the fact that the troop increment 
(commonly known as the ‘Surge’, an increase of 20,000 men positioned 
around Baghdad to battle the insurgency) which the United States had 
overseen in 2007 had left only the most battle-hardened elements of 
the original AQI and of ISI standing. Al Baghdadi would in effect (re)
build his group on a pre-filtered, solid base of vengeful and experienced 
insurgents, such as former al Zarqawi right-hand man, Abd al Rahman 
Mustafa al Qaduli. These assertive elements were joined by remnants of 
Hussein’s Ba’ath party and special military forces, in particular from the 
once-feared Hammurabi Division of the Republican Guard, and former 
senior military advisors of Hussein, such as Ezzat Ibrahim al Duri and 
Fadel Abdulla al Hiyali (Abu Muslim al Turkmani) – men with ‘superior 
counterintelligence and security skills’.2 Many of these men had also been 
imprisoned and tortured by American forces at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere, 
and others had suffered at the hands of the Shi’a militias. The radicalising 
prison experience and repression was not limited to local Iraqi actors. 
Several of the early foreign fighters coming from Europe experienced 
the same torture at the hands of American and Iraqi troops and ended 
up joining IS. One such case is the Belgian-Moroccan national Oussama 
Atar, who was held first at Abu Ghraib and then at Camp Cropper (the 
same camp where Hussein had been held), and eventually at Camp Bucca 
from February 2005 to August 2012, where he met al Baghdadi. Upon 
release, Atar re-established contact with al Baghdadi, and allegedly went 
on to oversee the operations leading to the attacks in Paris in November 
2015 and Brussels in March 2016. To further reinvigorate the backbone of 
this rising new insurgency, al Baghdadi initiated a series of prison breaks 
in 2012–13, from the Abu Ghraib prison itself, to release inmates who 
went on to join his emerging group. 
In effect then, IS rose from the deliberate actions of the most fiercely 
independent and violent lieutenant of Bin Laden (al Zarqawi) only 
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to be taken over by battle-hardened local Iraqis, such as al Baghdadi, 
who recalibrated the group’s orientation towards a domestic path and 
upgraded violence. Such a to-the-far-enemy-and-back indigenisation of 
a transnational group produced the uncertain transformation of a hybrid 
organisation that was expanding outwardly while remaining wedded to 
local goals. Similarly, the specialisation in coercion witnessed a dedicated 
reconfiguration with, in time, that refocusing translating into military 
patterns. Whereas, for instance, suicide attacks were being carried out 
predominantly by foreigners against civilian targets, as was the case circa 
2004, IS’s suicide attacks from 2014 onwards were primarily perpetrated 
by local operatives against military targets (923 attacks were, for instance, 
conducted in one year alone during that period, between December 
2015 and December 2016).3 To be certain, the recentring on Iraq, which 
culminated in the capture of Ramadi and Fallujah in early 2014, did not 
alter the fundamentals of a movement that still remained in key aspects 
transnational and regional, and in which, for instance, the Arabian Gulf 
area had always played a key role in terms of soldiery. Saudi recruits 
had indeed remained steady (around 2,000 men) and were motivated 
by a sense of pan-Islamism,4 and this took place in the wider context 
of a loss of Sunni leadership across the region, filled by insurgents and 
hardliners. Similarly, the international radical Islamist movement – still 
led officially by Al Qaeda and al Dhawahiri, who had replaced Bin Laden 
– had remained significant in the late 2000s. One of the most successful 
operations for Al Qaeda had, for instance, taken place during that period. 
On 30 December 2009, Khalil Humam al Balawi, a Jordanian-born Al 
Qaeda double agent working for the Jordanian intelligence services and 
the CIA, and pretending to have penetrated the upper ranks of Al Qaeda, 
conducted a suicide operation inside the CIA camp in Khost, Afghanistan, 
in which he killed the seven top CIA operatives in the region.5 However, 
the shift in Iraq – what we can term an umma (community) to qabila 
(tribe) transfer – was important, as it effectively confirmed a path that 
had been adopted haphazardly as early as 2006 in the wake of al Zarqawi’s 
disappearance. Al Zarqawi’s pre-Al Qaeda materialisation in Iraq in 
2003 was itself indicative of a rerouting of the journey of transnational 
Islamism. In offering to lead the fight against the Americans that had 
been brought to Iraq, the Jordanian’s group was now performing under 
a theme of min al adou al qarib ila al ‘adou al ba’eed (from the near to 
the far enemy), to a new one of wusul al ‘adou (the arrival of the enemy). 
All in all, IS’s multiple births betray this essential dialectic, namely the 
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recurring question within its ranks of which battle to pursue, what level 
of engagement to prioritise and in which particular direction to move. 
The local vs. international options were not the only ones, and the key 
event that would accelerate the rise of ISIS and then IS would come from 
an unexpected regional situation.
Into Levantine Battle
By mid to late 2011, ISI was at a strategic dead end. In the interregnum 
between the disappearance of Bin Laden in May 2011 and ISIS’s April 
2013 arrival, there was a transitional period wherein the global soldiery 
of Al Qaeda was looking more for strategic direction than for a cause. 
What was to become of the organisation the Saudi millionaire had set 
up? Where was it heading after the fall of its iconic leader? What should 
the movement’s priorities be, as uprisings and upheaval proliferated 
unceasingly around the Middle East and North Africa? While Arab 
Spring-driven analyses decreed the end of Al Qaeda,6 and Bin Laden’s 
deputy al Dhawahiri sprang forth as the new formal but impotent 
leader, a global power vacuum deepened in radical Islamism – and 
Iraq remained, as it had been since 2003, its centre of gravity. Three 
unexpected events allowed IS to occupy that fluid space successfully: 
the transitional chaos that followed the social rebellions of the Arab 
Spring, starting in Tunisia and Egypt in December 2010 and January 
2011; the anticlimactic death of Bin Laden the following May; and, most 
importantly, the Syrian civil war from March 2011 onwards. Immediately 
seeing the rebirth opportunity offered by this coincidence of events, and 
particularly the Syrian conflict, in July al Baghdadi set in motion a plan 
aimed at positioning his group at the centre of these changes. The first 
component concerned the revamping of ISI’s soldiery in Iraq itself, in the 
context of Sunni disenfranchisement. As noted, al Baghdadi oversaw his 
replenishing of manpower through a number of prison breaks to free the 
most ruthless operators, whom he then appointed – alongside hardcore, 
middle-aged veterans and former Iraqi army officers (in its heyday, up 
until the early 2000s, the Iraqi Republican Guard had been an efficient 
and well-organised corps) – as his lieutenants to increase the group’s 
lethality. During this period (July 2012–July 2013), eight high-profile 
prison breaks were organised in a campaign dubbed ‘Breaking the Walls’, 
using an upgraded military capability featuring vehicle-borne improvised 
explosive devices – culminating in a night-time assault on the prison of 
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Abu Ghraib on 21 July 2013, from which some 500 inmates were freed.7 
In the middle of this sequence, first in August 2011 and then in January 
2012, al Baghdadi dispatched representatives to Syria to meet with the 
newly formed Jabhat al Nusra (the Victory Front), a Syrian radical Islamist 
group opposed to Syrian President Bashar al Assad, which had coalesced 
in the wake of the uprising and was being set up officially (it would be 
announced on 23 January 2012), to discuss operational collaboration 
across the Iraqi-Syrian border. (On 28 July 2016, Jabhat Al Nusra would 
be renamed Jabhat Fath al Shaam, or the Front of Opening of the Levant.) 
Eventually, on 9 April 2013, recognising an opportunity dovetailing the 
crisis in Syria, al Baghdadi stepped out to announce the creation of IS in 
Iraq and al Shaam – in effect adding Syria to his existing Iraq dominion. 
In that statement, al Baghdadi declared that Jabhat al Nusra was joining 
his movement as the local Syrian branch of ISI. Yet the next day, al Nusra’s 
leader, Abu Mohammad al Jolani, rejected the integration, stating that 
‘neither the al Nusra command nor its consultative council nor its general 
manager were aware of this announcement. It reached them via the media 
and if the speech is authentic, we were not consulted.’ This then led to a 
split within Jabhat al Nusra, a wing of which opted for integration into the 
newly formed ISIS, which also secured the support of Harakat Ahrar al 
Shaam (the Movement of the Free Men of the Levant), another powerful 
rebel group set up in Syria in 2011. Stepping in to settle the dispute, on 23 
May al Dhawahiri disavowed the announced ISI-Jabhat al Nusra merger 
(‘Sheikh Abu Bakr al Baghdadi was wrong when he announced the Islamic 
State in Iraq and the Levant without asking permission or receiving advice 
from us and even without notifying us; the Islamic State in Iraq and the 
Levant is to be dissolved, while the Islamic State in Iraq is to continue its 
work’), and called again for ISIS’s disbandment on 7 November.
Such an extraordinary sequence of statements and counter-statements 
was unprecedented in the annals of Al Qaeda, and was indicative of the 
rough-and-ready threat IS had come to represent to Al Qaeda. Never 
before had Al Qaeda aired its disagreements so explicitly, and never 
before had its leadership been questioned so openly and its lack of 
control over matters revealed so plainly. Above and beyond the divisive 
contestation, this was arguably a revealing moment in the end of the cycle. 
Simply put, al Dhawahiri had failed to inherit Bin Laden’s leadership. In 
contradistinction, the then-ISIS group saw strategic value in the Syrian 
civil war and opportunistically moved to harness it, with a view to both 
engineering the group’s design and remapping the very environment 
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in which it existed. As one analyst noted, in such an intervention-
filled context: 
catastrophes are large-scale or mega-disasters that affect multitudes 
or entire populations and leave their marks on many people’s space 
and time. Space is marked by the de-territorialisation of a whole region 
and then by a re-territorialisation of a special zone within it … This is 
the area where former order crumbles, normal expectations become 
meaningless, the self-evident dimension of everyday life is lost … 
amidst ruins of all kinds.8
Al Dhawahiri’s 2013 statements were indicative of Al Qaeda’s weakness 
and ISIS’s rising power. Upping the ante, al Baghdadi chose to ignore the 
injunctions he had received, and moved to accelerate his group’s plan in 
a second phase he dubbed the ‘Soldiers’ Harvest’ (July 2013–July 2014). 
In December 2013/January 2014, he entered in the most ambitious phase 
of the group’s history. ISIS initiated a two-step plan to try and position 
itself as the leading insurgency force in both Iraq and Syria within six 
months (before Ramadan of 2014). During that phase, the group battled 
a coalition, known as Jaysh al Mujahidin (Army of the Fighters), of eight 
small- and mid-sized Gulf-sponsored Islamist groups in the area around 
Aleppo, which it managed to defeat, as well as the Supreme Military 
Command of the Free Syrian Army (Jaysh Souriya al Hor), and went on 
to establish control of key sectors in north-eastern Syria, in particular 
the city of Raqqa. Subsequently, most Syrian cities straddling the border 
with Iraq were captured by the group: Tal Hamis, Shaddadi, Markada, 
Suwar, Hraiji, Abu Hammam, Hajjin and Bukkamal. On the strength of 
this show of force, ISIS turned back to Iraq, where it then seized control of 
Iraq’s second biggest city, Mosul, on 10 June 2014. The fall of Mosul was 
a turning point and arguably the single event that allowed the group to 
materialise as ‘Islamic State’ on the strength of its recent military victories, 
the territory it now held and the cadenced momentum it rode in both 
the Iraqi and Syrian insurgencies – all against the focused attention of 
the global Islamist movement observing its actions in awe. Over the next 
months, and while positioning a force of 3,000 or so men in Raqqa as the 
centrepiece of its presence in Syria, the group moved on from Mosul to 
seize the Iraqi cities of Qayyara, al Shirqat, Hawija, Tikrit, Siniya, Saadiya, 
Anah, Rawah, Habbaniya, Tal Afar, Fallujah, Mahmoudiya, Traybil, Sinjar, 
Yarmouq and Al Qadisiya.
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The Iraqi group was also able to count on the presence of a similarly 
fertile Islamist and tribal terrain in Syria. In October 2013, as ISIS was 
gaining ground in north-east Syria, a ceremony was organised in Raqqa 
during which 14 Syrian tribal leaders publicly announced their support 
for the group. To be certain, extremist Islamists had long been present 
in Syria, coexisting with the tribal structure – al Tali’a al Muqatila (the 
Fighting Vanguard) was, for instance, among the early groups in the mid 
to late 1970s, long predating the 2010s whirlwind of new formations. In 
1982, a large-scale rebellion of Islamists in the city of Hama had led to a 
massacre of thousands ordered by Bashar al Assad’s father, President Hafez 
al Assad. As the radical Islamist militancy persisted in Syria in the 2000s, 
it gradually became influenced by Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda, and, in time, 
merged with the post-2011 rebellion. Just as it had done in Iraq, ISIS now 
capitalised on the rising tensions between the Syrian state and the tribes, 
which had historically controlled eastern Syria. In losing their clientelism 
with the state and their ability to deliver security locally, the tribes found 
themselves in an uneasy position whereby they had to negotiate with the 
armed groups not merely politically but operationally. In that context, it 
is important to note that, for all its different social ‘asabiya anchoring the 
armed group’s religious call, Arab tribal structure was never fundamentally 
problematic for IS. Rather, as a time-tested and organised source of power, 
the tribe offered a ready-made and legitimate local construct, which the 
group could engage with and enlist in its opposition to the Iraqi9 or Syrian 
state, and indeed align itself with; shuyoukh wa ‘ashayr (chiefs and tribes) 
fighting alongside mujahideen (religious warriors) was not an unfamiliar 
scene in the region, and specifically in the Levant, and such a relationship 
was often displayed as alliance imagery in the videos of IS. For instance, 
when it sought to establish its dominion over the Deir Ezzor area, IS had 
to navigate the local power configurations between various tribes such as 
the Bukeyr, the Buchamel and the Shuheil.
 The history of IS that emerges from these first two configurations – of 
a post-Al Qaeda national focus on Iraq and the regional Syrian expansion 
– is a picture of a passive entity present in Iraq before the US invasion 
in 2003 which seizes that opportunity to unleash its operations, before 
folding itself temporarily into Al Qaeda and then joining in a nationwide 
Iraqi insurgency platform, before using a second opportunity afforded 
by the Syria conflict to reactivate its operations and move on to claim 
a regional and ultimately international leadership of radical Islamism. 
In the event, IS was therefore driven by its provincial ambition, the 
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deterioration of the Iraqi situation under Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki’s 
rule, post-Bin Laden indecisiveness on the part of Al Qaeda and the 
unexpected situation provided by the Syrian conflict.
State-Building from Franchise to Region
ISI’s April 2013 decision to expand officially to Syria took Al Qaeda by 
surprise. Just as he was not able to take Al Qaeda’s project forward after 
Bin Laden’s death, al Dhawahiri failed to address the issues raised by 
the gradual independence and, in time, the full break of al Baghdadi’s 
organisation. Indeed, al Dhawahiri weakened his position in August 2015 
by pledging allegiance to a new Afghan leader, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, 
in effect relinquishing the sovereign leadership status Bin Laden’s death 
had bequeathed on him. In reacting indecisively – as noted, he twice 
called unconvincingly for a cancellation of the ISIS project in May and 
November 2013, and also failed at an attempted mediation in January 
2014 between ISIS and Jabhat al Nusra – al Dhawahiri opened the way 
for al Baghdadi to make a full run for the leadership of the global Islamist 
movement. This was forcefully embodied in IS’s June 2014 dual statement 
about the birth of IS and the claim to the Caliphate. From that point 
onwards, Al Qaeda and IS were formally on different trajectories and 
tempos, with the original group playing catch-up. Al Qaeda was able to 
push back operationally through the association with Jabhat al Nusra, 
which became its local representative in Syria until July 2016 (when it 
became Jabhat Fath al Shaam and adopted an ambiguous stance towards Al 
Qaeda), but that owed much to the latter’s own initiative in (temporarily) 
choosing to side with it. However, two caveats are in order as we observe 
this evolution. First, Al Qaeda and IS share a common history, with IS 
having been Al Qaeda’s franchise in Iraq between October 2004 and 
January 2006. Second, limitations in their competing and oppositional 
stances after 2013 were, to a significant extent, inevitably self-imposed on 
both sides, as Bin Laden and al Zarqawi were key founding figures shared 
by both groups. Ultimately, however, Al Qaeda was falling slowly and IS 
rising fast. The rupture with Al Qaeda was then nevertheless the result 
not merely of classical group competition or turf wars, but of a deeper 
shift in strategy. Part of this was historical – the waxing and waning 
of irredentist armed militancy – and part of it behavioural. For all IS’s 
actions, it must also be kept in mind that Al Qaeda’s 20-year saga since 
1989 was naturally beginning to slow down by the late 2000s. With Bin 
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Laden’s death and al Dhawahiri’s inability to take the project forward, Al 
Qaeda’s story was slowly closing. This in effect opened a window for any 
group willing and able to fill that vacuum. It took an Al Qaeda franchise to 
do it, with al Baghdadi in Iraq forcefully, opportunistically and decisively 
positioning himself. The key decision on his part was to capitalise on 
the post-2011 strife in Syria to both expand his domain of operation 
– ISI was now folding the Levant in its envisioned wider jurisdiction – 
and to gain added military experience. The result, two years later, was a 
reborn entity that was eminently hybrid, with some seven layers in its 
midst (see Table 3.2): part Al Qaeda; part Iraqi Islamist insurgency; part 
Ba’ath renaissance movement; part Syrian armed rebellion; part regional 
post-Arab Spring political and security phenomenon; part global Islamist 
movement taking the place of Al Qaeda, from West Africa to the Indian 
subcontinent by way of the Sahel; and part Western metropolis-based 
rebel. IS was therefore able to pursue and deepen Al Qaeda’s transnational 
mode of force projection while focusing on the territorial centre of gravity 
it controlled between Mosul and Raqqa. 
Table 3.2 The seven layers of IS
Identity Environment Purpose
1. Heir of Al Qaeda Global franchise system Perpetuating Al Qaeda’s 
war
2.  Iraqi Islamist 
insurgency
US occupation of Iraq 
and Shi’a government
Leading armed national 
Sunni movement
3.  Iraqi military 
insurgency
US occupation of Iraq 
and Shi’a government
Avenging Ba’ath regime 
defeat
4. Syrian insurgency Syrian civil war Unseating Syrian regime
5.  Regional Islamist 
group
Post-Arab Spring, Middle 
East and North Africa
Seizing governance 
opportunity
6.  International Islamist 
group
Muslim world Replacing Al Qaeda
7.  Transnational post-
modern radical
United States and Europe Rebelling against 
alienation
On the surface, the differences between Al Qaeda and IS grew ever 
more visible from 2013 onwards, both at the leadership level and among 
their respective followers. The relationship between al Dhawahiri and 
al Baghdadi was itself strained, competitive and irreconcilable. The 
men were of different generations, experienced different battlefields 
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(Afghanistan 1980s vs. Iraq 2000s) and harkened back to different social 
backgrounds; a bourgeois surgeon from Cairo thinking strategically, 
on the one hand, and a working-class student of religion from Samarra 
versed in tactical operations, on the other – everything conspired to keep 
them estranged from one another. In the aftermath of the Paris attacks in 
January 2015, there was conjecture about an alliance between Al Qaeda 
and IS, although no tangible evidence of such potential partnership 
materialised. Specifically, the issue arose because Chérif Kouachi, one 
of the two brothers who had led the attack in Paris on the offices of the 
Charlie Hebdo satirical magazine, declared to the French news channel 
BFM that he had been sent by AQAP and had been financed by its 
then-senior operator Anwar al ‘Awlaqi; while his likely co-conspirator, 
Amedy Coulibaly, who led a follow-up attack two days later on a Jewish 
supermarket, stated in a video message that he was affiliated with IS. 
Yet Kouachi’s alleged AQAP connections went back to an earlier, pre-IS 
phase, with al ‘Awlaqi now dead (killed by a US drone attack in the Al Jawf 
region of Yemen on 30 September 2011), and Coulibaly’s statement was 
more akin to a unilateral pledge of allegiance than a revelation of pre-set 
operational links. Beyond that undecided episode, the larger relationship 
was much more one of competition in the Levant, in the Gulf, in North 
Africa and in Afghanistan.
In the wake of its coup on Al Qaeda and expansion into Syria, 
paradoxically IS started going down a path towards the type of organisation 
that Bin Laden and his associates had set up in Afghanistan in 1988. As 
IS firmed up its power in Iraq and Syria, secured control of large swathes 
of territory and embarked on a wider regional strategy, the conditions 
that obtained were reminiscent of what took place a quarter of a century 
earlier in that arc bridging Afghanistan and Pakistan, when Osama Bin 
Laden, Ayman al Dhawahiri and Abdallah Yusuf al ‘Azzam set up Al 
Qaeda in the summer of 1988 following the Soviet retreat. Witness the 
similarities: a context of lengthy armed conflict born out of occupation 
and domestic strife (Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989, Iraq since 2003 
and Syria since 2011 – IS was also born in war); a globally expanding 
transnational militant front (‘Arab Afghans’ then, ‘foreign fighters’ now); 
the complex tapestry of guarded but real superpower involvement (Soviet 
Union and US then, US and Russia now); active and competing powerful 
regional actors with colliding agendas (Pakistan and Afghanistan; Iran, 
Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar); shadowy proxy-war dynamics (the 
Pakistani ISI and the Mujahideen then, Lebanese Hezbollah, Iranian Al 
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Quds and others later); powerful local insurgencies (Northern Alliance 
and Taliban in Afghanistan, all manner of Sunni and Shi’a groups in 
Iraq and Syria); and in both cases sporadic tactical victories by a rising 
group, cumulatively generating further strategic momentum. The sum 
total of these parallels was consequential, as the new group continued to 
experience a complicated relationship with the mother organisation that 
spawned it, with IS seeking to replicate Al Qaeda’s successful militarised 
matrix but with a view to introducing important innovations of its own. 
There were, however, key differences in the related stories, and the 
parallel during that phase should ultimately be relativised because 
it moved towards a different horizon. First, IS was immersed in a 
territorially defined struggle (a romanticised Levant or Shaam, which 
is real to many militants but which never existed administratively in 
the past), whereas the original Al Qaeda had been eminently about 
transcending boundaries, with Afghanistan being the springboard on to 
the American ‘far enemy’ (al ‘adou al ba’eed) in lieu of the Arab regimes 
‘near enemy’ (al ‘adou al qareeb). Second, the ideological component 
of IS remained thin10 and ranked behind its identity (Levantine) and 
confessional (Sunni) dimensions when Bin Laden consistently stressed 
political goals and religious unity among Islamists of all hues, including 
non-Arabs and non-Sunnis. Finally, the increasing inroads of IS were 
mostly attracting a motley crew of fighters from around the world who 
had come, almost overnight, to regard Syria as the new cause célèbre 
of ‘jihadism’, whereas Al Qaeda had been painstakingly constructed in 
several stages in Asia – Al Qaeda was set up in Khost, Afghanistan and 
Bin Laden died in Abottabad, Pakistan – under a logic of homogenising 
and exporting operators and opening fronts in various other geographical 
centres (East Africa, Western Europe, North Africa, the Arabian Gulf). 
In other words, IS was concerned with securing an inwardly driven, 
regional centre of gravity (coalescing somewhere between Fallujah, 
Iraq and Raqqa, Syria) for primarily regional purposes, while Al Qaeda 
rewrote the transnational rulebook to beam out its politico-religious fight 
internationally. Notwithstanding the subsequent smartphone tweeting of 
its flag in front of the White House to reach and frighten the US,11 for the 
new group, the prize was Baghdad and Damascus. For the older one, it 
had been New York and Washington.
The IS story thus indicated that, for all the decentralisation, there 
remained among international Islamist militants a yearning for a global 
leadership, as had once existed during the heyday of Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda 
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al Oum (1995–2005). IS certainly filled the vacuum, and regenerated a 
brand that was successful among those militants, but it did so without 
establishing unquestioned political legitimacy. In the mid-2000s, Al 
Qaeda’s franchising had been accepted internally because it was decreed 
by Bin Laden’s authoritative figure and because it made sense tactically 
to the group’s militants, as Al Qaeda avoided structural collapse by 
proactively embracing generational shift. Al Qaeda, which again refers 
to itself officially as Qaedat al Jihad (the Base of the Jihad), saw itself as an 
enabler, whereas IS’s centrifugal dynamics indicated otherwise, revealing 
the limits of the franchise model under such an evolved logic. Similarly, al 
Baghdadi’s in-your-face ruthlessness was the consequence of the urgency 
of the battle scene he inhabited in ultra-violent 2000s Iraq, and the 
outcome of mixed results, demanding and battle-hardened management 
of ISI-to-ISIS-to-IS since 2006, rather than distant inspiration by Bin 
Laden. If most insurgent groups are born from pre-war politics,12 both 
Al Qaeda and IS were forged in war. The martiality that presided over the 
birth of Al Qaeda was what allowed IS to take Bin Laden’s real legacy, ‘Al 
Qaedism’ – a loose ideology, rather than Al Qaeda the physical group – to 
the next level.
The campaign al Baghdadi orchestrated was undeniably a qualitative 
milestone in the larger Al Qaeda story, which in effect closed the Bin 
Laden era and displaced al Dhawahiri, as the new strongman in Mosul 
proclaimed himself Caliph (‘I have been plagued with this great matter, 
plagued with this responsibility and it is a heavy responsibility’, he said 
in his 4 July 2014 address). Yet framing IS merely within the logic of 
Al Qaeda would be missing the novelty of the group, as it introduced a 
dimension previously neglected by Al Qaeda, namely state-building. Just 
as Al Qaeda was an emanation of both globalisation and transnationalism 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, IS during the 2010s was a testimony 
to the mutating manifestation of international insecurity in the form of 
weakened states, increasingly ‘militiaised’ in the Levant but also of those 
so-called ‘ungoverned spaces’13 that had been materialising in the Middle 
East, in the Sahel and in sub-Saharan Africa, and which IS now sought 
to govern differently. And so, just as al Baghdadi expressed a desire to 
unite (‘It is time for you to end this abhorrent partisanship, dispersion 
and division’, he remarked in his Mosul lecture), the strategy of his group 
was to build up momentum towards physical expansion. In that respect, 
it was IS’s very existence, not its tactics or cadence, that were offsetting its 
enemy, and so bombings such as those ordered by US President Barack 
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Obama in August 2014, and by France and Russia starting in September 
2015, were likely to achieve little in terms of lasting resolution of the 
problem. Reflecting on the relevance of Von Clausewitz’s ideas regarding 
the Great Arab Revolt, T.E. Lawrence captured a key marker of such 
an asymmetrical engagement: ‘Clausewitz had said that rear-guards 
modulate the enemy’s action like a pendulum, not by what they do, but 
by their mere existence.’14
The evolution of IS during this phase was therefore a combination of 
an independently moving battle plan – now focused on Iraq, now centred 
on Syria – and an adaptation to domestic and regional contingencies. 
Tellingly, the move on to Syria was not isolated, but from the beginning 
part of a regional logic – at the time al Baghdadi also reportedly met with 
Egyptian fighters from the Sinai,15 which eventually would become Ansar 
Beit al Maqdis (as discussed below). In this inherent duality and flexibility 
resided the initial strength of IS, namely its forward-looking versatility. 
This is what allowed it continuously to present its struggle as driven by 
urgency: the immediate need to resist the US invasion in 2003–6; the 
necessity to oppose Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki and his Shi’a 
militias in 2006–11; the imperative to go to battle against Syrian President 
Bashar al Assad and his Alawite troops in 2012, and their Russian ally in 
2015; the obligation to resist the Iraqi and American troops advancing 
on Mosul and Raqqa in 2016–17; and so, on open-endedly. In other 
words, the ability to stay the course and reinvent itself continuously – a 
feature of modernity – is what made IS potent in that way. The brand 
that IS physically stamped on a conspicuously displayed flag in lieu of 
the distant and ethereal Al Qaeda name ensured a stronger impact on the 
new group’s social and religious milieu. Most importantly, and in spite 
of the prevalence of that narrative, IS managed to avoid the perception 
among its soldiery that it could, at any given time, be finished, since each 
new episode appeared to lead logically to the next one. Seen as such, IS 
was the natural culmination of the United States’ failed adventurism in 
Iraq, Maliki’s authoritarianism, Assad’s ruthlessness and post-Bin Laden 
Al Qaeda’s discomposure. The central question was less the pull of IS in 
the eyes of its fighters, or its grandstanding towards the umma, than its 
real reach and impact on the ground. As al Baghdadi reintroduced the 
street style of al Zarqawi, and focused on prison breaks to staff his group 
with ruthless operators, he also pursued a centralised conquer-and-hold 
approach to seizing territory, instead of an open-ended, evanescent and 
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sporadic insurgency. With the ‘Islamic State’ announcement in 2014, this 
became coupled with symbolic, overreaching state-building claims.16
Realistically, IS’s state-building project started in earnest in mid-June 
2014. The fall of Mosul – the second largest city in Iraq and an extended 
urban centre with a population of over two million people – was, for 
IS, a moment akin to what 9/11 represented for Al Qaeda; namely an 
unexpected success of enormous magnitude with unforeseen strategic 
implications to which they needed to adapt. Instead of bunkering down 
and using Mosul as a base merely to continue its insurgency and the 
attacks it had actively led that year (notably against Baghdad), the IS 
leadership produced a more ambitious plan which was revealed to the 
world at the end of that month. On 29 June, the group’s spokesman, al 
‘Adnani (who would be killed by a Russian airstrike on 30 August 2016 in 
Aleppo) delivered a 34-minute audiotaped speech in which he announced 
the creation of an ‘Islamic State’:
The time has come for those generations that were drowning in oceans 
of disgrace … The time has come for the umma … to wake up from 
its sleep, remove the garments of dishonour and shake off the dust of 
humiliation and disgrace, for the era of lamenting and moaning has 
gone and the dawn of honour has emerged anew. The sun of jihad 
has risen … The signs of victory have appeared … Here the flag of 
the Islamic State, the flag of tawhid [religious unity] rises. Its shade 
covers land from Aleppo to Diyala. Beneath it, the walls of the tawaghit 
[religiously illegitimate rulers] have been demolished, their flags have 
fallen and their borders have been destroyed. Their soldiers are killed, 
imprisoned or defeated. The Muslims are honoured … Prisoners 
are released by the edge of the sword. The people in the lands of the 
[Islamic] state move about for their livelihood and journeys, feeling 
safe regarding their lives and wealth … Jizya [religious taxation] has 
been enforced … Zakat [alms] have been collected. Courts have been 
established to resolve disputes and complaints. Evil has been removed. 
Lessons and classes have been held in the mosques … The Islamic State 
… resolved to announce the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate, 
the appointment of a Caliph for the Muslims … descendent from the 
family of the Prophet, Ibrahim Ibn ‘Awad Ibn Ibrahim Ibn ‘Ali Ibn 
Muhammad al Badri al Hashimi al Husayni al Qurashi by lineage, 
al Samarrai by birth and upbringing, al Baghdadi by residence and 
scholarship … Thus, he is the imam and the Caliph for the Muslims 
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everywhere. Accordingly, the ‘Iraq and Shaam’ in the name of the 
Islamic State is henceforth removed from all official deliberations and 
communications, and the official name is the Islamic State from the 
date of this declaration.
On 16 June – two weeks earlier and five days after the fall of Mosul – al 
‘Adnani had released another overlooked but equally important message 
entitled ‘Apologies, Emir of Al Qaeda’, in which he referred explicitly to 
Bin Laden’s earlier calls to the Iraqi people to rise up against the occupiers 
and praised fully that legacy (Ayman al Dhawahiri and Abu Yahya al 
Libi, another former senior leader of Al Qaeda, were also mentioned in 
that speech):
This is the base of Al Qaeda [qaedat al jihad], this is Al Qaeda as we 
have come to know it, this is its path and whoever changes it we change 
him, this is Al Qaeda as we have loved it, as we have inherited it and 
as we have made it victorious, this is Al Qaeda, this is Al Qaeda that 
has terrorised the enemy, this is Al Qaeda that runs in our hearts … 
this is our relationship to Al Qaeda … but sorry, Emir Al Qaeda, the 
[Islamic] State is not a branch of Al Qaeda … a state cannot be part of 
a group. (Emphasis added)
In so doing, IS was unambiguously connecting its project with that 
historical Al Qaeda lineage – in effect to show its colours to its constituency 
– but in addressing al Dhawahiri in such less-than-complimentary terms 
it was severing the relationship and already embarking on the writing 
of its own history. Lest it be misunderstood, the 16 June message was 
a polite divorce. The new armed group went on at once to flesh out its 
ambition to become an institution able to deliver services to a community 
and beam a message – however embryonic and however fledging – of 
statehood. To that end, religion was enlisted with a view to sacralising 
this project – something that was not too difficult to achieve given that 
Islamist armed groups benefit from the fact that the pursuit of state-
building has been assumed in its militant cosmogony, with the notion 
of an ‘Islamic state’ regarded as the natural and self-evident demand of 
a religion such as Islam that is steeped in politics and state formation.17 
Conceived as the natural order of things, the group’s envisioned role as 
a state-in-the-making was presented as merely that of an implementer. 
Therefore, declaring statehood is notionally relatively easy, and functions 
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for any Islamist group as a circular logic. The question of statehood came 
equally logically into the IS saga, as it connected specifically with the 
unfinished debates of the Middle East a century ago, in the mid to late 
1910s. At the time, ‘[T]he question of the Islamic state [had been] a major 
point of debate after the defeat and eventual dissolution of the Ottoman 
Empire after the First World War. A number of thinkers presented their 
ideas on the nature of the Islamic state when the new Turkish rulers 
decided to abolish the Caliphate and establish a republic.’18 Bin Laden 
did not have to be too concerned with an actual discussion of that project 
as he was merely, by his own reckoning, setting the base for that effort. As 
his task was accomplished, territory gained and communities in need of 
services were in expectation, however, the IS leadership made the leap to 
a maximised vision of both religious legitimacy and historical statehood 
(combined in the Caliphate construct). In that regard, IS’s state-building 
project could, arguably, be seen as classically linked to state-formation 
processes characterised by what Heather Rae terms a ‘pathological 
homogenisation’19 of peoples, namely a redefinition of a socio-political 
community as an exclusively moral one. Indeed, the homogenisation 
pursued by ISIS is here reconstitutive of a long-gone system and creative 
of a modern one, as well as destructive of the existing Iraqi and Syrian 
states. Moreover, the process pursued – as opposed to classical Tillyan 
state-building – was not led by an elite (it would have been if, say, Bin 
Laden had pursued it) but by lower elements in the group (regardless of al 
‘Adnani’s cosmetic insistence on al Baghdadi’s alleged Hashemite lineage). 
Nevertheless, whereas Al Qaeda’s references to the Caliphate had been 
inconsistent and aspirational, IS positioned itself from the beginning of its 
history within a firm logic of statisation. Like most modern-day Islamists, 
IS ideologues therefore faced the challenge of reconciling modernity and 
tradition. As Nazih Ayubi explains: 
[T]he neo-fundamentalists, or the proponents of political Islam, have 
actually introduced some novel, and radical, changes in the way the 
Islamic political tradition is understood. While they want to preserve 
the close link between religion and politics that the traditional 
jurisprudence had developed, they want to reverse the order within 
this link. The traditional jurists had forged a link between politics and 
religion by giving a religious legitimacy to political power. The political 
Islamists maintain that religion and politics cannot be separated, but 
because they are now in the position of resisting the existing state, 
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not of legitimising it, they are seeking the politicisation of a particular 
vision of religion that they have in mind. To achieve this purpose, the 
contemporary Islamists are often inclined to be more innovative and 
less textual in their approach.20
This is precisely what IS did, as in the next phase it quickly moved on 
with its territorial administration project, alternating orthodox readings 
and modernising ones – all in explicit pursuit of statehood. Some of that 
had been done in Ramadi and Fallujah when the cities fell to the group 
six months earlier, but now the project was taken to a new level, with a 
view to institutionalising it on a lasting basis. Roads were refurbished in 
the Mosul and Raqqa areas in the summer of 2014, garbage was collected, 
telephone lines were fixed, ‘police’ were posted at traffic intersections, 
banking services were taken over and money distributed, salaries were 
established for foot soldiers (approximately USD400 monthly) and strict 
law and order was imposed terroristically (with public beheadings and 
individuals pushed from rooftops). In both cities, a proto-administration 
was set up with departments of water, electricity, communication and 
transport. Seizing the oil fields around Mosul, IS went on to establish 
control over their production sites, and set up black market routes to 
sell that oil (averaging 50,000 barrels a day in some sites during 2015). A 
chief financial officer was appointed to oversee an annual budget, and a 
team of ‘consumer protection agents’ were dispatched to conduct surprise 
visits in stores throughout the occupied cities to check on the prices set 
by store owners. Territory, finance, population and use of violence – the 
classical trademarks of statehood – but also armament as resilience came 
to the group, through an important volume of weapons seized. These 
were mostly those which the US Army had provided to the Iraqi military 
and counter-terrorist special forces it had set up and trained; small and 
heavy weaponry, M1A tanks, 155 mm artillery, truck-mounted machine 
guns, portable surface-to-air missiles, man-portable air-defence systems 
and bomb-proof Humvee vehicles.
The economic base of the group solidified during this phase, which 
witnessed a shift from small-scale financial support (wealthy Gulf 
benefactors, religious donations and Hawala system transfers) to an 
industrial-scale economic base with pirate oil sales and the sale of 
antiquities – historical cultural artefacts captured in both Iraq and Syria, 
most of which were put on the international market through private sellers. 
The group’s coffers were also replenished by way of taxation established 
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at checkpoints throughout the territory the group held in Iraq and Syria, 
including across the wheat fields in the region. In November 2014, the 
creation of a currency using the old Arabic Dinar was announced. Ten 
textbooks (on religion, geography, jurisprudence, grammar and history) 
and a school curriculum were issued in September 2015 (the corpus 
was a combination of Abu Mus’ab al Suri’s globally oriented texts, the 
more regionally focused writings of Abu Mohammad al Maqdisi and 
the political and strategic messages of Ayman al Dhawahiri). A 6 July 
2016 video entitled Structure of the Khilafa explained how the Caliphate 
worked. To be certain, IS’s challenging of the Iraqi and Syrian states was 
facilitated by these states’ incompleteness and nature as by-products 
of colonial continuity,21 but the new group proceeded from a different 
place to delegitimise these state authorities, seeking to combine in turn 
a supra-authority with evidence of administrative efficiency in the face 
of its enemies’ inaptness and ineptitude. The logic of state-building – 
vividly seen in the videos produced that summer with the chant baqiya 
(staying), as in ‘the Islamic State is staying’ (al dawla al Islamiya baqiya), 
becoming a leitmotiv of the group – was also based on a broadening of 
what that ‘state’ was seen as offering, namely institutional perennation 
and self-realisation. Whereas Al Qaeda was all about military output and 
warrior ethos, IS widened that by promoting a single target, aiming at 
statehood. In a June 2014 IS video entitled There is no Life without Jihad, 
inner peace and atonement with oneself (away from ‘trouble in the West’) 
is promised to the militant invited to join the group and find his or her 
place in the dawla. One fighter remarks in that video, in English, that ‘the 
cure to depression is jihad’. As Christoph Günther and Tom Kaden note: 
‘IS can be regarded as both a socio-political movement and a quasi-state 
with different sources of authority and means of power pertaining to 
each of these two roles. Both of these dimensions of authority guarantee 
and reinforce each other, thus providing IS with a stability that is often 
overlooked in public debates about its aspirations and prospects.’22 It is 
this pervasive, pragmatic, programmatic and regulatory authority that 
must be stressed in making conceptual sense of IS.
With shades of incomplete colonial episodes and a mix of political-
military group logic and religious movement dynamics presiding over it, 
the IS state-building project, which carried with it obvious limitations, 
could not then be dismissed so easily as mere militant rhetoric. Its 
emergence was due primarily to the societally degenerated situation in 
both Iraq since 2003 and Syria since 2011. As, however, we find ourselves 
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at a key moment in the evolution of the armed groups evolving in the 
larger Middle East and North African area, the IS trajectory must in 
turn be located in a wider history not fully of its making, and removed 
from its specific motivations and methods. The materialisation of IS also 
owes a lot to the changing contexts of politics in the region. This, in 
effect, was a third phase in an interlocked scene in which post-colonial 
battles had generated a first transnational moment in the 1970s. In that 
respect, Bin Laden was not the first to introduce a globally oriented 
struggle. The first to do so were the Palestinians, and a first transnational 
moment – albeit a secular one regarding a national struggle for liberation 
– had taken place in the early to mid-1970s.23 The birth of Al Qaeda 
in the wake of the Afghan-Soviet war led to the rise of a second, more 
effectively transnational moment with completely different radical 
Islamist motivations. As Al Qaeda began receding in the late 2000s and 
early 2010s, and as the Syrian uprising mutated into an internationalised 
civil war, a third global moment was born, again for different reasons 
but building on the same state-weakening grammar as the previous 
wave. Whereas the Palestinian guerrillas had straightforward national 
liberation motivations and Bin Laden’s agenda was politico-religious, IS’s 
motivations – which, as noted, were partly derivative from Al Qaeda in 
that complex bilateral relationship – were expressed compellingly to their 
soldiery by way of a narrative about statehood (‘a state cannot be part of 
an organisation’, al ‘Adnani had pointed out almost apologetically to al 
Dhawahiri, but also de facto defiantly). IS’s motivations denoted agency 
but were unshakably circumstantial and derivative. Martial dynamics 
such as resistance (muqawama) and fight (nidal) in the 1970s and 1980s, 
and jihad (struggle) in the 1990s and 2000s, were replaced by the control 
and dominion logics of dawla (state) in the 2010s (Figure 3.1).
Although it was striking alliances in the revolts in Iraq and Syria 
and feeding off the neo-fitna (strife/dispute) between Sunni and Shi’a 
in the Muslim world, IS was not actually launching a global offensive 
on many fronts, as it was focusing on building a core. In so doing, IS 
had two previous examples of failed Islamist management to learn from: 
the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990s, and AQIM in the late 2000s 
and early 2010s. Both had chosen punitive approaches to their relations 
with the local population, which proved fatal to the groups. Missing an 
enabling environment and ready-made acceptance, both had artificially 
stretched their connections with the locals in Afghanistan and Mali, as 
these two groups relied primarily on ruthless and violent control. In 
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contradistinction, Al Qaeda had been born out of a bureau of assistance 
in Afghanistan (Maktab al Khadamat lil Mujahideen). Therefore, IS 
adopted the posture of a firm, indeed extremely ruthless organisation 
(conducting routine public executions), but alternated that violence with 
an image of service delivery and administrative rule-enforcer. However, 
it must be noted that were it not for the tribal Sunni support in Iraq 
and the presence of other Sunni groups battling the regime in Syria for 
their own reasons, IS’s strength might not have been sufficient on its 
own to change the dynamic in the region so radically. This then raises 
the important question of whether IS – which, as noted, can also be 
looked at as a neo-Ba’athi state resurrecting the military segments of that 
defunct political structure – was ultimately not merely a super-Sunni 
group. In 2007, the Sunni Sahwa (Awakening) tribal movement gained 
the upper hand on the then-ISI in high-profile engagements in the Diyala 
and Anbar provinces, and, seven years later, Sunni tribal revolt against al 
Maliki enabled IS’s rise. Yet alliance with the Sunni tribes could not last, 
and talk of khilafa (Caliphate) was not reconcilable with Iraqi wataniya 
(patriotism), which in the past took secular forms and involved many 
different ethnic and confessional identities across Iraq. Tellingly, the Shi’a 
aspect per se was not problematic for Al Qaeda, and Bin Laden was always 
careful not to alienate the Shi’a, explicitly reprimanding al Zarqawi in 
2005 for his attacks on them. That, however, was a different context before 
Saddam Hussein’s December 2006 hanging amid Shi’a religious chants, 
which marked a turning point in the conflict between Sunnis and Shi’a.
Figure 3.1 The changing contexts of transnational Islamism
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It is no small paradox that, benefitting from the most globalised 
context ever, IS first behaved eminently locally. The reason for that lay 
in the initial refocus on Iraq, the desire to append neighbouring Syria 
to that project and the pursuit of contiguous, delineated, physical and 
territorial statehood. As, however, the group made forays in that regard 
in mid to late 2014, it saw merit in capitalising on an objective attraction 
phenomenon in Syria, whereby fighters were coming from other regional 
groups, from the diasporas in the West and from their ancestral homes. 
Amid these reinvented possibilities, each of these arrivals had several 
layers of motivations, and this served to open the purview of IS both in 
further territorialising it and in introducing a key spin on the Al Qaeda 
franchising system.
As IS led its coup on Al Qaeda in June 2014, closing the book on al 
Dhawahiri’s indecisive leadership (which it regarded as weak and obsolete) 
more than on Bin Laden’s original movement (‘that is the Al Qaeda we 
love’), it had also shed its identity as a former franchise of that group. 
To that end, the announcement of the re-establishment of the Caliphate 
and the pursuit of statehood immediately served to project a new group 
identity, transcending the earlier one and eschewing factional bickering. 
Such a power move on the part of al Baghdadi was also meant visibly to 
discourage any attempt to question this new project. The concerns were 
not unfounded, as two other Al Qaeda franchises had, earlier, taken pole 
position in the global radical Islamist movement without taking off in that 
direction. In the late 2000s, as Al Qaeda al Oum began losing influence 
and started becoming evanescent, AQAP and AQIM gained visibility in, 
respectively, the Arabian Gulf and the Sahel, with the former riding high 
in security dangerousness rankings and considered the more lethal of 
the Al Qaeda franchises.24 This meant then that a key element in the 
evolution of the Al Qaeda-IS rift could be the stance the other power 
houses in the Al Qaeda constellation would take vis-à-vis the matter, 
notably AQAP and AQIM. Initially, neither group adopted a clear-cut 
position regarding the IS power grab. Early, low-level reactions were 
guarded, with both resentment of IS and attraction towards it coexisting. 
Then, on 14 July 2014, AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel rejected 
IS’s call and reaffirmed his allegiance to al Dhawahiri and to Al Qaeda. 
This proved to be unsettling as, on 25 June, the head of AQIM’s Central 
Zone had announced his support to IS. Similarly, the founder of AQIM 
offshoot Jama’at al Tawhid wal Jihad fi Gharb Ifriqiya (the Movement 
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for Unification and Jihad in West Africa), Hamada Ould Mohamed 
Kheirou, had expressed, three days before Droukdel, his support of ‘the 
Islamic Caliphate’. For its part, and while being enmeshed in the Yemeni 
post-Arab Spring political transition, AQAP remained silent officially, 
but on 3 July its leader, Nasser al Wuhayshi, issued a poem praising al 
Dhawahiri and implicitly criticising IS’ pronouncements, although, as 
was the case with AQIM, AQAP commander Sheikh Makmun Hatim 
had previously indicated support to IS. Both AQIM and AQAP would 
officially remain unclear about their stance vis-à-vis IS: formally staying 
part of Al Qaeda, de facto fully independent and in effect espousing the 
same ideology as IS, which they also never criticised explicitly nor called 
on to cease what it was doing.
Over the next two years, IS would see its appeal grow internationally, 
and dozens of radical Islamist organisations round the world would pledge 
allegiance to or express formal support for it. As opposed to Bin Laden’s 
project, there was, to be sure, more internal resistance to allegiance among 
the new groups towards IS (as evidenced by the different statements from 
operators within the same branch or region), but overall the movement 
was wider and faster. More importantly, it had acquired another nature: 
the groups were not so much inventing or reinventing themselves as 
franchises – that is, materialising as localised mini-versions replicating 
the nature of the mother entity (Al Qaeda al Oum) – as they were pledging 
allegiance to a ‘state’ and a leader they came organically to consider their 
own. Paradoxically, the elasticity of the Caliphate logic also worked to 
provide these groups with more independence – while they were pledging 
allegiance – than was the case with Al Qaeda, since as wilayas (regions) 
they could also claim sovereign control over regional matters, whereas 
Al Qaeda’s original franchise system carried a measure of departmental 
discipline in relation to headquarter’s directives (e.g. al Zarqawi circa 
2005 being told by al Dhawahiri that Bin Laden did not approve of his 
targeting of Iraqi Shi’a). In quick succession, the pledges of allegiance and 
statements of support materialised after the June 2014 announcement of 
the Caliphate, providing a clear indication of the successful use of that 
narrative with the worldwide Islamist armed militancy. Within two years, 
the group had received the allegiance or formal support of 40 groups from 
22 countries (see Table 3.3). On 13 July, Abubakar Shekau, the leader of 
the Nigerian group Boko Haram, expressed support, and his organisation 
followed that with a formal pledge of allegiance a few months later in 
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March 2015. In September 2014, an Algerian group, Junud al Khilafa (the 
Soldiers of the Caliphate), was created to support the establishment of IS, 
which in the context of the global Al Qaeda-into-IS story was particularly 
revealing, as an offshoot of Al Qaeda had effectively given birth to its own 
offshoot. In Libya and Tunisia, respective branches of Ansar al Sharia 
(Partisans of the Sharia) followed suit. In Libya, IS supporters faced fiercer 
competition among the dozens of organised militias, which had come 
to dominate the country’s security landscape in the aftermath of the fall 
of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime. Several engagements took place, notably 
with the Derna Mujahideen Council in Derna in July 2015, before IS 
was able to claim a wilaya on the Mediterranean coast that it controlled 
sporadically over the next two years.
Table 3.3 Pledges of allegiance and/or support to IS
Organisation Date of pledge/support Region/country
1. Mujahideen Shura Council 6 February 2014
(pledge to ISIS, before 
IS name change)
Palestine
2. Al Huda Battalion in the Islamic 
Maghreb
30 June 2014 Algeria
3. Liwa Ahrar al Sunna fi Baalbek 
(Brigades of the Free Men of the Sunna 
in Baalbek)
30 June 2014 Lebanon
4. Mujahideen Indonesia Timur 30 June 2014 Indonesia
5. Jaysh al Sahaba (Army of the 
Companions)
1 July 2014 Syria
6. Ansar al Sharia (Partisans of the 
Sharia)
4 July 2014 Tunisia
7. Tehrik-e-Khilafat (Caliphate 
Movement)
9 July 2014 Pakistan
8. Jama’at al Tawhid wal Jihad fi Gharb 
Ifriqiya (Movement for Unification 
and Jihad in West Africa)
11 July 2014 Sahel/Mali
9. Sons of the Call for Tawhid and 
Jihad
20 July 2014 Jordan
10. Itisaam al Qur’an wal Sunna 
(Spread of the Qur’an and Sunna)
1 August 2014 Sudan
11. Ansar al Khilafa (Partisans of the 
Caliphate)
13 August 2014 The Philippines
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Organisation Date of pledge/support Region/country
12. Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom 
Fighters
14 August 2016 The Philippines
13. Ansar al Tawhid (Partisans of 
Unification)
4 October India
14. Ansar al Sharia (Partisans of 
Sharia)
31 October 2014 Libya
15. Junud al Khilafa (Soldiers of the 
Caliphate)
14 September 2014 Algeria
16. ‘Oqba Ibn Nafaa Battalion 20 September 2014 Tunisia
17. Al Tawhid Brigade in Afghanistan 23 September 2014 Afghanistan
18. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 25 September 2014 Uzbekistan
19. Junud al Khilafa fi Ard Kinana 
(Soldiers of the Caliphate in the Land 
of Egypt)
29 September 2014 Egypt
20. Heroes of Islam Brigade in the 
Khorasan
30 September 2014 Afghanistan
21. Tehrik-e-Taliban (Movement of the 
Taliban)
4 October 2014 Pakistan
22. Shabaab al Islam fil Darna (Youth 
of Islam in Darna)
6 October 2014 Libya
23. Ansar al Tawhid fi Ard al Hind 
(Partisans of Unification in the Land 
of India)
6 October 2014 India
24. Katibat al Imam al Bukhari 
(Brigade of the Imam al Bukhari) 
29 October 2014 Syria
25. Ansar al Sharia 31 October 2014 Libya
26. Ansar Beit al Maqdis (Partisans of 
the Holy House)
10 November 2014 Egypt
27. Mujahideen al Yemen (Mujahideen 
of Yemen)
10 November 2014 Yemen
28. JundAllah (Soldiers of God) 17 November 2014 Pakistan
29. Ansar al Dawla al Islamiya fi 
Bilad al Haramayn (Supporters of the 
Islamic State in the Land of the Two 
Holy Sites)
2 December 2014 Saudi Arabia
30. Ansar al Islam (Partisans of Islam) 8 January 2015 Iraq
31. Leaders of the Mujahideen in 
Khorasan
10 January 2015 Pakistan
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Organisation Date of pledge/support Region/country
32. Boko Haram 9 March 2015 Nigeria
33. Junud al Khilafa (Soldiers of the 
Caliphate)
31 March 2015 Tunisia
34. Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Group) 27 April 2015 The Philippines
35. Al Murabitun (The Almoravids) 14 May 2015 Sahel/Mali
36. Mujahideen Kairouan (Mujahideen 
of Kairouan)
18 May 2015 Tunisia
37. Caucacus Emirate 23 June 2015 Russia
38. Hezb-e-Islami (Islamic Party) 6 July 2015 Afghanistan
39. Jabhat East Africa (East African 
Front)
8 April 2016 Somalia
40. Ansar al Khilafa (Partisans of the 
Caliphate)
19 July 2016 Brazil
Shamasr, or the geographical combination in Arabic of Shaam (Levant) 
and Masr (Egypt), an area historically linked politically and militarily, 
came next. In Egypt, on 24 October, the speaker of a new group known 
as Ansar Beit al Maqdis (the Partisans of the Holy House), Kamal Allam, 
announced that his group was joining IS: ‘Give the good news to al 
Baghdadi … Give the good news to the Caliph of the believers. Victory 
is coming and we are your soldiers.’ A month later, on 10 November, 
the group’s commander, Abu Osama al Masri, confirmed that statement, 
declaring: ‘The Caliphate has been declared in Iraq and al Shaam … 
We have no choice but to welcome the invitation of God’s caller. We 
therefore pledge religious and political loyalty to Caliph Ibrahim.’ As was 
the case with AQIM and AQAP, there were internal disagreements, and 
an earlier pledge issued on 3 November had been denied the next day, 
again indicative of lingering uncertainty. This was also illustrative of the 
complexity of that particular scene, as the insurgency in the Sinai had 
been born initially in the aftermath of the 1978 Camp David Accords 
between Egypt and Israel and the subsequent Israeli withdrawal in 1982, 
but this particular incarnation of the movement was much more recent 
and closer to IS’s perspective. Ansar Beit al Maqdis were in effect heirs 
to Al Tawhid wal Jihad fi Sayna (Unity and Jihad in the Sinai), which 
had emerged in July 2005; and that first generation, founded by Khaled 
Musa’id, had been visibly influenced by al Zarqawi. (In September 2015, 
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a video by IS’s Sinai wilaya paid homage to the Jordanian first leader of 
AQI.) A second group, Al Tawhid wal Jihad-Beit al Maqdis, was formed 
in 2009. The same themes about Jerusalem (the holy city formally known 
in Arabic as Al Quds is also referred as beit al maqdis) were appearing 
among Iraqi groups such as Ansar al Sunna, and early connections 
with them were visible. As was the case with ISI, that group’s violence 
increased symmetrically with ruthless counter-insurgency and counter-
terrorism operations led successively by the Hosni Mubarak, Mohamed 
Morsi and Abdelfattah al Sisi regimes, and the repression turned that 
violence inward. However, the 2014 allegiance to IS was an unprecedented 
event, particularly as the earlier Al Qaeda in Egypt franchise failed to 
take off in 2006. As Omar Ashour notes: ‘The November [2014] pledge 
of allegiance … to ISIS was perhaps the most critical and unprecedented 
development in the history of Egyptian jihadism. It was the first time that 
a local armed jihadist organisation of Ansar Beit al Maqdis’ size declared 
transnational loyalty to a foreign organisation.’25 Ansar Beit al Maqdis’s 
choice of IS over Al Qaeda was indeed revealing – particularly in light of 
al Dhawahiri’s Egyptian lineage – but it was essentially a choice dictated 
by the overwhelming power of IS and the appeal of its dangerousness. 
In effect, Ansar Beit al Maqdis’s militarisation in the following months 
during 2015 spoke of its increasing emulation of IS’s tactics, notably the 
use of improvised explosive devices. The group’s military prowess and 
capture of Egyptian military material, including at least one tank, were 
also shown in a video entitled Desert Flames posted online by the group 
in August 2016, again using the same communication strategy that had by 
then been fully implemented by IS (see Chapter 4). This went along with 
investment in an effort to maintain the religious leadership claims of the 
group, which also impacted the international radical Islamists’ scene – as, 
for instance, on 22 October 2015, the chief ideologue of Somalia’s main 
radical Islamist group, Al Shabaab, Abdelqader al Mumin, shifted from 
his Somali group to IS.
The global appeal of the group continued to expand into places 
previously unreached by Al Qaeda, and by 2017 IS influence had reached 
Trinidad and Tobago, Indonesia and the Philippines.26 As such dissemina-
tion played out, two dynamics were emerging. On the one hand, the groups 
appeared primarily to value the military might and power of the brand 
‘Islamic State’, and supported its ‘religiously sacred’ fight. They therefore 
privileged presentations of themselves as junud (soldiers) and ansar 
(partisans/companions). IS, for its part, regarded these different entities 
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as essentially formal regions of its dominion (as explicitly communicated 
in the 6 July 2016 video message), and sought to introduce the normative 
use of a term that had not been previously used by Al Qaeda, namely 
wilaya (region or province, but with an administrative and departmental 
connotation). Accordingly, in the different video messages that were 
produced and released officially by the group in the next phase, that 
terminology was used systematically for individual militants’ operations 
or group insurgencies, notably in Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Afghanistan, 
Nigeria and Pakistan. In most cases, IS was essentially renaming the 
existing regional internal divisions of these countries (e.g. the three 
regions of Libya: Cyrenaica, Fezzan and Tripolitania), but in some cases 
it was purposely blending countries, with Bahrain for instance integrated 
into what were mostly Saudi provinces, or Nigeria standing in for all of 
West Africa (gharb ifriqiya). The core IS system was, however, focused on 
those Iraqi and Syrian wilayat (19 out of 35) that were most often referred 
to or featured in messages (Table 3.4).
Table 3.4 Wilayas (regions) of IS
Country Wilayas (regions)
Afghanistan Wilayat Khorasan
Algeria Wilayat al Jazayr
Egypt Wilayat Sinai
Iraq Wilayat Ninawa, Wilayat al Jazira, Wilayat al Furat, Wilayat Jila, 
Wilayat Kirkuk, Wilayat Salah al Din, Wilayat al Anbar, Wilayat 
al Faluja, Wilayat Diyala, Wilayat al Shamaal, 
Libya Wilayat Barqa, Wilayat Fezzan, Wilayat Tarablus
Nigeria Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiya
Russia Wilayat Qawqaz
Saudi Arabia Wilayat al Hijaz, Wilayat al Najd
Syria Wilayat al Raqqa, Wilayat al Barqa, Wilayat al Khayr, Wilayat 
Homs, Wilayat Halab, Wilayat Hama, Wilayat Dimashq 
Yemen Wilayat Aden-Abyan, Wilayat Ataq, Wilayat Bayda, Wilayat 
Hadramawt, Wilayat Luaa al Akhdar, Wilayat Sana’a, Wilayat 
Shabwa
The elasticity of IS’s positioning across the region also meant it could 
always find new territory to claim. Its territorial structure featured four 
different sectors: centres of immediate importance (Iraq and Syria), areas 
of control and action (Libya, Egypt and Yemen), places of active influence 
120 . a theory of isis
(Somalia, Nigeria, Mali, Niger, Afghanistan, the Philippines) and 
locations with active operators (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Algeria, 
Tunisia and Europe, notably France, Belgium and Germany). The group, 
however, headquartered itself in a ‘capital’ of twin cities in Iraq and Syria, 
namely Mosul and Raqqa, from where, until 2017, it directed its project 
under the leadership of al Baghdadi and his associates. In August 2014, 
as the Iraqi army was still reeling from its shock eviction from Mosul 
by IS (32,000 soldiers had fled the area in early June in the face of 1,500 
militants), Iraq’s military (with US aerial support) initiated engagements 
with the group around the city. The Battle for Mosul began in earnest, 
and for the next three years was presented by the Iraqi authorities and 
their Western counterparts as a key event in the envisioned defeat of IS. 
In October 2014, it was announced anew that plans to retake the city were 
under consideration. Later, Iraqi officials declared that the offensive was 
still under preparation. A year later, in December 2015, following the 
liberation of Ramadi, it was announced again that Mosul would be next. 
Eventually, the coalition assault on the city began the following year, on 
20 October 2016, and lasted a year. Battling the United States (the first 
ground clashes between the group and US forces took place in December 
2014 in Ein al Asad near Ramadi), Russia, the United Kingdom, France, 
the US-trained Iraqi military, the Iraqi official militia known as the 
Popular Mobilisation Forces (set up in mid-June 2014 specifically to 
battle IS after Mosul’s fall), Turkey, experienced Iranian military advisers, 
battle-hardened Kurdish Peshmerga (in May 2016, following the advance 
of Iraqi troops, IS led several large-scale operations against the PKK/
YPG (Kurdistan Workers’ Party/ People’s Protection Units) groups in 
Manbij), Sunni tribes and the Shi’a Lebanese Hezbollah group, IS held 
on to the two cities for more than three years. Arguably, however, and as 
regarded their eventual retaking by the Iraqi and Syrian regimes, for all 
their tactical importance to the group the two cities were not crucial to 
IS’s strategy. The capture of those regional urban centres by IS was, in the 
first place, the consequence of historical contingencies and the storm of 
deteriorating conflicts. In Iraq, as noted, the group’s success owed much 
to Sunni resentment and Ba’athi vengeance, with tribesmen providing 
the soldiery and former senior officers becoming the cadre of the group. 
In Syria, Bashar al Assad’s cautious focus on the ‘useful’ territory he had 
wanted to protect since the start of the Syrian civil war led to his shying 
away from adventurism further north in rebel-held lands such as Raqqa. 
With territory coming and going in fragmenting Levantine lands, for the 
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armed group that IS was before it captured Mosul, territory itself was a 
malleable commodity. If the territorial approach failed and if the leaders 
were killed, transnationality and online space, which the group capitalised 
on, as well as the post-modern incarnations of its brand of terrorism, 
would provide equal opportunities for IS to evolve and to keep attacking. 
Fully aware of what it was doing, IS publicly recounted the logic of its 
emergence, writing in issue twelve of its magazine Dabiq (see Chapter 4), 
released in November 2015: 
It was not but a few years [ago] that the Islamic State made a great 
comeback on the scene of Iraq. At the same time, it had entered into 
Shaam [Levant] and prepared the foundation of wilayat there. The 
words ‘the Islamic State is baqiya [remaining]’ filled the air and echoed 
before this and also thereafter in various addresses of the Islamic State 
leadership. The Islamic State not only remained in Iraq, it had spread 
to the Arabian Peninsula, Shaam, North and West Africa, Khurasan 
(Afghanistan), al Qawqaz (Caucasus) and elsewhere. 
Regeneration naturally came to the IS repertoire – from Caliphate legacy, 
from Al Qaeda reboot, from the continuing history of Iraq and from the 
uprising in Syria seeking a new order. What al Baghdadi simply had to do 
was to stage the re-incarnation of those interrupted narratives. At the same 
time, emphasis was placed on maximising the role played by operators 
located in the West.27 As IS saw it, the project of a religious state garnered 
more impetus since opposition to it was simply ideological; on the one 
hand, the neo-authoritarian Arab state and, on the other, the European 
neo-colonial and US imperial states, as it regarded them. Problematically 
for them, all carried contradictions in their fight against IS. The Arab 
states often produced terrorism in the name of fighting it, and the Western 
countries often closed democratic space in the name of opposing the 
threat represented by the group. Was it ever clear to al Baghdadi – who 
was always less strategic and visionary than Bin Laden, and closer to the 
ruthless ways of al Zarqawi – how his organisation could simultaneously 
pursue its domestic plan of conquering, controlling and administrating 
large swathes of territory over Iraq and Syria, expanding regionally per 
its Caliphate logic and folding new provinces from the groups pledging 
allegiance to it, all while acting globally in attacking the West with its large 
contingent of foreign fighters? Ultimately, weren’t the different identities 
and multiple layers of IS contradictory, in particular its combination of 
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the local and the distant (whereas Bin Laden had simply privileged the 
latter)? It is in this sense that the eventual disappearance of IS as a group 
and its leaders will not necessarily be consequential. The logical next 
step for such a movement could, for instance, be relocation or rebirth in 
the name of a sacralised Mosul/Raqqa golden age. Alternatively, the lost 
Eden might be reconceptualised virtually or displaced transnationally 
(see the Conclusion).
The campaign launched by IS in 2014 generated deep fear among 
Western citizenry. Between June 2014 and June 2016, the group had 
conducted or inspired 75 attacks in 20 countries besides Iraq and 
Syria, killing a total of 1,280 people, with attacks continuing steadily 
throughout 2017. This staccato violence reached its apex in the summer 
of 2016 (see Chapter 4). Besides the different Western governments 
battling the group, sub-state entities in Europe and in the United States 
also reacted by threatening IS. The group Anonymous ‘declared war’ on 
IS on 16 November 2015 shortly after the attacks in Paris, and claimed 
subsequently to have closed 5,000 Twitter accounts. On 28 July 2016, a 
faction (known as ‘22 October’) within the Corsican nationalist group, 
the Corsican National Liberation Front, said it would retaliate against any 
ISIS attack on the French island. In effect, Western state and non-state 
entities came to regard the group as an existential opponent – actions and 
reactions which closed the circle on what Bin Laden had wanted to do, 
namely wrestle the martial function from the regional Arab and Muslim 
state and locate it in the actions of non-state actors putting pressure on the 
West. IS appeared thus to follow an accelerated version of Al Qaeda. Too 
black, too strong, it experienced the same sequence as its begetter, with 
spectacular victories followed by a large-scale allocation of resources by 
its state opponents to target and kill its leaders. The new group invested 
in reorganising its ‘army’, with regional commanders reporting to a key 
senior structure and a military-style organisation comprising different 
types of uniformed special units with black fatigues and balaclava hoods. 
Holding ground meant proactively planning new operations, and this IS 
did by launching simultaneous campaigns on two fronts against the Yazidi 
areas of Sinjar in Iraq and the Kurdish-dominated city Kobani (Ayn al 
Arab) in Syria. Again, the two sectors were not of strategic importance 
to IS, and were recaptured in 2015 by the respective Kurdish and Turkish 
forces, but at that key moment they served an important tactical purpose 
in ‘spreading the enemy’ and buying time for the group as it settled in 
Mosul and Raqqa. Similarly, the group captured, in May 2015, the cities 
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of Ramadi (Iraq) and Palmyra (Syria), which it lost the following year. 
On 26 and 29 September 2015, Russia and France respectively stepped 
up their involvement in the fight against IS, launching a series of aerial 
bombings on the areas held by the group, which responded by downing 
a Russian plane on 4 October, and conducted attacks in Paris on 13 
November killing a total of 354 Russian and French citizens. With the 
other regional and international powers remaining active as well, the 
group would experience first a slowdown and then a gradual loss of the 
areas it controlled at the height of its advance in mid to late 2014. At that 
time, it had controlled over 60,000 km2. By the summer of 2017, it had 
lost 23,000 km2 but continued to hold most of Mosul and Raqqa, as well as 
the Euphrates River sector between the two countries and other pockets, 
carrying out regular local attacks.
Ultimately, as regards their common religious identity, Al Qaeda 
and IS were close enough as Sunni neo-Salafist radical Islamist 
groups. Ideologically, Al Qaeda was a transnational entity focused on 
displacement of its war on to ‘the far enemy’ (the US principally) and 
dealing secondarily with the ‘near enemy’ (local Arab authoritarian 
regimes). IS, for its part, worked in the opposite direction. It started off 
as a local Iraqi story, built up momentum with the Syrian issue and then 
moved to the global chessboard, inviting not so much franchises as Al 
Qaeda did but rather provinces. Politically, Al Qaeda was a post-Cold 
War and post-globalisation development representing the entry of radical 
political Islam on to the global scene. IS was a post-modern story, only 
partly related to radical Islamism and indeed to the Middle East and 
North Africa. There was always a larger dimension at play in the case 
of IS, which connected with the violence projected from the Western 
metropolis and with a series of military interventions. An understanding 
of the state-building project of IS goes a long way to explaining the 
emphasis on administration, taxation, legitimation and the conduct of 
‘foreign affairs’, but it must be complemented by an examination of an 
additional, equally innovative element of communication. Following 
on from Bin Laden, IS had understood the importance of spectacle. 
Immediately after its takeover of Mosul – and therefore coincidentally 
with the announcement of its Caliphate-building project – in the summer 
of 2014 it unleashed a media blitzkrieg which would take the world by 
storm, raising Al Qaeda’s professionalised communication to another 
level and, in so doing, introducing the third layer of IS’s identity, one 
located in modernity and in the West.
4
Modernity and the  
Globalised Insurgent
The price of freedom is death.
Malcolm X (1964)
On the strength, the situation’s unreal. 
I got a raw deal, so I’m going for the steel …
As for the rest of the world, they can’t realise. 
A cell is hell. I’m a rebel, so I rebel.
Public Enemy, ‘Black Steel in the Hour of Chaos’ (1988)
In a 29-minute video entitled A Year upon the Conquest, posted online 
on 12 June 2015, IS celebrated the one-year anniversary of its takeover of 
the Iraqi city of Mosul. Starting with footage of SUV columns lining up 
at dawn on 4 June 2014 to launch the attack, and depicting the different 
phases over the next seven days – during which a group of approximately 
1,500 irregulars overran the 32,000-strong Iraqi army force stationed 
in and around Mosul, forcing its disorderly retreat – the step-by-step 
video was the culmination of the second phase of IS’s history, namely 
as a modern phenomenon with global communication playing a central 
role in that effort. Recognising the impact of this unique campaign, the 
international public relations firm Global Leadership later noted in its 
ranking for 2015 that the international brand recognition of IS or ISIS 
had come to surpass that of the Vatican.
The proverbial ‘day after Mosul’ for IS came under the theme of 
state-building and management of victory, but also under the theme of 
dissemination of an increasingly globalised narrative. In line with their 
three-tiered local, regional and international strategy of holding ground, 
developing resilience and expanding front, the group, now boasting 50,000 
men (according to Al Jazeera on 19 August 2014), invested massively 
in a large-scale multimedia advertisement campaign. The organisation 
had already been deft at using social media, but in the summer of 
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2014 it launched a conspicuously more ambitious plan to let the world 
know about its presence and agenda. This was in effect the moment at 
which ‘ISIS’, as a news phenomenon, fully came to the attention of the 
mainstream public in the West and, indeed, when policymakers started 
paying attention to the group with more urgency.
IS’s storming of the world stage in this fashion, and specifically the 
expert use of communication technology tools, enabled it to add a new 
layer to its identity above and beyond its Al Qaeda core: the Iraqi and Syrian 
insurgencies it rode and the regional groups it had begun influencing in 
North and West Africa and in the Gulf. The group would now come to 
tap into the very heart of European and North American cities and a 
tempest of political, cultural and socio-economic discontent and malaise 
in the West. As the tech-minded, self-empowered message beamed by the 
group from the territory it held in Iraq and Syria gained momentum in 
this way, putting pressure on policymaking at the highest international 
level to stop such a disrupting campaign (indeed an embarrassing one, 
years after the ‘liberation’ of Iraq boasted by President Bush in May 2004), 
IS unexpectedly started appealing to many a radical rebel-in-the-making 
across Europe and the United States – extremists of all hues, young and 
old, second- or third-generation Muslim immigrants and local religious 
or ideological converts. The extreme violence used by the group did not 
deter these individuals. To the contrary, many of them saw in it – as 
they made explicit in their recorded messages – a way to visit violence 
on their own societies. In so doing, these actors prioritised that specific 
adrenaline-heightened, violent release dimension over the state-building 
project of IS and the socio-political conflicts the group was immersed in 
in the Levant. As it entered this phase of its history, IS therefore continued 
to function as a political entity bent on power acquisition and informed 
by the different aspects of the ongoing Iraqi and Syrian conflicts, but also 
as one displaying an added dimension of privatised and individualised 
martiality driven from the West itself.
IS’s rapid redirection towards a previously untapped dimension of its 
initial project was enabled primarily through a Hollywoodised staging of 
violence that was designed to appeal to a different militancy than merely 
its local and regional one. The impact of this effort was global, quickly 
leading to a so-called phenomenon of foreign fighters, which was large 
in scale but manifested particularly in Europe and best encapsulated in 
the alienated youth networks in post-colonial Europe. Those actors were 
driven primarily by a domestic experience of loss and disenchantment, 
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which they connected with the Western military interventionism that had 
been playing out in a number of Muslim countries, in the Middle East, 
North Africa and the Sahel. In the event, this sequence of forward-looking 
dynamics furthering IS’s game plan during the mid to late 2010s ended 
up unexpectedly but revealingly echoing the 1970s societal malaise that 
had dominated the social and political scene across the United States and 
Europe 40 years ago, indirectly reactivating many rebellions that were not 
related to radical Islamism per se, but which fed off this atmosphere of 
violence. In a further historical twist, this evolution and the reaction to 
it also laid the ground for the rise of a type of authoritarianism in these 
societies reminiscent of the 1930s climate.
Remixing Violence
In the years after the events of 9/11, Al Qaeda had overseen the asymptotic 
decentralisation of its operations and the capacitation of a number of new 
franchises around the world. From roughly 2007 onwards, the combined 
effect of these strategies started birthing a post-modern type of terrorism 
– in effect one that was already post-Al Qaeda. This new mode featured 
a number of traits, chief among which was a widened and facilitated 
private resort to terrorism, self-radicalisation on a heroic-punitive 
mode, a symbiosis of physical and symbolic violence moving from the 
battlefield to the virtual battlespace and organisational professionalisation 
anchored in an active and innovative use of information technology. The 
successfully Uberised bottling of the new terrorism by Al Qaeda was, 
however, only the start of its story in the late 2000s and early 2010s. 
The rapid succession of individual high-profile and mediatised attacks 
inspired by Al Qaeda – as illustrated by cases involving David Coleman 
Headley in Chicago in 2008, Nidal Malik Hassan in Fort Hood in 
November 2009, Omar Faruk Abdulmuttalab in Amsterdam in December 
2009, Colleen LaRose in Pennsylvania in March 2010, Anders Breivik 
in Oslo in July 2011, Mohamed Merah in France in March 2012 and 
Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev in Boston in April 2013 – paved the 
way for a second generation exemplified by Chérif and Said Kouachi in 
Paris in January 2014, and many more that followed in subsequent years. 
The rise of those latter-day, variously-Al Qaeda-influenced terrorists was 
now accompanied, indeed facilitated, by a spider-net communication 
campaign designed by IS that would impact directly upon and mould a 
new brand of globalised insurgents.
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In the summer of 2014, IS embarked on a media blitzkrieg. The project 
constituted a fully fledged component of its battle plan and functioned 
in a way that revolutionised communication by violent, armed non-state 
actors. Earlier generations of terrorist groups addressed communication 
matters after their operations. A message would be sent or a telephone call 
placed ex post facto to a news agency to claim an operation or formulate 
demands. Al Qaeda changed this approach by working upstream and 
pre-recording video ‘wills’ of its operators conducting the suicide attacks, 
which it then released to media outlets (Al Jazeera mainly) or uploaded 
online. IS took that logic to the next level by conceiving of communication 
as an integral, in situ component of its war, not merely to make demands 
or to inform but to strike the minds and expand.1 The architecture put 
in place to that effect was large, complex and multifaceted. The group 
combined official releases with messages put out independently by its 
operators. This allowed it to ensure wall-to-wall, expanded coverage of 
its actions and, in so doing, generate an impression of omnipresence. 
Operations by the group were systematically recorded on video and 
published online, either near-simultaneously with their performance (in 
one instance – the killing of a married couple of police officers in their 
home by an IS sympathiser in France in June 2016 – the video was posted 
on Facebook by the killer while he was still on the premises) or shortly 
thereafter. Replacing an earlier media branch set up by ISI in November 
2006, Al Furqan Foundation for Media Production (which continued to 
release IS messages), a new official media branch named Al Hayat Media 
Centre was launched in August 2014. Videos were released in Arabic, 
English, Spanish, French, Turkish, German, Italian, Dutch, Bahasa, 
Swedish, Polish, Chinese, Japanese, Farsi, Russian, Portuguese, Azeri, 
Somali and Hebrew.2 With multiple media platforms used extensively, 
releases were of high quality and produced to professional standards. 
Closing the book on the early shaky cell phone footage uploaded hastily 
on rogue temporary YouTube accounts (predominantly from its Syrian 
operators during the first year of the civil war), these were now regular, 
high-definition videos shot professionally and staged with specific themes 
and narrative arcs: previews followed by main stories with cliff-hanger 
endings. The videos ranged from lengthy serialised features such as 
Clanking of the Swords IV (Salil al Sawarim IV, using Roman numerals)3 
– which opened with an aerial shot of Mosul – to 50-second ‘coming 
soon’ trailers such as The Flames of War, posted in September 2014, 
the day after a speech by US President Obama threatening the group 
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with reprisals; with the subtitle Fighting Has Just Begun accompanied by 
imagery of the White House in flames. The powerful and colourful visuals 
(exaggerated hues of vivid red for gory blood and cut angles with shadows 
of fighters riding against orange sunsets) of the videos were directly, and 
at times explicitly, inspired by Hollywood productions; in particular 
Oliver Stone’s frenetic editing style as seen in JFK (1991) and Natural 
Born Killers (1994), David Fincher’s execution scenes in Se7en (1995) and 
Kathryn Bigelow’s Copper Green military overtones in The Hurt Locker 
(2009). With super-slow motion, reverse motion, Go-Pro fight scenes, 
drone IMAX-like wide shots and mid-speech angle cuts (indicative of 
several cameras used during the filming and subsequent editing), these 
state-of-the-art videos, often emulating real-life special forces operations 
and depicting them with Mission Impossible-inspired visuals, represented 
the first time in history that a terrorist group was communicating in such 
a technically polished fashion, articulating its ornate propaganda (with 
‘top ten videos’ listings) beyond that of states. During World War II, 
Triumph of the Will and Why We Fight had been state-sponsored films, 
Clanking of the Swords IV was the work of a non-state actor. Filmed with 
drones, suicide attacks were integrated into these videos and were often 
preceded by interview with the attackers, minutes before their assault 
generating a you-are-there, or rather you-should-be-there, feel for their 
mesmerised audience of radical extremist militants. A video released in 
February 2015 (A Message Signed with Blood to the Nation of the Cross) 
featured CGI special effects and apparent use of green screen to make IS 
executioners on a beach off the shores of Libya appear taller than their 
victims being marched dramatically in a single line to their death. The 
serialised logic was also featured in a number of verisimilitude health 
services videos (NHS-style, one featuring Australian doctor Abu Yusuf 
at the Raqqa General Hospital), history lessons (Breaking of the Borders, 
The End of Sykes–Picot presented by a Chilean national introduced as Abu 
Safiya), statistics on military operations and news reports (From Inside 
Mosul, Lend Me Your Ears) hosted by hostage John Cantlie in Kobani on 
26 October 2014 and in Mosul on 3 January 2015. The group reached out 
to the American cable television programme HBO Vice News and, in July 
2014, took them on a tour of positions held in Syria. A number of themes 
were repeated in these videos: punishment of the Safavids (the term used 
by the group to refer to Iraqi and Iranian Shi’a, associating them with the 
Safavid dynasty which ruled Persia from 1501 to 1736), resistance to the 
Crusaders (the term used for Western countries) and punishment of the 
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apostate or murtad (the term used for the Arab and Muslim authoritarian 
regimes), as well as rejection of the modern boundaries of the region.
In print, the group introduced a series of glossy publications with an 
equally professional use of software (InDesign, Adobe and Photoshop) 
at times indicative of the likely involvement of trained graphic designers. 
An official magazine entitled Dabiq (the name of a city in northern Syria 
where in IS eschatology an end-of-days battle is expected to pit Muslims 
against Christians) was launched in July 2014 (with 15 issues as of July 
2017). The same slick film imagery used in the videos was reproduced 
in the magazine (an advertisement for IS’s upcoming currency in issue 
twelve used a visual from the 2001 film The Lord of the Rings), as were the 
recurrent gory details of beheadings. The magazine led every issue with 
a main theme, combining current questions and historical commentary: 
‘The return of the khilafa’, ‘The flood’ (the cover of that issue was 
inspired by the 2014 Hollywood film Noah), ‘A call to Hijra’, ‘The failed 
crusade’, ‘Remaining and expanding’, ‘Al Qaeda of Waziristan’, ‘From 
hypocrisy to apostasy’, ‘Sharia alone will rule Africa’, ‘They plot’, ‘The 
law of Allah’, ‘From the battle of al Ahzab [between the Meccans and the 
early Muslims] to the war of coalitions’, ‘Just terror’, ‘The rafida’ [Shi’a], 
‘The murtad brotherhood’ and ‘Breaking the cross’. Other magazines 
followed in December 2014 with a French-language release, Dar al Islam 
(House of Islam), and, in June 2015, others in Turkish, Konstantiniyye 
(Constantinople), and Russian, Istok (The Source). In September 2016, a 
fifth magazine entitled Rumiyyah (Rome) was released in six languages; 
English, French, German, Russian, Indonesian and Uyghur, appearing to 
replace Dabiq, and, in March 2017, yet another one entitled Al Haqiqa 
(The Truth) was launched. Radio news bulletins were started in April 
2015 in Arabic and Russian by an IS online radio channel entitled Al 
Bayan (the announcement) but subsequently discontinued. The group 
also released a mobile telephone app entitled The Dawn and produced a 
manual for evading geolocation.
With a strong impact on the seen-it-all globalised youth, such intricate, 
gear-shifting modern propaganda was allowing multiple narratives, 
and was depicting action, combat and killing rather than speeches – an 
important qualitative departure from Bin Laden’s lengthy videotaped 
messages aired semestrially on news channels or summarised in 
newspapers. Indeed, al Zarqawi’s bravado, rather than Bin Laden’s gravitas, 
was more often featured in these IS videos, with footage of al Zarqawi in 
April 2006 showing him firing AK-47 rounds in the Anbar desert of Iraq as 
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a recurring image. These innovations also superseded the first generation 
of hour-long documentary videos that had been released by Al Qaeda in 
the second half of the 2000s. As noted, the use of communication was also 
conspicuously proactive, and not an ex post facto afterthought, and in that 
sense communication was inherently part of the IS battle plan. Over time 
a pattern emerged involving what we can distinguish as three different 
types of videos released by the group. A first batch was concerned with 
religious commentary (e.g. To Establish the Religion, Racing to the Villages 
to Spread Guidance, And You Will Remember What I Now Say to You, 
Of Their Goods Take Alms, Into Light, The Fortress of Perseverance, The 
Rejecters of Injustice, Answer the Call), a second set depicted attacks and 
military-style operations (e.g. The Generation of Epic Battles, Clanking 
of the Swords IV, Crushing the Enemy, Bangers of the Swords, Reaping 
Heads, The Warriors, The Harvest of the Soldiers, The Assault of the 
Righteous II, Raid of the Predators II, Kill Them Wherever You Find 
Them, No Escape, Strategy of War) and a third cluster provided political 
messages and analysis (e.g. From Humiliation to Dignity, They Are the 
Enemy, An Eye for an Eye, No Respite, Their Alliance and Our Terrorism, 
That They Might Stop, The Reality of the American Raid, The Battle to 
Achieve Good, A Birthed Nation). To this could be added a dedicated line 
focused on education and social services (e.g. The Path of the Righteous 
Fathers, Those Who Believed and Migrated, He Will Surely Establish their 
Religion for Them, Safety and Security in the Islamic State, The Office of 
Protection and Safety, Food Security). Longer, documentary-style videos 
(such as Hunters of the Shields, released in December 2016) blended these 
different approaches. As regards communication from the leadership, it 
was handled primarily by al ‘Adnani until his death in August 2016 (he 
was replaced formally by al Muhajir as spokesman in December 2016, but 
with much less visibility the following year). Learning the lessons from 
the fate of Bin Laden, who had been located by the US in 2011 through 
couriers tracing his communication, but also modulating the group 
leader’s presence, only one video message was issued by al Baghdadi, on 
4 July 2014, followed by three audio messages in August 2014 and March 
and December 2015, until the Russian announcement of his reported 
death (unconfirmed at the time of writing) on 28 May 2017.
As Twitter and Facebook accounts held by IS militants and sympathisers 
(45,000 accounts by mid-November 2014, generating an estimated 
200,000 daily tweets during that period) were being shut down in 2015–16 
(the first filtering measures were taken officially by Twitter in September 
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2014), the group launched a news agency known as Al ‘Amaq al Ikhbariya. 
The agency was initially set up in October 2014, independently from 
IS, by a Syrian journalist named Re’yan Mash’aal who had previously 
managed an online news website in the city of Aleppo. As that site grew 
in technological sophistication (launching an Android application and 
delivering its bulletin in a dozen languages) and in ideological sympathy 
to IS, the outlet triggered the interest of the group’s communication 
team, which in effect sought to integrate it eventually into its business 
plan. Dispatches by Al Amaq ‘objectively’ announcing operations and 
attacks started delivering the news on an encrypted mobile application, 
and in so doing widened the impact of what the organisation was trying 
to do beyond boastful messages. Though IS had lost the ability to have 
several simultaneous sources beam information, notably the Arabic-
language use of the Twitter service by militants on the frontlines, the 
idea was that a centralised and more detached source would enable it to 
elevate its authority and only communicate consequential developments. 
Often, operations were also announced by official news agencies or news 
channels (notably the Arabic-language news channels Al Jazeera and Al 
Mayadeen) before IS itself would inform of such developments; Agence 
France-Presse, for instance, first reported the retaking of Palmyra by IS 
on 11 December 2016. For IS, Al ‘Amaq’s use of ‘neutral’ terminology was 
meant to provide credibility to the information relayed.
IS’s mode of war was the centrepiece of the news relayed and of the 
videos posted; a combination of urban terrorism, guerrilla warfare, 
special forces commando-like strikes, exploding drones, war of attrition, 
siege of cities, informant-hunting, door-to-door combat and vehicle-
borne improvised explosive device operations, performed by a soldiery 
made up of a mixture of battle-hardened Syrian and Iraqi defectors, local 
insurgents, inexperienced youth and sympathisers coming from around 
the world. (In October 2014, an IS video showed fighters training to fly 
warplanes seized from the Jarah military airport in Syria.) The commando-
style approach to battle, which Al Qaeda had adopted with AQI, was 
rebooted by IS, and this was facilitated by the involvement of Saddam 
Hussein’s former officers. In so doing, IS merged those innovations with 
earlier tactics of revolutionary warfare as developed historically by Mao 
Zedong. Specifically, a review of the evolution of IS makes it clear that 
its leaders had honed those techniques and the synchronisation of Mao’s 
well-known critical elements of revolutionary warfare.4 Such unrestricted 
asymmetrical combat also combined with references to classical Arabo-
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Islamic tribal warrior warfare (images of Saladin’s troops advancing 
towards Jerusalem in 1187 from the 2005 Ridley Scott film Kingdom of 
Heaven on the Crusades were used in several IS videos and in its French-
language magazine Dar al Islam, as was footage from Mel Gibson’s 2004 
film The Passion). Digital networks and high-tech graphs staging that 
asymmetrical martial mode were on full display in these videos which, 
consequently, acquired a videogame feel (influenced specifically by the 
games Counter Strike, Call of Duty, Splinter Cell and Metal Gear Solid), 
and in turn these repatterns inspired the real-life militarisation of attacks, 
as witnessed in Paris and Brussels in 2015–16. In September 2014, the 
group released a trailer for its own video game based on the game Grand 
Theft Auto, with customised IS computer graphics and redesigned IS 
fighter profiles, and did the same the following December with the game 
Hearts of Iron IV.
The hobgoblinisation of this violence registered with a segment of 
the disenfranchised Western youth, as it illuminated their readings of 
political and historical conflicts in the Levant they knew little about and 
a world religion they were largely ignorant of, even when nominally of the 
Muslim faith, with a contemporary sociological lens that was determined 
primarily by the format of the message and the brutal manner in which 
such communication connected with their daily, Western, suburban 
lives. Whereas the tone of Bin Laden’s and al Dhawahiri’s messages in 
the 2000s had been slow, sombre and solemn, the fast-paced IS messages 
were now accompanied by a distinctive audio track that featured crisp 
sound effects of loud machine-gunning and blade-sharpening, but also 
nasheeds or anthems sung by a male chorus. Recorded and released in 
various languages, these original hymns were idiosyncratic a cappella 
war chants that merged religious litany with warrior cheer. The hybrid 
mélange of the martial rhetoric (e.g. ‘clashing of the swords: a nasheed 
for the defiant, the path of fighting is the path of life, so amidst an assault 
tyranny is destroyed’) with religious aesthetics and a totalising style of 
history framed as meta-narrative (images cutting back and forth from 
ancient history to current affairs) was subsequently reappropriated by IS’s 
international followers. Strikingly, a new type of soundtrack developed in 
a second wave of IS videos: part religious, part tribal and part rap. These 
anthems became a dedicated line of release by IS. Language-specific 
versions started appearing in 2015 and traded online on nasheed-
specialised sites (such as DankestNasheeds.com). On 5 July 2016, in the 
aftermath of the Brussels March 2016 and Paris November 2015 attacks, 
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a chant entitled ‘Ma Vengeance’ (‘My Revenge’) was released in French 
by IS’s Hayat Media Centre. The video for the chant, which played like a 
rap music video, starts with an excerpt of French Prime Minister Manuel 
Valls stating that France was at war with IS, followed by a chant in French 
verse: ‘Valls wants to threaten us and see our corps amassed, remember 
the past O my brother, for they transgress against us, when their planes 
take off and bomb our schools and when they take control of our lands 
and plunder our oil, after all these years of fierce battles, the khilafa thrives 
once again and the time has come for revenge.’ The scene goes on: ‘This 
is for François Hollande. My Kalash [Kalashnikov firearm] is loaded, the 
civilians isolated, I eliminate the French, so thank Valls, an explosive belt 
is ready, I detonate it in the middle of a crowd, I blow up French people.’ 
And ends thus: ‘You can all do it. My brother [Amedy] Coulibaly has 
made them pay a heavy price. Carnage hypercasher.’ (A similar chant 
‘Avance, Avance’ – ‘Advance, Advance’ – had been released on 31 October 
2015 two weeks before the attacks in Paris; and on the eve of those attacks 
a chant in Russian entitled ‘Soon, Very Soon’ had been put out.) But for 
the sex, the contemporary urban world of gangster rap and its modern 
industrial cityscape was being visibly imported and exported in a form 
and tonality which sought to reconfigure its aesthetics as militarised 
political violence. Reworking a socio-economic delivery historically 
pioneered long ago in American urban settings (from the Last Poets in the 
1970s to Public Enemy in the 1980s), the violence-advocating soundscape 
of these messages was now borrowing from a different imaginary than its 
initial Middle Eastern one, redesigning the original religious and political 
landscape of IS, martialising it and formatting it to the experience of 
the young Western rebel-in-waiting familiar with the by-now globalised 
musical form of rap. In sonically redefining the parameters of what was 
once a local and regional message about political, social and economic 
grievances, IS had in effect become an entity whose logic had arrived 
in an altogether different cultural territory; one in which al Baghdadi 
or the former Ba’athi officers fighting the Shi’a militias alongside him 
had less control than the radicalised youth of French, British, German 
or American suburbs and inner cities. The rat-a-tat-tat of the delivery 
and the rigmarole of you-are-there accounts were now a distinct and 
powerful trademark that made IS appeal to a new circle of militants who, 
first and foremost, sought the turn-on and exhilaration of that particular 
experience. The impact was rapid, global and enormous. For instance, 
83 per cent of the individuals indicted by the United States Department 
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of Justice for IS-related offences between 2014 and 2016 had watched 
IS videos.5 Indeed, as regards the attacks that took place in Europe and 
the United States, IS had explicitly called for operations of this kind. In 
a September 2014 message, al Muhajir, who would become the group’s 
official spokesman in December 2016, had addressed sympathisers in the 
West thus: ‘[R]edouble your efforts and step up your operations … Smash 
[the kaffir’s] head with a rock, or slaughter him with a knife or run him 
over with your car … Attack them inside their houses, markets, roads and 
clubs and burn the land under their feet ... Destroy their vehicles, raid 
them … in their shelters so they can taste some of your misery and do not 
talk yourselves into fleeing.’ In the months following his call to terrorism, 
attacks perpetrated by individual operators, all claiming one way or the 
other a link to IS, had taken place in precisely these types of places in 
Europe and in the United States (see Table 4.1, later in this chapter).
One of the techniques that IS used to cement this approach further was 
to individualise the narratives. Whereas Al Qaeda’s productions featured 
testimonials and ‘wills’ videos, IS’s new films presented more personalised 
‘life stories’. These were shared either directly by the individuals in 
extended narrations or in homages paid to ‘fallen soldiers’. In either 
mode, the attention paid to the lives and stories of their foot soldiers 
were indicative of a strategic investment at the level of the fighters, not 
merely the leadership. For instance, in the March 2017 issue of the IS 
magazine Al Haqiqa, an article opened thus: ‘Abu Jandal was a muhajir 
[migrant fighter], who made hijra [journey] from The Netherlands. This 
is the remarkable story of his Life, his da’wa [proselytising], his jihad and 
his martyrdom in Shaam. It is told by his younger brother Abu Aicha.’ 
The same approach was featured in several videos of French fighters 
recounting their life stories; Nicolas Bons, Jean Daniel and Kevin Chassin, 
for instance. The theatrics of the elevation of these individuals to glory 
status and the visuals used in video and in print endowed them, in the 
eyes of IS’s audience, with a Marvel Comics-like narrative of the ‘average 
kid’ character turned superhero or supervillain overnight. 
Half a decade after 9/11, a new generation in the West had become 
influenced by the fire Bin Laden had started in New York and had become 
radicalised within the West. Among the early figures giving shape to that 
first pattern was Samir Khan, a young Pakistani born in Saudi Arabia 
and living in the United States. By the time Khan left North Carolina, in 
October 2009, travelling to Sana’a, Yemen to join AQAP, he had travelled 
the road that many foreign fighters would tread five years later. As an 
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18-year-old, in 2003 he had set up a blog entitled InshaAllahshaheed 
(martyr, if God wills), which by 2007 had developed a large following. 
Khan represented the face of an emergent and diversifying radical Islamist 
digital media activism, which had started with grainy video uploads of 
al Zarqawi severing heads in Iraq.6 Khan put out the first magazine that 
influenced Al Qaeda’s own magazine, Inspire, which started in June 2010 
(and released 15 editions until September 2015). Jihad Recollections, 
which was put out by Khan in a series of online PDFs in 2009 (the last 
issue came out in September that year), was the precursor to both Al 
Qaeda’s Inspire and IS’s Dabiq. Khan was in effect the link between cyber 
and field, as he himself noted, writing in an article entitled ‘I am Proud 
of being a Traitor to America’ – penned for the first edition of Inspire a 
year before he was killed in Yemen by a US drone attack on 30 September 
2011 – that: ‘I knew I could no longer remain in the United States as a 
compliant citizen. My beliefs had turned me into a rebel of Washington’s 
imperialism’ (emphasis added). Khan’s odyssey – and Anwar al Awlaki’s 
for that matter – came, however, more as a bookend to Al Qaeda’s from-
the-East-to-the-West-and-back trajectory than as a full building block of 
IS beaming its message to the West and tapping into a ready-made nest 
of alienated radical youth. As illustrated by hip hop bands such as Los 
Angeles-based Soldiers of Allah, which were expressing in music their 
political discontent and nostalgia for Islam’s golden age well before 9/11 
(‘Salah al Din [Saladin] we are here … How did they do this to you and 
me? We turn on the TV and all we see is a world full of casualties, a 
generation in agony, our umma is in misery, let us go back to beginning 
of the century and review our history’, the group raps in a song entitled 
‘1924’ in reference to the date of the end of the Caliphate after the collapse 
of the Ottoman Empire), the issues which IS would awake violently had 
been buried in the post-colonial years and rediscovered gradually by a 
new generation, not of artists but extremists, many of them in the West. 
As the 2000s moulded that experience further with this youth living 
through the Al Qaeda and Iraq years, the experience became much more 
violent and the rupture with society more visible. By 2016, in Germany, 
the Kabul-born rapper SadiQ (who had posted pictures of dead children 
in Syria on his Facebook page) was releasing a video entitled ‘Charlie 
Hebdo’ in which he rapped: ‘I shoot with the Arabs, the Parisians flee 
… I burn the pages of Charlie Hebdo.’ Denis Cusper, another German 
rapper known as Deso Dogg, had earlier joined IS and helped shape the 
content of its media releases (Cusper was reportedly killed in October 
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2015, with a first announcement of his death made by US authorities in 
April 2014),7 as had Ahmed Abousamra (a Syrian born in France and 
raised in the US) and one ‘Chechclearr’ from The Netherlands.8 Another 
example is that of a young Italian rapper, Anas el-Abboubi, who organised 
a demonstration against the anti-Muslim film The Innocence of Muslims 
(2013), set up a blog to express his radical political views and ultimately 
travelled to Syria to join IS – from where he posted a video about ‘killing 
the Infidels’ in October 2013.
The impact of IS’s mid-2014 media offensive – to which the US 
State Department tried unsuccessfully to respond using Hollywood 
screenwriters9 – was enormous and swift. Within months, approximately 
30,000 foreign fighters had travelled to Mosul and Raqqa from some 
80 countries. In the face of the phenomenon’s unprecedented security 
implications, the UNSC adopted a resolution in September 2014 (2178) 
– the first text of its kind to register the transnational effect of these 
operators at the UN level (‘foreign terrorist fighters increase the intensity, 
duration and intractability of conflicts, and also may pose a serious threat 
to their states of origin, the states they transit and the states to which 
they travel’, the resolution noted). Although most of these foreign fighters 
were from the Middle East, North Africa or Central Asia (between 2012 
and 2015, 4,000 individuals came to Iraq and Syria from Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan), many were from 
Western countries. Within a year of the fall of Mosul to IS, by 30 June 
2015, 677 Germans had departed Germany for Syria or Iraq, with an 
increasing number of women involved.
At the tail end of the 2010s, Somalis in Minneapolis, Moroccans in 
Brussels, Algerians in Paris, Pakistanis in London or Turks in Berlin, and 
many more, almost all citizens of the Western countries they lived in, had 
been involved in radical Islamist circles. Young British and French dyed-
in-the-wool men and women – earning culturally hybrid media monikers 
such as ‘Jihadi John’ (whose real name was Mohammed Emwazi, a Briton 
of Kuwaiti origin who executed several hostages – seven Westerners 
and Asians and 21 Syrian soldiers – on video before being killed on 12 
November 2015 in Raqqa by a US drone strike)10 or ‘the Beatles’ (three 
British Islamists in addition to Emwazi, who tortured hostages in Raqqa) 
– were now drawn to IS, its state-building project and its mode of extreme 
violence. The profile of these individuals varied, with university graduates 
– Emwazi attended Westminster University where he earned a degree 
in computer science; Najim Laachraoui, one of the suicide bombers of 
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the Brussels March 2016 attack, went to Catholic school and studied 
electrical engineering – and working-class profiles mixed. A June 2016 
report by the World Bank reported that 69 per cent of IS foreign recruits 
in Syria had at least a secondary level education. Prior signs of the specific 
IS-inspired wave of terrorism in the West were noticeable when on 22 
May 2013, as the latest strife in Iraq and Syria was picking up momentum 
in the media, Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale (two British 
citizens of Nigerian descent) attacked and killed a British army officer 
in a London street, running him down with a car and hacking him to 
death in an attempt to decapitate him. In a video filmed by a bystander, to 
whom the perpetrators also handed a handwritten note explaining their 
act, Adebolajo declared: 
The only reason we have killed this man today is because Muslims are 
dying daily by British soldiers. And this British soldier is one … [W]e 
swear by the almighty Allah we will never stop fighting you until you 
leave us alone … [W]hen you drop a bomb do you think it hits one 
person? Or rather your bomb wipes out a whole family? ... An eye for 
an eye, a tooth for a tooth … Do you think politicians are going to die? 
No, it’s going to be the average guy, like you and your children. So get 
rid of them. Tell them to bring our troops back … leave our lands and 
you will live in peace.11 
This was the opening salvo of a wave of 60 attacks inspired or led by IS 
throughout the West over the next three years (see Table 4.1).
Two years into the IS Western offensive, the violence had spiralled and 
a significant mimetic effect had taken hold like a forest fire, producing a 
helter-skelter summer of terror in 2016 with a spike of attacks. On 12 June, 
a security guard killed 49 people at the Pulse gay nightclub in Orlando, 
Florida before calling the police emergency line 911 and declaring himself 
‘a soldier of ISIS’. The next day, in France, a snack-food entrepreneur killed 
a policeman and a policewoman in their home and pledged allegiance to 
IS on a video posted on Facebook. On 14 July, in Nice, France, a truck 
driver drove a truck into a crowd killing 86 people. Five days later, a 
young Afghan refugee armed with an axe injured four people in a train 
in Würzburg, Germany. On 22 July, an 18-year-old German shot and 
killed nine people in a shopping mall in Munich (five years to the day 
after the Anders Breivik attack in Norway). On 6 August, in Brussels, a 
33-year-old Algerian man attacked a guard post outside a police station 
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with a machete. On 11 August, a 24-year-old Canadian, who previously 
filmed himself pledging allegiance to IS, was shot by the Canadian 
police in Ontario as he was about to set off a bomb in Strathroy, south of 
Toronto. Two days later, a 27-year-old Swiss man set a train wagon on fire 
in north-east Switzerland and stabbed six people. An 18-year-old French 
girl was arrested, the next day, in Clermont-Ferrand, France, on charges 
of supporting IS’s messages and echoing them on the online application 
Telegram (an app that had also been used by Abdelmalik Nabil Petitjean 
and Adel Kermiche, two teenagers who had killed a French priest in 
France on 26 July). On 1 September a 25-year-old Dane of Bosnian origin 
shot two policemen in Copenhagen, an attack claimed two days later by 
IS. On 7 September, French police arrested three young French women 
accused of planning an attack on the Notre-Dame Cathedral in Paris. 
On 14 September, French police arrested a 15-year-old boy suspected of 
plotting to carry out terror attacks in the country and accused of links 
with IS, with which he had established contact via social media. On 17 
September, a man stabbed ten people in a mall in Minnesota and was 
depicted three days later by IS as one of its ‘soldiers’. The same day, a 
28-year-old Afghan American was arrested on suspicion of detonating 
a bomb in the Chelsea neighbourhood in New York, which injured 29 
people. On 16 December a German Iraqi boy tried to blow up a Christmas 
market in the town of Ludwigshafen, Germany.
As this international sequence of individual extreme violence played 
out from summer to winter, it became clear that these attacks had 
recommissioned and repurposed the substance of what IS had initiated, 
and were being used to vent all manner of violent local discontent and 
radicalisation. An entanglement of configurations developed whereby the 
perpetrators sought to anchor their violence in IS mythology, however 
superficially, IS itself claimed these attacks or congratulated the attackers 
opportunistically and belatedly, and the public perception increasingly 
linked the attacks to Islam and Muslims. By 2016, the conflict had 
morphed in such a way that Europe was literally bracing for hundreds 
of IS fighters to attack the continent in a ‘wave of bloodshed’.12 What 
was significant, however, was the fact that, just as the motivations were 
variegated, identity lines had become increasingly blurred, with Asians, 
Africans, Europeans and North Americans involved, as well as converts 
to Islam (e.g. Aaron Driver) and children of mixed marriages (e.g. 
Savoy-born Abdelmalik Petitjean). These new actors straddled a logic 
of notional historical revenge, immediate dispossession and imagined 
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future. Theirs – ‘jihad in the hood’13 – was violence in search of local 
impact and recognition, and one which was equally performative.14 
Nowhere was that better seen than in the violently radicalised, post-
colonial and post-modern youth of 2010s France.
Imperial Reconnections
Associations between IS’s ambition to link itself with different communities 
beyond Iraq and Syria – following al ‘Adnani’s explicit September 2014 call 
– and Western actors located in the metropolis, were possible because the 
nature of these ‘imagined communities’ (linked traditionally to statehood 
and the nation, as Benedict Anderson had discussed the notion) were now 
also lending themselves towards a multiplicity of societal reinterpretations. 
As Diane Davis remarks, the territorialities of today suggest that political 
communities of reciprocity are no longer limited in the same way as before, 
owing to globalisation and the transnational flows of peoples and ideas, 
and to the fact that states are neither uniformly legitimate nor the only 
authority in an increasingly interconnected and globalised world. This 
does not mean that political communities of reciprocity (or imagined 
communities) have disappeared, only that they are transforming in scale 
and scope.15 In that sense, the modernity of the movement triggered by 
IS rests in its novelty, which in turn is a combination of displacement 
into a different setting and the initial ability to escape recognition. As 
Michael North remarks, ‘an innovation is by definition something that 
has become new by being moved to a place unfamiliar with it. Diffusion, 
that is to say, is itself tantamount to innovation. … Even in its reduced 
form as innovation, then, actual innovation only exists at the very crest of 
the wave … dependent on its relative unfamiliarity to a new audience.’16 
Therefore, what IS did in 2014 was to provide a different population than 
the Mesopotamian and Levantine one it was immersed in originally with 
a threefold narrative of nation (Caliphate) and community (umma), but 
also (and more importantly) actionable transformation (agency through 
rupture and the diffusion of violence), allowing it to express a pre-existing 
dormant radicalisation that was merely in search of a conduit. Explicitly 
aimed at Muslims – while inviting others to convert to Islam – and 
calibrated to influence those populations in the West, more so than, say, 
Africans, Asians or Latin Americans (although IS was present in these 
regions too), the calls acquired particular acuity in the context of post-
colonial societies.
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France, which had one of the largest colonial empires – colonising 
Algeria for 132 years – and which was now home to the largest Muslim 
population in Europe (as well as the largest Jewish population in Europe), 
was a theatre where these issues would predictably play out. Though the 
administrative heritage of colonial history is rarely recognised in relation 
to the manifestation of contemporary political violence and terrorism, 
understanding the conflicts over immigration and citizenship in France 
today necessitates a journey into this often overlooked aspect of the 
genealogy of France’s political culture.17 Just as it had trouble coming 
to terms with its years of collaboration with the Nazi regime during the 
German occupation and the deportation of Jews between 1940 and 1944, 
France has not yet been able to address its colonial past. Specifically, the 
national (non-)discussion of the issue has seesawed between amnesia and 
romanticisation, caged in by a dominant theme that this was a long-gone 
era whose relevance to contemporary developments is negligible. As 
Muslim migrants from the former North African and West African 
countries it had colonised started arriving in France from the 1960s 
onwards, a societal process of transformation of the country was inevitably 
set in motion. By the early 1980s, as the first generation of children of 
these migrants were coming of age, signs of cultural tension with the 
rest of society appeared, heightened by the fact that the vast majority 
of the population which moved in during the 1960s had been housed 
in large-scale, low-income housing projects. Known as banlieues, these 
densely populated areas (e.g. Les Minguettes, Vaulx-en-Velin, Clichy-
sous-bois, La Courneuve, Sarcelles, Les Mureaux, Trappes) inhabited by 
working-class families were located on the outskirts of the major urban 
centres such as Paris, Lyon and Marseilles. Petty criminality, juvenile 
delinquency and insecurity became the staple of these places, and was 
compounded by poverty. This led to regular riots, starting in 1981 and 
running until the 2010s (with a major uprising in October–November 
2005 that triggered a national state of emergency declared by President 
Jacques Chirac). In the face of police brutality, killing of suspects and 
socio-economic exclusion, the second generation of these populations 
– whose parents had mostly come from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, 
Senegal and Mali – became increasingly alienated from the rest of French 
society. Initially, the non-political resentment of some started acquiring 
undertones of a politics of identity and, soon enough, of culture and 
religion. Although, the majority of these youth had not been particularly 
religious, religion started gaining ground within the banlieues, pushed in 
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further as a reaction to a number of stigmatisation measures adopted by 
the successive right-wing and left-wing French governments – notably 
opposition to the Islamic scarf (hijab) in September 1989, leading to a 
law prohibiting it in public schools in 2003 and a ban of the full body veil 
(burqa) in September 2010.
As a segment of France increasingly regarded these populations in its 
midst as alien, looked upon their religion as a threat and revisited the 
country’s colonial history (in 2005, the French National Assembly adopted 
a law requiring high schools to teach the ‘positive’ values of colonialism, a 
bill that was later repealed), and as its highest officials called these youth 
‘scum’ and ‘riff-raff ’ (as did Prime Minister Nicolas Sarkozy in 2005), 
the societal rupture deepened and connections with far-away conflicts 
in the Middle East and North Africa increased, as did violence. By 2015, 
the country was experiencing a ‘social, territorial and ethnic apartheid’, 
according to French Prime Minister Valls. As one analyst summed it up:
When it comes to jihad … there is a French exception … France’s dis-
tinctiveness arises in part from … decades of economic hardship, the 
growing stigmatisation of cultural differences [and] the fervent indi-
vidualism of new generations … Above all, France has not been able 
to solve the problem of economic and social exclusion. Its system … 
breeds angst all around. Young people in the banlieues, marginalised 
and with few prospects, feel like victims. They become prime targets 
for jihadist propaganda, often after a stint in prison for petty crimes. 
Neither Germany nor Britain faces the banlieues phenomenon, at 
least not on such a scale ... this growing gap is a source of pervasive 
distress. And so … the weight of France’s national identity has become 
a problem. It only heightens the discontent of young people with 
foreign origins.18
This situation had not escaped the attention of Al Qaeda, whose leaders 
issued calls in 2005 to the Muslim youth of France to rise up against their 
society. Ten years later, it was those young French men and women who 
were recording the videos and calling for violent action on their fellow 
citizens. The political sympathy or cultural affinities, which radicalised 
segments of the French Arab and Muslim population initially shared with 
the suffering populations in Palestine, Iraq or Syria, gradually turned 
into an existential and intimate issue, driven not-so-subterraneously 
by more local socio-economic issues of rejection and alienation. As 
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some of these actors became more violent, French society became more 
intolerant and vice versa. The logic of forcefully suppressing social 
opposition was often associated with the need to rid society of a specific 
segment. Awash in a media landscape where ethnic minorities were also 
represented by what Cornel West termed non-oppositional instances of 
commodification,19 the radicalised French Muslims became looked upon 
not merely as a discrete security threat (i.e. specific individuals related 
to given events), but more so as a loose ideological if not ontological 
masse, carrying a ‘disease’ that could affect the ‘French French’, through 
those converted to Islam and represented by the mainstream media as 
internal enemies.20 Lurking behind every male Muslim in the city was 
the widespread unspoken suspicion of a born terrorist, and attacks on 
the Western metropolis never failed to trigger debates on the nature of 
Islam and of needed cultural responses. However, such societal drift 
created an unexpected danger for French society, as the unanticipated 
appeal of IS to young Western men and women became visible when the 
global foreign fighters phenomenon emerged so massively. In increasing 
the dangerousness of the young Muslim figure and featuring it non-stop 
in the media, it would seem the French and other Western authorities 
paradoxically and self-fulfillingly raised its symmetrical appeal for those 
willing to act as radical outlaws in their own societies and culture – and 
those were legion. At a time when transgression is commoditised and 
staged in every day (‘thug’) life, the extreme stance of IS and its followers 
became a lure for those individuals on their way to radicalisation. (Even 
the obvious sexism of IS was no deterrent, as the groups it spawned in 
the metropolis often featured women; in the 2016 French film Le Ciel 
Attendra (Heaven Will Wait), for instance, the experience of these young 
French girls, both of immigrant and local extraction, working and middle 
class, is depicted in all its contradictions.)21
Initially, however, the rebellion of these disenfranchised actors 
was about defence of social space and identity – constructs that were 
eminently local and Western.22 In racialising its reading of the global 
order and linking that construct to a population in its midst, a segment 
of French society opened itself to being racialised back by these actors – 
and by those groups such as Al Qaeda and IS pushing from outside to 
facilitate that. French youth of recent immigrant origin thus coined a 
derogatory term, souchiens, to refer to the French of local, older origin 
(i.e. de souche), which conveyed a double entendre insult as the term also 
sounded liked sous-chiens (underdogs). Societal tensions of this nature in 
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play well before IS (and even Al Qaeda) now became related to the way 
in which France came to interact with itself, and how foreign conflicts 
had evolved and violently inserted themselves into such a context. At 
the centre of this shift stand the motivations of the IS perpetrator of 
the Western type. ‘Who fights, for whom and why’?23 is a question that 
acquires new resonance in this context. As Tarak Barkawi remarks: 
In order to understand the nature of security relations in a post-9/11 
world, we must revisit the most basic issues concerning war and armed 
conflict. Two factors dominate contemporary security relations. The 
first is the ways in which the new threats have arisen from, and develop 
in and through, long histories of interaction between the West and 
other parts of the world. The second is how these threats interact 
with the societies and politics of the West, not least by fostering a self-
perception that prevents full understanding of the situation.24 
A post-modern cultural landscape characterised by narcissism, self-
absorption, constant distraction, incessant consumption and status 
obsession provided a facile platform for the fundamentalist expression of 
back-to-your-roots cleansing championed by IS’s Western sympathisers, 
and the linking of that with terroristic violence. Yet paradoxically the new 
IS insurgent is also a consumer of celebrity culture – the Thanatos-like 
celebrity of his or her breaking news in the wake of a terrorist attack. That 
culture ‘has taught us to generate, almost unconsciously, interior personal 
screenplays in the mould of Hollywood, television and even commercials. 
We have learned ways of speaking and thinking that disfigure the way 
we relate to the world’25 – and this has been adopted by the new global 
terrorising insurgent. As events and fake news can now be manufactured 
more than ever, nouveau terrorism – wherein illusion dominates, staged 
under pornographic violence exposure and constant category-shifting – 
has emerged lethally in our midst.
This new domestic revolution, observed in accelerated fashion in 2010s 
France, appeared to seek to displace and transcend the territoriality in 
which it was boxed. Such spatial transformation was carried in earlier 
moments of radicalised violent revolt, but with IS’s self-capacitation logic, 
and following Al Qaeda’s transnationality, it becomes more qualitatively 
defining of the latter-day terrorist. The Kouachi brothers ‘travel’ to the 
heart of Paris to ‘avenge the Prophet’. Yet, once their deed committed, for 
the next hours they are stuck in the Parisian ‘space’, precisely because their 
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space is one of the no-man’s land of transgression and contestation. The 
reification of IS as Southern violence playing out away from the North and 
only interacting with it when it travels to attack it (breaking news, terrorist 
attack) or when it calls Western youth to join it (foreign fighters) misses 
on this newly problematic hybrid dimension of the group. Indeed, the 
cold-bloodedness displayed by the perpetrators of the attacks in Paris and 
Brussels often played out in relation to a deeper, buried and unresolved set 
of multiple histories, which they carried intimately and which were largely 
unspoken – the key to which could not be found in their pseudo-religious 
statements. In the formation of identities, memory is not only invented, 
conjured up or reawakened, it is also purposely suppressed, erased and 
deleted.26 Both the core of IS and its copycat followers function according 
to a logic of romanticisation of the past, with their respective creations of 
fanciful realms into which their different swashbuckling projections of 
global expansion are performed. The gory projected violence is indicative 
of a distant memory of the colonial period, but one that has not been 
experienced by these eminently Western youth. The original rebellion 
brewing in the French suburbs was getting more violent as the youth 
became increasingly alienated from the rest of French society. Depicted 
in the 1995 film La Haine (The Hate) directed by Mathieu Kassovitz, these 
life patterns were indicative of a profound split within French society 
which Al Qaeda tried to manipulate early on and IS would in time build 
on. For all its tragic poignancy, La Haine featured lost youth that had 
not yet been ideologised. The economic dispossession and social anger 
felt existentially by the three main protagonists – the Arab, Said (Said 
Taghmaoui); the Jew, Vinz (Vincent Cassel); and the African, Hubert 
(Hubert Koundé) – was arguably more related to familiar class disparities, 
and as such more reminiscent of the tragic fate of, say, The Outsiders’ 
small-town working-class Greasers fictionalised in Francis Ford Coppola’s 
1982 film, or the more violent inner-city isolation of suburban African 
American, Latino and ‘White Trash’ gangs in Walter Hill’s 1979 film The 
Warriors.
The new post-colonial and post-modern radical insurgent arises 
instead from within Western societies, because these societies have also 
developed an updated form of Orientalism beamed at (and representing) 
the ‘Oriental’ in their very midst, and that projection allows the violence 
to come out in the mode of connection-disconnection with the distant 
wars of the Middle East. In other words, the rebellion is essentially an 
open-ended release wherein the choice of violence and the moment 
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of rebellion is the acme of local built-in frustrations connected to an 
external realm. Agency and desire to control one’s own trajectory are 
prime movers of the rebellion at the core of this violence. Whether during 
suicide operations, attacks against targets in the metropolis or travel to 
Raqqa or Mosul, there is little calculation beyond the final, no-turning-
back terroristic rupture. As Chris Hedges notes more generally on the 
nature of rebellion, ‘There is nothing rational about rebellion. To rebel 
against insurmountable odds is an act of faith, without which the rebel is 
doomed. This faith is intrinsic to the rebel the way caution and prudence 
are intrinsic to those who seek to fit into existing power structures. The 
rebel, possessed by inner demons and angels, is driven by a vision.’27 In 
a context where ‘[c]itizenship has been redefined in terms of consumer 
choice … [and where] many citizens increasingly think of security in 
terms of individualised safety, and seek to secure themselves against 
anything that is deemed to put them at risk’,28 that very idea of a violent 
vision is adopted by the globalised insurgent who in effect makes a 
statement akin to ‘my security is a product of the insecurity I can visit 
upon you’. At the heart of the new rebel’s disposition often stands an 
urban context and a consumer lifestyle. However, inspired by distant 
conflicts and couched in religious terms, like all politics, such violence 
is inescapably local. It springs from and speaks to the frustration arising 
from the terrorist’s vicinity – one from which he or she cannot escape 
(the Tsarnaev brothers circling Boston and the Kouachi brothers driving 
around Paris, for three days in both cases), or to which they are lured 
back in Dostoevskian fashion (Abdelhamid Abaaoud returning to his 
crime scene an hour after the explosions in Paris, and later caught in the 
Saint-Denis apartment of his cousin, Hasna Ait Boulahcen, two days after 
the November 2015 attacks; or Salah Abdeslam captured in his childhood 
Molenbeek neighbourhood in Brussels where he hid for weeks after the 
Paris November 2015 attacks in which he was involved).
France’s IS back-to-the-colonial-future experience of this new sort is 
visible in two cinematic illustrations that capture both the slow-motion 
emergence of the phenomenon and its subsequent dramatic acceleration. 
The first one is Michael Haneke’s 2005 film Caché (Hidden). Ostensibly, 
the film is a psychological thriller about a Parisian couple (played by 
Daniel Auteuil and Juliette Binoche) whose bourgeois routine is disrupted 
by a series of creepy videotapes they receive anonymously, showing their 
home filmed from outside, all in the context of a childhood episode of 
the husband and his resentment towards the orphaned son of an Algerian 
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family who had been adopted by the man’s parents. The evasive whodunit 
nature of the plot hides a deeper (hidden) dimension in which the 
colonial past resurfaces to terrorise the lives of the French couple and the 
now-adult Algerian immigrant by way of their children. As the Algerian 
man’s son confronts the husband (Auteuil), blaming him for his father’s 
suicide, it becomes clear that the repressed memory of the 1960s events 
and their seeming unrelatedness to the present malaise was misleading 
– more so, in a further twist, as the couple’s son is shown in the last shot 
meeting with the Algerian man’s son (for what purpose it is not clear). 
Mid-1990s fictions of this sort – foreshadowing everything to come from 
IS, from culturally mixed foreign fighters to threatening video imagery to 
psycho-cultural violence in the heart of the über-tribalised post-colonial 
metropolis city (as they come out of a police station, the couple has a 
violent argument with a young man of West African origin with the 
same subtext of post-colonial ethnic tension) – were already indicative 
of the materialisation of a ‘problem’ that French society had with that 
segment of its population, then shapelessly representing an unspoken 
cultural threat. The second illustration of France’s inescapable colonial 
past and its current reconnection with the IS story comes unsurprisingly 
from Gillo Pontecorvo’s The Battle of Algiers (1966). As the 1957–8 events 
depicted in the film spiralled into violence, and as the Algerian militants’ 
terrorism and the French army’s repression symmetrically increased, a 
scene towards the end of the film shows two Algerian youths at the dead 
end of their radicalisation driving a van at full speed in the boulevards 
of Algiers, indiscriminately machine-gunning French passers-by and 
others sitting at cafés, before eventually ploughing the van into a crowd of 
Frenchmen and women. Such paroxysm, the modus operandi, the identity 
of the perpetrators and that of the victims, eerily foreshadowed precisely 
what took place in Paris on 13 November 2015 and in Nice on 14 July 
2016 at the hands of IS-inspired attackers.
Beyond the choice he makes to turn to terroristic violence, the 
post-modern insurgent is also a pathology of empire; a phenomenon 
that is the hybrid child of a century of colonial experience that has 
morphed into an imperial one, today begetting forward-looking modern 
terrorism that is all the time looking in the rear-view mirror. This brings 
us back full circle to the question of racism and international relations 
(see the Introduction), and to the blurring of the boundary between 
opposition and terrorism. As Aziz al Azmeh noted early on, observing 
the specific French case: ‘Primary importance must be attributed to the 
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impossibility of socio-economic assimilation experienced by second-
generation immigrants born in situations of urban degradation and into 
marginal, declining and unskilled industry, at a time of increased state 
indifference and hostility coupled with racism in the very capillaries of 
the “host society”.’29 The children of post-colonialism falling into such 
extreme violence are also faced with an environment of this nature in 
which modernity and liberalism proclaim colour-blindness and equal 
opportunity while practising exclusion and beaming dispossession: 
So the irony of modernity, the liberal paradox comes down to this: 
As modernity commits itself progressively to idealised principles of 
liberty, equality and fraternity, as it increasingly insists upon the moral 
irrelevance of race, there is a multiplication of racial identities and the 
sets of exclusion they prompt and rationalise, enable and sustain. Race 
is irrelevant but all is race. The more abstract modernity’s universal 
identity, the more it has to be insisted upon, the more it needs to be 
imposed. The more ideologically-hegemonic liberal values seem and 
the more open to difference liberal modernity declares itself, the more 
dismissive of difference it becomes and the more closed it seeks to make 
the circle of acceptability … Liberal modernity denies its racialised 
history and the attendant histories of racist exclusions, hiding them 
behind some idealised, self-promoting, yet practically ineffectual 
dismissal of race as a morally-irrelevant category.30
The halogen-like insistence on laicité as a reaction to IS’s attacks in France 
in the mid-2010s was an illustration of this self-generated, historically 
blind tension in which the violence remained immersed, politics unnamed 
and race unspoken. As a conflation of different forms of violence, IS circa 
2016 in France and Europe is in that sense terrorism by a radical Islamist 
group born in Iraq but also a Westernised rejection of Westernisation, 
which the Western dweller-perpetrator is only acting out for reasons 
notionally beyond the West. Abandonment and disarticulation as 
responses to hegemony are then, as the French context tells us, widening 
the nature of the sociological base of this ‘from-there-but-really-here’ 
political violence. The question at the core of this process is ultimately 
threefold and concerns the authenticity of agency, the dynamic of cultural 
borrowing and the structure and technique of (violence) improvisation. 
As Talal Asad noted:
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When a project is translated from one site to another, from one agent to 
another, versions of power are produced. As with translations of a text, 
one does not simply get a reproduction of identity. The acquisition of 
new forms of language … – whether by forcible imposition, insidious 
insertion or voluntary borrowing – is part of what makes for new 
possibilities of action in non-Western societies. Yet, although the 
outcome of these possibilities is never fully predictable, the language in 
which the possibilities are formulated is shared increasingly by Western 
and non-Western societies. And so too, the specific forms of power 
and subjection.31
Amid denial, exclusion and radicalisation, it seemed as if French society 
since the 1960s had been building up slowly and inevitably to the events of 
2014–17 by nurturing the production of such versions of violent counter-
power. In France, 
the fiction of a French society less racialised as compared to the United 
States and the United Kingdom works on a twofold denial. Historically, 
this is based on an arbitrary separation between the metropolis and 
the colonial empire whereby racialisation was not only a matter of 
representation but of legal and administrative status. […] The second 
denial is contemporary as it pretends to ignore that, for the first time 
in its history, the racialised population of the former colonial empire 
lives nowadays on the metropolitan territory, thus de facto establishing 
a post-colonial situation.32 
Indeed, as the socio-economic Third Worldisation of France proceeded,33 
with leading French news magazines (notably Le Point, L’Express and 
Valeurs Actuelles) multiplying sensationalistic covers against Islam, and as 
IS attacks augmented, the banlieues became militarised and seen by many 
as occupied territory in effect foreign to France. In a book published in 
the fall of 2016, one commentator maintained that the French police had 
contingency plans for an operation dubbed Opération Ronces (brambles) 
to ‘reconquer’ the banlieues, declaring that the plan had allegedly been 
developed by the French authorities in cooperation with Israeli officers 
who shared their experience in Gaza. (The French authorities denied that 
information.34)
The last part of Al Qaeda’s story had been its incipient Europeanisation 
(the Madrid 2004 and London 2005 operations) and Americanisation 
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Figure 4.1 The biformity of the Islamic State
Militarised state-building
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Source: Islamic State publications; Al Naba, May 2016 and poster on Twitter account, June 2016
Transnationalised sleeper agent
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(Adam Gadahn, Samir Khan, Anwar al ‘Awlaqi), as well as the rise of 
its different franchises. The homogenisation that Bin Laden had sought 
disappeared slowly and he embraced that. In the combined aftermath 
of the Iraq and Syrian conflicts, and IS operators joining hands from 
Mosul to Manchester, the violence produced in the metropolis was 
now on its way to transforming those Western states and societies 
involved in this process (the United States, the United Kingdom and 
France, primarily). Rising methods of control of citizens, securitisation, 
big-brother Orwellian meta-logics, racial and religious discrimination 
against Arabs and Muslims, lawfare and weaponisation of legislation and 
military urbanism were the result of the series of military adventures from 
Afghanistan to Iraq by way of the Sahel, Somalia and Yemen. IS emerged 
from these ashes to pursue its Al Qaeda-transcending plan, but also to 
produce and orchestrate something new, namely boomerang violence on 
the West. This transformed the landscape, and its distinct, simultaneous 
relationship between different causalities and places had echoes of an 
earlier era of violence and transnationalism in the West.
The 1970s Redux
As IS’s post-Mosul international campaign proceeded, and as the do-it-
yourself violence it exported from Iraq and Syria into the Western 
hinterlands increased dramatically in 2015–17, the global context of this 
situation – while denoting novelty – increasingly resembled an earlier 
decade during which international conflict, societal malaise and ethnic 
tensions had featured prominently alongside waves of terrorism and 
insecurity, namely the 1970s. In reviving the memory of those forgotten 
‘days of rage’,35 the new 2010s context was revealing another dimension 
of transnationality that had played out mostly in Europe and in the 
United States around several radicalised groups. At the point when the 
new globalised insurgency originated, we therefore find a number of 
historical currents which merged to inform the violence in different ways. 
Combined with Al Qaeda’s founding matrix (as seen in Chapter 1), these 
traditions also partake of the new IS operator’s trajectory, endowed as it is 
with a shared transnational consciousness, albeit an eclectic one. Among 
these few-and-far-between influences, two in particular were important 
in the deep and almost imperceptible legacy they left on the new story-
in-the-making: the Palestinian ‘global offensive’ noted in Chapter 3,36 
which connected Palestinians and Europeans; and a so-called ‘Muslim 
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international’, which connected African American domestic issues in the 
United States with larger international Islamic questions in the Middle 
East and North Africa. Importantly, neither of these movements was 
radical Islamist in nature.
During the 1970s – a period more accurately spanning the years 
1967 to 1984 – large parts of the Western world came under attack from 
several movements advocating political violence. In the United States, the 
Weather Underground Organisation (also known as Weatherman) started 
a significant underground radical violence tradition in 1969, opening the 
gates for the Black Liberation Army, the Symbionese Liberation Army, the 
Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional, the Pan-Radical Alliance, The 
Family and the United Freedom Front. Amid years of strife, assassination, 
war and terror, societal change itself came to the United States through 
the tumult of the 1970s with a vivid and violent sense of rupture.37 The 
terrorism of these groups on their own society adopted the absolutist 
language of war and punishment of the government. Just as Al Qaeda 
would in 1996 and 1998, the Weather Underground ‘declared war’ on 
the United States in 1970 in its own way, and for six years went on to 
detonate bombs across the country in New York, San Francisco, Chicago, 
Boston, Pittsburgh and Washington, DC. A militant from one these 1970s 
underground movements in the United States later noted: ‘People always 
ask why I did what I did and I tell them I was a soldier in a war.’38
Some eras, noted Philip Jenkins, stand out because of the unusual 
rapidity of change and the transformation of values and ideals in a very 
short time.39 The 2010s were indeed similar in that regard, replaying 
the 1970s in reinvented ways. Particularly in the United States, the echo 
patterns were visible. Stories of that decade’s terrorists were being retold.40 
Racial tension between Whites and Blacks resurfaced, reaching dramatic 
new heights and indicating that the previous 30 years – the Reagan-
driven consumerism of the 1980s, the Clinton-led nonchalance of the 
1990s and the Bush-forged aggressive patriotism of the 2000s – were 
seemingly but an interlude from the unresolved tensions of the 1960s 
and the 1970s.41 Wars had then been taken to Vietnam, others were now 
brought back from Iraq and Afghanistan. The deeper societal meaning 
of the calls for retaliatory defensive violence that the likes of Malcolm 
X, and those movements he influenced such as the Black Panthers, had 
advocated was re-examined, as were the 1965 (Watts), 1967 (Detroit) 
and 1992 (Los Angeles) riots amid new ones in 2014–16 in Baltimore, 
Ferguson, Milwaukee and Charlotte. These were but tell-tale signs of 
160 . a theory of isis
another back-to-the-future moment in which the IS story played out 
elusively for the most part. In the meantime, things had evolved and 
the Iraq wars, Al Qaeda and IS were now also at the unseen centre of 
this evolution of American society. Whereas it had taken Al Qaeda a 
few years to attract US-based operators (such as baptised Catholic John 
Walker Lindh or Queens-born Latino Bryant Neal Vinas), IS mobilised 
sympathisers in the United States almost at once. Indeed, IS incited US 
militants at a rate four times higher than Al Qaeda, with 83 per cent of 
those fighters that joined it from America being US citizens, and 65 per 
cent born in the United States.42 That quicker connection was due to 
the IS approach of ‘striking the minds’ globally, but it was also informed 
by an earlier connection between political Islam and African American 
history, one that re-emerged in the 2010s in film and television series 
(e.g. American Crime).
The relationship between the dispossession of African Americans in 
the United States and the decolonisation wars had been substantial in 
the 1960s. Although it never became fully explicit, except in Malcolm 
X’s pronouncements and militancy, and later on in Stokely Carmichael’s, 
the issue had arisen during that decade. For instance, on 3 October 
1962, an editorial in the New York Times noted that: ‘The United States 
is experiencing in Mississippi what is tantamount to its own form of 
decolonisation. For our colonialism, sociologically-speaking has been 
within the USA and not abroad.’43 From the 1930s to the 1970s, different 
African American movements in the United States had displayed generic 
influence by Islam, which was reinterpreted and merged with local 
American folklore. These semi-political, semi-religious, part-cult, part-
business movements included the Temple of Islam (also known as the 
Allah Temple of Islam, which had opened in 1930 in Detroit), the Moorish 
Science Temple of America (MSTA, established in Chicago in 1931), the 
Holy Temple of Islam (an offshoot of the MSTA) and, on a much larger 
and more visible scale, the Nation of Islam (founded in 1930). Although 
secular, later on the Black Panthers were partly influenced by that same 
legacy, but more directly through the more distinctly socio-political, no 
sell-out approach of Malcolm X and his teachings (at the specific origin of 
the new disposition was indeed the rebellion conceptualised by Malcolm 
X in the period between his pilgrimage and his assassination).44 Sohail 
Daulatzai has documented that international solidarity moment where 
radical politics about race inequality in the United States connected with 
the resistance fight against imperialism and colonialism in the Middle 
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East and in Africa.45 The tapestry connecting Malcolm X and his legacy 
(Stokely Carmichael, Huey Newton, Eldridge Cleaver) with, earlier, The 
Battle of Algiers and, later, the battles of Fallujah (2006 and 2016), is an 
important, as-yet unexamined scene, which plays out in the background 
of the radicalisation process of US-based IS militants. ‘They think of you 
as they think of us; they despise us equally’ says an Iraqi nationalist to 
an African American US agent posted in Baghdad about his American 
colleagues in the novel Baghdad Blues – a book written in the 1970s.46 
The most explicit ideological connection between these two different 
strands materialised when, on 5 May 2007, Al Qaeda released a video 
message in which its number two, al Dhawahiri, included imagery and 
speeches of Malcolm X, presenting him as a model to emulate. A year 
later, on 19 November 2008, another video of al Dhawahiri discussing 
the actions of Malcolm X was released, again interspersed with footage of 
the 1960s militant’s speeches, notably his 10 November 1963 ‘Message to 
the Grass Roots’ talk, in which he used the ‘house Negro and field Negro’ 
metaphor, which al Dhawahiri proceeded to quote and link to the election 
of President Obama.
As the 2010s proceeded, as the backlash against African Americans 
gained ascendancy in pre-Trump America and as police violence on them 
increased – according to data compiled by the Mapping Police Violence 
project,47 303 African Americans were killed by the police in 2016 and 
346 in 2015 (30 per cent unarmed) – the same malaise that had presided 
over the 1970s made a comeback, and lurking behind it was the spectre 
of Iraq, Afghanistan and IS. Never explicitly, never too clearly, the issue 
was there nonetheless, and it is in that sense that the experience of the 
new Western metropolis insurgent borrowed from or was influenced by 
what al Baghdadi and his cohorts started in 2014, when they beamed 
their message calling for international attacks and in time reached an 
audience. Micah Xavier Johnson, who killed five police officers in Dallas, 
Texas on 9 July 2016, was a member of the US Army Reserve and served 
in Afghanistan, where he was awarded the Afghanistan Campaign Medal, 
an Army Service Ribbon and an Armed Forces Reserve Medal. Similarly, 
Gavin Long, who a week later killed three policemen in Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana, was an ex-Marine who served in Iraq in 2008–9. In a video, 
he spoke of ‘fighting back’ in the name of ‘justice’ in reaction to the 
‘treatment of African Americans’. In March that year, a young African 
American Mississippi woman, Jaelyn Young, a former honour student, 
pleaded guilty to conspiring to support IS after trying to travel to Syria 
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with a companion. A year later, on 18 April 2017, Kori Ali Muhammad 
– a homeless African American Muslim who been associated with 
gangs, released two hip hop albums under the name B-God MacSun and 
expressed support for Black nationalism on his Facebook page – killed 
three people in Fresno, California, declaring his hatred for white people 
and shouting ‘Allahu Akbar’ (God is great) during the shootings. Sign-
of-the-times episodes such as these were affecting the very manner in 
which the United States was dealing with the recurring racial question 
in the country and with terrorism. Indeed, in the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks, the city of Washington had been terrorised during three weeks 
in October 2002 by a series of sniper attacks that had killed a total of 17 
people and which had been perpetrated by John Allen Muhammad and 
Lee Boyd Malvo. A member of the Nation of Islam, Muhammad declared 
his admiration for Osama Bin Laden and for Al Qaeda, and, later in jail, 
Malvo drew pictures of Bin Laden and of characters from the film The 
Matrix (1999).48
Re-examination of the years of rage, which in the 1970s had produced 
deep rifts in American society, only partly revealed the nature of that 
indirect influence of the ‘far-away’ conflicts in the Middle East. Because 
the interventionist violence notionally operated at a distance, and because 
many African Americans were historically located in a separate, segregated 
social space,49 the US’s relationship with this new violence was not readily 
recognised, much less linked to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and to 
the struggle against discrimination in the US. Yet just as Vietnam found 
its ways into the Bronx and Compton in the 1970s, giving resonance 
physically and domestically to the violence the United States was enmeshed 
in abroad, the post-9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were repatriated and 
they awakened American radicalism and the social tensions of the 1970s. 
For the profiled African American Muslim in particular, the problem 
was especially vivid. A 2015 investigation by the Guardian newspaper, 
for instance, suggested an explicit continuum between police abuses in 
urban America and the wartime detention scandals, as it uncovered a 
pattern of brutality to elicit murder confessions from minority Americans 
at the hands of a Chicago detective, Richard Zuley, from 1977 to 2007, 
and his assignment at Guantánamo Bay to conduct the interrogation of 
high-profile detainees.50 As one commentator noted months into the 
Trump presidency: 
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To be a black Muslim today is to be part of wide cross-section of 
US Muslims of African descent, US-born and immigrants, who are 
subjected to a double burden of state violence: as black people and 
as Muslims. They are subjected to the war on crime and the War on 
Terror, to surveillance, aggressive policing and systematic civil rights 
violations. … While the security state renders black Muslims hyper-
visible, the multicultural state operates as if they do not exist.51 
Reflecting on the contemporary situation of African Americans, Melina 
Abdullah of California State University summed it up: ‘The communities 
in which Black people live really become occupied territories and Black 
people have become seen as enemy combatants.’52 Violence (symbolic 
or real) turning within came to the United States because of external 
actions and external pressure, and this fed domestic radicalisation across 
social lines. Addressing students at Trinity College, Dublin in January 
2017, the filmmaker Martin Scorsese remarked that the aftermath of 
the 2003 war in Iraq ‘had created thousands and thousands of Travis 
Bickles who say they have nothing to lose’, referring to the depressed loner 
vigilante character at the heart of his 1976 film Taxi Driver.53 The same 
reverse transplantation process was witnessed in the case of members of 
the Somali community in the twin cities of Minneapolis and St Paul in 
Minnesota. Initially, the radicalised members of that community were 
concerned mostly with religious issues, and with Somali questions per 
se in the context of the Al Shabaab insurgency in the mid-2000s in their 
country of origin.
As [Al Shabaab] joined Al Qaeda and ISIS, gradually the message 
widened to encompass questions related to African-Americans. In 
response, Al Shabaab broadened the pool of Americans to which 
it [was] appealing. [An IS video] Pathway to Paradise … explicitly 
appealed to African-Americans through surveying institutional 
racism throughout the United States. It provides statistics about the 
mass incarceration of African-Americans, while highlighting racist 
organisations throughout the country. The video offers Islam as an 
accepting alternative to the discrimination faced in America. While the 
narrative is superficially consistent with past Al Shabaab recruitment 
techniques, the video marks the most explicit incorporation of racial 
issues into Jihadist messaging.54
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The new globalised insurgents are, however, only partly political and 
only distantly shaped by these antebellum feuds, whether in the US or 
elsewhere. Removed from the 1970s actors’ ideologised socio-political 
grievances, the new operators are driven by a more aggressive political 
economy of terrorism and are intimately linked to the urban landscape 
and to the martial use of technology. One reason for this is that they are 
paradoxically much more shaped by the increasingly militarised police 
they are facing. That particular police tradition had also been born earlier, 
again in a symbiotic connection with racial tension in the US in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. The August 1965 Watts Riots in Los Angeles 
allowed the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) to introduce, two 
years later, special forces – the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) unit 
– departing from classical police methods and borrowing from military 
methods and gear. Within a few years, amid the Vietnam War and as 
the militarisation of that department became a recognisable matrix – 
indeed a romanticised one when, in 1975, Hollywood introduced the 
fictional television series S.W.A.T., glamourising one such unit55 – the 
LAPD’s approach to policing gained ascendancy. Specific episodes, such 
as the 17 May 1974 violent raid on the Symbionese Liberation Army in 
Compton (hundreds of LAPD officers laid siege to a residential house 
where Symbionese Liberation Army members were hiding for several 
hours, shooting an estimated 1,200 rounds of ammunition and killing six 
members of the group), covered live on television channels, cemented that 
dynamic. Over the next 40 years, and particularly after 9/11, the methods 
pioneered by the LAPD kept expanding in a globalising back and forth 
(the relationship between Compton and Bel-Air, redefined as colonial-
colonised spaces,56 arguably informed the conceptualisation of the Green 
Zone of Baghdad circa 2003, which then impacted those Western cities in 
turn as the violence travelled back from Iraq to the US). In the early 1990s, 
the US Congress had created the military transfer programme, blurring 
the lines between soldier and peace officer.57 By 2017, the Department of 
Defense had transferred more than five billion US dollars in army military 
hardware to local law enforcement. Further militarised by the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, and accompanied by privacy violations and a ‘top secret 
America’ born out of fear and panic,58 which yielded an octopus of close 
to a million people with top security clearance and hundreds of secret 
governmental organisations – the militarisation of American cities had 
become the perfect paranoid and inwardly violent terrain for a group like 
IS to ship its hybrid, do-it-yourself post-modern terrorism.
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The post-modernism of IS was illustrated by its multiple referential 
motifs, the ambiguity it efficiently and purposefully orchestrated and the 
interpretative space it left for its militant-to-be to use and reuse according 
to their own specific grievances. Acting through symbolic signs as much as 
physical acts, it mimicked the violence that had been inserted in its midst 
as a result of unceasing intervention and shipped it back to the metropolis. 
In turn, that violence was seized upon variously by disenfranchised youth 
in France, the United States and elsewhere in the West to give violent 
voice to their variegated and buried issues – harkening back to the 
1960s and 1970s and unresolved post-colonial or racial questions. Such 
reproduction of the IS message was not a revendication of its agenda 
– certainly not in the case of the African American story or even the 
immigrant one in France. Rather, the violent performance influenced by 
IS was propaganda of the deed 2.0, and such digitalisation of combined 
counter-narrative, counter-message and counter-action was where the 
IS story had landed powerfully and unexpectedly. When discussion of IS 
picked up in the summer of 2014, the world had been introduced to a new 
term, foreign fighter. The phrase could not have been more misleading, 
for these storm riders were indeed travellers, but they were more than 
anything else domestic fighters.
Conclusion
Colonialism Boomerang
How long can we keep on kidding these people? How long before they 
turn their guns in the other direction?
George Orwell, Marrakech (1939)
To begin with, I turn back time. 
Tennessee Williams, The Glass Menagerie (1945)
Where was the violence of IS born, what meaning did it carry and where 
did it head? In inquiring as to the genesis, nature and trajectory of IS and 
attempting to conceptualise it, this book has argued that the entity which 
seismically stormed the world stage in the summer of 2014 was a hybrid 
meta-puzzle and an influential armed group, which, beyond its specific 
regional Middle Eastern history and radical Islamist nature, repurposed 
the larger meaning of contemporary violence, birthing a do-it-yourself 
wave of terrorism. IS, it was submitted, is anchored in an interrelated set 
of far-reaching and conflict-ridden histories between the Middle East 
and the West; it is the expression of a multilayered purposive terrorising 
force directed at local power struggles and societal dystrophies; and it 
has evolved rapidly towards an evanescent and individualised form of 
physical and symbolic violence that has been unpacked globally. That 
group displaced what had emerged 15 years earlier as the most powerful 
terrorist group in history, namely Osama Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda, and it 
went on to write its own wider and more complex story – one that is 
open-ended, will increasingly play out in the heart of the West and has 
escaped the group’s initial definition and control.
It was offered that the dominant discourse in policy, journalism and 
academe about IS has so far been problematic in a number of ways. This 
is primarily because it has concentrated too much on the micro-narrative 
of the group’s immediate operational actions to the detriment of deeper 
historical and political issues; has given excessive explanatory weight to 
the organisation’s religious pronouncements; and has exceptionalised IS’s 
violence in the sole purview of the Middle Eastern or Islamic context. 
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In so doing, such examinations have stood in the way of historicised 
and comparative analyses of the contemporary meaning of the violence 
produced, performed and projected by IS domestically, regionally and 
transnationally. Martial policy and sensationalist media accounts dictated 
a pace that academia followed too complacently, substituting instant and 
short-term terrorism expertise for lasting comparative knowledge on 
political violence. As a result, dominant scholarship about IS has been 
lacking in sophistication – as earlier work on Al Qaeda had a decade ago 
– beholden as it is to narratives that one-dimensionally portray a sense 
of things gone wrong overnight or inevitably turned violent due to the 
nature of the culture and religion of the people involved. Ultimately and 
contradictorily, IS under these perspectives was looked upon as either 
obvious or inscrutable.1 It is to be either read linearly (as apocalyptic 
Islamist terrorism) or apprehended as being too complex to be deciphered 
meaningfully at all. What have been missing are several meta-arguments 
to help account critically for IS in conceptual ways that go beyond the 
rehearsed arguments about the group’s irrationality, apocalypticism 
or barbarity. Furthermore, the arguments put forth about IS are not 
persuasive. The group’s religiosity is most certainly front and centre, 
but arguably it is mere theatrics. The organisation’s violence is clearly 
extreme but, clinically, that is but a manifestation of a terrorising use of 
force, and stressing that single aspect eschews the socio-genesis and the 
opportunistic political calculations behind it. IS’s terrorism is obvious, and 
yet one-dimensional discussion of it hardly tells us anything about what 
its strategic logic conceals. ‘How much of a state is ISIS?’ ‘How Islamic 
is ISIS?’ ‘What does ISIS really want?’ Such incessant second-guessing 
of nominal aspects – and in effect uncritical acceptance of the group’s 
discourse at its most basic, declamatory and superficial level – has for too 
long been characteristic of analyses that lack persuasiveness, particularly 
so as certain political questions were wittingly or unwittingly kept at bay.
A recontextualisation of IS’s regenerational dynamics means connecting 
several strands of history and geography. These, this work contends, play 
across three linked temporalities. Historically, IS – as it coalesced in 
2012–13 and emerged publicly in mid-2014 – is, first, the manifestation of 
the reformation of the Iraqi branch of Al Qaeda; an entity itself moulded 
in several other layers of lineal depth through Al Qaeda’s own history 
since the mid to late 1980s and the Jordanian Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi’s 
organisation Jama’at al Tawhid wal Jihad between 1999 and 2003. IS is, 
second, the embodiment of two national insurgencies, in Iraq since 2003 
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in the aftermath of the US invasion and in Syria since 2011 after the 
start of the civil war in that country. Thirdly, IS is the expression of a 
transnational rebellion born in the Western metropolis that expresses 
itself both in the so-called foreign fighters phenomenon – men and 
women travelling from around the world to Iraq and Syria to take part 
in the state-building project of IS – and the domestic operators visiting 
violence on their own societies, notably in France, the United States, the 
United Kingdom and Germany. Such three-tiered identity, it is claimed, 
is inscribed in three different experiences that cumulatively account for 
the hybrid nature of the movement. IS’s story is thus anchored in the 
colonial story linking the Middle East and North Africa with the West, 
with specifically earlier patterns of violent interaction in the Levant with 
the United Kingdom (and to a lesser degree in Asia) and in the central 
Maghreb with France echoed in the current clashes – a colonial history 
further made relevant through the manner in which the United States’ 
neo-colonial policies in Iraq after 2003 enabled this dimension to inform 
the materialisation of IS. The group’s trajectory and configuration are 
similarly inscribed in a globalisation moment, which determined the 
fluidity, density and intensity of the organisation’s usage of violence, and 
facilitated the global beaming of its action as well as the interpenetration 
of its cross-currents. Finally, IS is firmly ingrained in post-modernity, 
as its natural and efficient use and reuse of media, technology, arts, 
communication techniques and language vividly illustrates – all in the 
transformative context of urban aesthetics, commercial individualism 
and societal alienation. The dialectical relationship between these 
lineages and temporalities thus invite a reading of IS as the sum total of 








ISLAMIC STATE ISLAMIC STATE
Post-modernity
Figure 5.1 Lineages and temporalities of IS
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In lieu of a plural IS, however, we have, in the historiography of IS, been 
treated to the singularity of a religious terrorist group. That dominant 
storytelling representation of IS and these non-conceptualisations are, 
it was also argued, situated in a larger incomplete discussion about 
terrorism, which is itself immersed in a specific construct of international 
relations – an architecture that conceals not merely familiar Eurocentrism 
but racism itself, which was present at the inception of ‘international 
relations’ (in its modern guise) in the 1910s and continued traversing it 
for the next hundred years; an ‘epistemic racism [that ]crosses the lines 
of social and institutional spheres … hidden beneath the naturalisation 
of certain ways of thinking and producing knowledge’.2 Specifically, that 
still-dominant configuration of international relations – statist, power-
defined, Western-spoken and derivative of colonial and imperial histories 
– was the platform from which descriptive and prescriptive storytelling 
about IS proceeded. Such a disposition then logically boxed intellectual 
work on Al Qaeda, IS and more generally contemporary terrorism as 
an exercise confined to the revelation of Middle East and North Africa 
dystrophies or the identification of crazed Islamists. The analytical, 
historical importance of IS lies, however, neither in its brutal lethality 
nor indeed in its undeniable efficiency, or even its consequential short-
circuiting of Al Qaeda. It lies rather in an original development happening 
both at its hands (that is, behaviourally) and as the result of the sum 
total of its hybrid dynamics (that is, objectively), namely the mutation 
of violence which the group generated in the very midst of its enemy. As 
discussed, Al Qaeda took the battle to the enemy (‘from the near to the 
far enemy’) then began shipping it back (‘from to the near to the far 
enemy’ ... and back, as it were) without fully closing that sequence. IS 
emerged, tentacle-like, in that last phase, initially amid eminently local 
dynamics (Iraq post-2003 and Syria post-2011) but only to use that dual 
base as a reinforced and better-controlled springboard to redeploy its 
efforts externally. Only this time, it was done with greater ease within 
an enabling environment of social sectors from the West migrating to 
it (the foreign fighters), others emulating its violence in the heart of the 
Western metropolis (the Kouachi brothers, the Tsarnaevs and similar 
actors), as well as Muslim and Western states increasingly displaying 
authoritarianism towards their populations in the name of opposing the 
new IS threat. Such circularity of the transnational terrorism pioneered 
by Al Qaeda and upgraded by IS ushered in a new dimension of this 
discussion, where post-colonialism meshes with post-globalisation 
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revealing what post-modern violence is beginning to mean. Simply put, 
at this stage the meaning of dominant contemporary political violence 
is violence shipped back to its exporter. Al Qaeda, IS and their avatars-
in-the-making are but post-modern symptoms of a larger post-colonial 
dynamic that has been transformed by the refund patterns offered by 
globalisation.
Return to Sender
When Al Qaeda crashed the world stage of global politics on that fateful 
Tuesday in September 2001, unleashing its terrorism in New York and 
Washington, the world embarked on a decade during which it was 
systematically treated to explanations of that group which highlighted its 
irrationality, religious fundamentalism and barbarity. In the context of a 
mental horizon dominated by the accretion of emotional commentary 
and ideological amplification, the study of Al Qaeda remained for a 
long time confined to the boundaries of journalistic accounts and policy 
planning. When academe fought its way in, it also erred by going down the 
road of Islamic theology and neo-Orientalist readings of a group whose 
instrumentalisation of Islam always ranked secondarily to its political and 
martial agenda. Lost in that translation were the functional innovations 
and behavioural displacements introduced by the first transnational 
non-state armed group in history, its offsetting reinventing of political 
violence, its influence on both a new generation of privatised terrorism 
(from the Islamophobe Anders Breivik to the Kouachi brothers by way 
of US Sergeant Malik Nidal Hassan and the Tsarnaev schoolboys) and a 
novel type of self-empowered armed group which would come to control 
vast territories in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, Mali, Somalia, Nigeria 
and Yemen. The Salafist ideology of IS was endlessly dissected, while the 
group’s modus operandi was neglected analytically, and proceeded to alter 
the parameters of early twenty-first-century international relations. Logics 
of ‘eradication’ and ‘termination’ dominated such journalistic, policy 
and scholarly discourse, and at the occasion of Bin Laden’s anticlimactic 
disappearance (following the largest manhunt in history; his number 
two is still on the run), Al Qaeda was decreed defeated, decimated and 
finished. Seldom had a narrative of closure been so misleading.
When, three years later, IS announced that it was becoming the 
Caliphate, that same sequence of analysis was reopened. Familiar 2000s 
arguments reappeared in the 2010s, again advancing savant theses about 
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the motivations of this new entity and gauging the levels of its ‘Islamicity’ 
and its violence. It was no small paradox that after years of planetary 
discussion of Al Qaeda and dozens of explicit discourses by their 
respective leaders, we were now asking the very same set of questions 
about IS. In truth, the reification of a documented story of the predictable 
maturation of a promethean Al Qaeda franchise-gone-local-and-moving-
to-surpass-its-begetter into an inscrutable Islamic group driven solely 
by blind violence, partakes of a logic of avoidance of the political. To be 
certain, Al Qaeda spoke repeatedly of the Caliphate as an aspiration, and 
IS formally pursued it in statements and deeds. Yet even if both were 
‘religious’ groups, there were many other irredentist entities of which the 
same could be said, because religion per se (more generally and beyond 
the Middle East and North Africa) has come to occupy a central place in 
the new conflicts, with one-third of countries experiencing a ‘religious 
conflict’ of one form or another. Furthermore, such an intensified interface 
between religion and global politics is a historical phase resulting from 
specific interlinked episodes over the past decades, namely the slowing 
down and eventual end of the Cold War, the 1979 revolution in Iran, 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the related rise of transnational 
Islamism, 9/11 and its international impact, the United States’ invasion of 
Iraq and the opening of the Pandora’s box between Sunna and Shi’a. If the 
readability of IS as a religious actor is warranted, it is primarily because 
there is a universal background of increased, religion-driven and religion-
dominated conflicts, rather than because it has a unique modus essendi.
The importance of IS rests elsewhere, in three impactful and challenging 
dimensions very much of this world. First of all, the degenerated 
consequences of an Iraqi society preoccupied with and occupied by war 
for three decades since September 1980. The combined aftermath of 
Saddam Hussein’s devastating wars in the 1980s, the UN’s cruel 1990s 
embargo and the United States’ cancerous invasion and occupation in 
the 2000s have cumulatively monstered an Iraqi generation bent on 
destruction and self-destruction, with lasting societal dystrophies. 
Second, the accelerated statisation of the armed group which IS has 
become has inspired other groups (such as Boko Haram and Ansar 
Beit al Maqdis), and the concomitant destatisation of states (in Iraq, 
Syria, Libya and Yemen) has yielded a fluid state-society grammar to 
which the international community has so far primarily responded 
with problematic interventions that have made matters worse. Finally, 
the ability of what once was, successively, Jama’at al Tawhid wal Jihad 
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(1999–2004), AQI (2004–6) and ISI (2006–13) to invoke and revoke Al 
Qaeda and be reborn as ISIL (2013–14) and then as IS (2014–), with 
an ambition to re-establish an Islamic Caliphate defunct since 1924, 
has ushered in a second stage in the transnationalism pioneered by Al 
Qaeda. The paradoxical, simultaneous pursuit of a territorial ambition 
(in the Levant) and a globalised influence (40 pledges of allegiance and/
or support in the two years between June 2014 and June 2016) reveals 
a hybrid entity-in-the-making; one that is internally transformed by 
an open-ended interface between radical Islamists, thousands of über-
ideologised and disenfranchised youth coming from around the world, 
Syrian militants bent on bringing down Bashar al Assad, former Ba’athist 
officers driven by Tikriti revenge and Baghdadi hoodlums tortured in 
US and Shi’a prisons, all sporadically allied with Arab tribesmen with 
financial rewards and community control on their mind. Problematically, 
such complexity is reduced to musings on the religiosity of the group, 
non-consequential debates about the group’s appellation, conspiratorial 
thinking about its genesis and premature announcements of its defeat. 
A more textured understanding of IS takes us into post-colonialism, 
with a critique directed at the lack of recognition of the political and 
historical nature of the movements observed – as well as the ‘deadly 
configuration of humans and technology external to the state’ that such 
groups represent.3 However, the classical post-colonial perspective can 
itself be of limited use in trying to make sense of the IS phenomenon, 
since it carries an anchoring in peripherality,4 whereas IS as discussed 
in Chapter 4 is a manifestation that equally proceeded from the centre. 
IS fundamentally calls, therefore, for an additional forward-looking 
reading, as it is undergirded by modernity. In that sense, its creative use 
of communication technologies should not come as a surprise: 
Indeed, marginality can produce an extraordinary degree of intelligence, 
not to speak of organising ability. These processes do not apply only 
to industrial countries. … Whole countries are more marginal today 
than they were at independence from colonialism. Such situations 
provide the raw materials, and in abundance, for the recounting of 
loss, of specifying grievances, of deprivation of life and liberty, the stuff 
of storytelling, the playgrounds for cosmocrats and prophets and the 
mytho-logics on which violence depends.5
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The incubation of the IS feedback loop is then an affair of long standing. 
Upon close examination, there is a longer history of violence imported 
back to the metropolis, of which the IS saga is arguably just the most recent 
and transformed episode – the novelty being that this latest phase of the 
process is done at the hands of the subaltern. World War I was, for instance, 
linked directly to the colonial wars which immediately preceded it. After 
World War II, colonial hegemony was ‘silently’ repackaged. As Frank 
Furedi argued6 – examining diplomatic and newspaper correspondence 
during the 1930s to 1950s – the relaxation of racist disposition during 
that phase was linked to the restlessness of the colonies. Subsequently, 
the ‘emergencies’ in Malaysia, Kenya, Aden and Indonesia served as the 
matrix for Northern Ireland, and the methods which the British had used 
in their colonies in the 1950s – in Kenya7 and Malaysia – to put down the 
Mau Mau Uprising and the Malayan Emergency rebellions against their 
rule were used in counter-terrorism measures in Ireland in the 1970s. 
Both Great Britain’s response to the intensification of the Irish Republican 
Army actions in the 1970s and France’s reaction to terrorism on its 
soil from the 1980s onwards, were influenced by these two countries’ 
respective colonial histories. Whether from the 1920s to the 2000s in Iraq, 
or from the British Mandate in Palestine in the 1940s to the trouble in 
Ireland, the British military experience – internment, indefinite detention 
without trial and blunt use of force – has been mirroring itself regularly 
in these conflicts,8 as was the case with the road from Vietnam to Iraq 
for the United States. Preoccupied for 50 years with the Cold War, the 
West dealt with the Global South in a way that maintained the status quo. 
With the end of the Cold War, a new dynamic was unleashed. Saddam 
Hussein solved the riddle for George H. W. Bush, as the coincidence of 
his invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 with the fall of the Berlin Wall nine 
months earlier pre-emptively filled a strategic post-Communism void-
in-the-making. The larger identity behind ‘Saddam’ was then available to 
further build the narrative from the Red to the Green menace – and that 
in turn fuelled Bin Laden’s project, as he himself stated in his 1996 and 
1998 declarations of war against the United States that set the stage for IS.
From this perspective, it becomes clear that the Al Qaeda-initiated 
and IS-perpetuated terrorism from the periphery played out against a 
deeper historical and political background. Awareness of the colonial 
past, bitterness as to post-colonial dynamics and resentment towards the 
local repressive regimes were carried over and linked to contemporary 
situations – notably in Iraq – wherein the notion of revenging occupation 
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and manipulation was featured regularly in the pronouncements of 
almost all the actors associated with Al Qaeda and IS. Such lex talionis 
logic was expressed in the titles of the video messages released by IS in 
2014–17 (e.g. Punish Them with an Equal Punishment; If You Return, We 
Shall Return; If You Punish, Punish as You were Punished; An Appropriate 
Reward) just as it was heard in Bin Laden’s speeches delivered between 
2002 and 2006 (‘Reciprocal treatment is part of justice’, ‘Just as you kill, 
you will be killed. Just as you bomb, you will be bombed’, ‘Our actions 
are but reactions to your acts’, ‘Just as you lay waste to our nation, so we 
shall lay waste to yours’, ‘For every action, there is a reaction’). In time, this 
logic travelled to the transnational agents of IS per the group’s biformity 
(see Figure 4.1). A revealing, initially unaired exchange between one of 
the Kouachi brothers, Chérif, and a journalist of the French television 
news channel BFM illustrates this mindset. On the morning of 9 January 
2015 – two days after he and his brother had conducted the attack on the 
Charlie Hebdo magazine offices, and as they were hiding in a factory near 
Paris – Chérif Kouachi answered a telephone call placed to the warehouse 
by Igor Sahiri, a member of the French news station’s editorial team, who 
then had the following conversation with him:
Chérif Kouachi: We just tell you that we are the defenders of the Prophet 
and that I was sent – I, Chérif Kouachi, by Al Qaeda in Yemen. 
BFM Journalist: OK.
Kouachi: I went over there and I was financed by Sheikh Anwar al 
‘Awlaqi.
Journalist: OK. When was this, roughly?
Kouachi: A while ago. Before he was killed [on 30 September 2011].
Journalist: OK, so you came back to France recently?
Kouachi: No, a long time ago. Don’t worry. I know how to do things 
properly.
Journalist: OK, and now there’s only the two of you, you and your 
brother?
Kouachi: That’s not your problem.
Journalist: Do you have other people there with you?
Kouachi: That is not your problem.
Journalist: OK. And you intend to kill again in the name of Allah? Or 
not?
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Kouachi: Kill whom?
Journalist: I don’t know. It’s a question I’m asking you.
Kouachi: Did we kill civilians during these two days that you have been 
looking for us?
Journalist: You killed journalists.
Kouachi: No, but did we kill civilians or people? Were we bloodthirsty 
during these two days that you were looking for us? Do you hear me?
Journalist: Wait Chérif, have you killed anyone this morning?
Kouachi: But we are not killers … We are defenders of the Prophet. 
We do not kill women. We kill no one. We defend the Prophet. Those 
who offend him, there’s no problem we can kill them. But we don’t kill 
women. We are not like you. We are not like you. It is you that kill the 
children of Muslims in Iraq, in Syria, in Afghanistan. That’s you. That’s 
not us. We have codes of honour, us, in Islam.
Journalist: But you took vengeance nonetheless ... You killed twelve 
people.
Kouachi: That’s right. Because we took vengeance. That’s it. You said 
it all. We took vengeance. Exactly. There you go, you said it yourself; 
because we took vengeance.
The shipping back of colonial and interventionist violence is an unfinished 
and open-ended process. Echoes of that interfaced and deforming 
experience are still ringing, distilling a legacy in ways that are societally, 
socially and humanely unexpected. Reflecting on the newly empowered 
US immigration officers enforcing the 2017 discriminating ‘Muslim ban’ 
under the Donald Trump administration, one analyst noted: 
For people who witnessed the American wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
such an aggressive stance is all too familiar … All this reminds me 
eerily of the words and actions by United States military officers who 
helped create the conditions that led to the abuses of Iraqi detainees 
at the notorious Abu Ghraib prison … Even the language is similar. 
On 14 August 2003, as the Iraqi insurgency was mushrooming, an 
Army officer in the Human Intelligence Effects Coordination Cell at 
American military headquarters in Iraq sent out a directive saying 
that ‘the gloves are coming off regarding these detainees’. In case that 
wording left any doubts, he added, ‘We want these individuals broken.’9 
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Such domestic imperialisation of the republic, as witnessed in the case 
of the rise of American authoritarianism, is arguably a by-product of 
the proto-colonial administration of Iraq a decade earlier. The more the 
US behaved in a colonial way, the more the colonised adopted violent 
reactions reminiscent of the colonial era and influenced others around 
the world, but also provided a narrative that could be picked up by the 
likes of Michael Adebolajo in London and Chérif Kouachi in Paris. In 
opposing the West so brutally and so radically – with professionally 
planned, take-no-prisoner, ultra-violent terrorism – IS furthered this 
sequence and repurposed it according to its specific state-building design. 
In the event, the notion of empire can no longer be seen euphemistically 
as a distant memory – merely in a sanitised logic of ornament – and 
the fundamentally dichotomising nature of colonialism, as Frantz Fanon 
identified it long ago, starts being replayed in remixed ways.10 And so, if 
well into the twentieth century and more so as this new century started, 
the West continued to think imperially,11 today the counter-imperial 
thinking of an insurgent, terrorising and militarised type has materialised, 
thickening the plot.
In the name of anti-terrorism, after 9/11 the United States launched 
a process of renewed imperialism under the guise of the GWOT, which 
came back to haunt and endanger it and a large segment of the West 
with it. Besides IS’s own Al Qaeda-forged and independently produced 
ambition to terrorise the West, as seen in Chapter 1, the path chosen to 
face the problem of terrorism was constitutive of a strategic entrapment 
that had culminated a decade after 9/11 in imperial hubris amid IS’s rise. 
The fetishisation of killing itself – as a way to rid oneself from terrorism 
– had been on display since the early days of the 9/11 aftermath and has 
continued ever since, with presidents boasting in that regard. ‘I am a 
war president’, declared President George W. Bush in February 2004, to 
which President Barack Obama added, in September 2011, that he was 
‘good at killing’, while President Donald Trump declared enthusiastically 
in February 2016 that he would ‘approve torture in a heartbeat’ and ‘bring 
back waterboarding and a hell of a lot worse’, and in January 2017 added that 
‘torture works’. With the War on Terror reported in a way that emphasised 
national security over civil liberties, that process forged ahead, facilitated 
by ethical disconnect. An army veteran who was a contract interrogator in 
Iraq in 2004, and who admitted torturing prisoners in Abu Ghraib, noted 
the apathy he faced when talking about the things American soldiers 
carried out in Iraq: ‘It was my first encounter with a generation that d[id] 
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not consider the release of the Abu Ghraib photographs to be a critical 
moment in their lives ... Abu Ghraib will fade. My transgressions will 
be forgotten.’12 In effect, the two most important events in the historical 
socio-genesis of IS – the torture at Abu Ghraib and the hanging of Saddam 
Hussein – are absent from mainstream Western public memory today. 
Indeed, they are arguably, psychologically speaking, repressed memories 
among IS itself. Their imprint is, however, most visible in the manner in 
which the group performed its violence. Orange jumpsuit there, orange 
jumpsuit here. The beamed message of reciprocal treatment was made 
more obvious as IS captors waterboarded four Western hostages in August 
2014, which they explicitly staged in video messages. As IS pursued its 
terrorism campaign, it further influenced the cementing, rationalisation 
and normalisation of the garrison state in the West. From Archibald Paton 
Thornton’s The Imperial Idea and its Enemies, published after the Suez 
affair in 1956, to Niall Ferguson’s Empire, released after 9/11,13 enthusiasm 
for imperial order has often been manifested in the aftermath of political 
setbacks lived through by the metropolis. In 1993, in an article entitled 
‘Colonialism’s Back and Not A Moment Too Soon’, Paul Johnson wrote 
in the New York Times Magazine that: ‘There simply is no alternative in 
nations where governments have crumbled and the most basic conditions 
for civilised life have disappeared.’ In 2015, Robert Kaplan maintained in 
Foreign Policy, that ‘imperialism bestowed order ... The challenge now is 
less to establish democracy than to re-establish order.’14
In such a context, where history so consequentially and multifacet-
edly determines their interface, IS and the West can be seen as caught in 
a dance of mutual implication and rejection, which Elizabeth Povinelli 
captured indirectly when discussing what she termed the ‘governance of 
the prior’: 
From the point of view of the governance of the prior – the priority of 
the prior across political, market and social relations – the indigenous 
does not confront the state, nor does the state confront the indigenous. 
Both are caught in strategic manoeuvres of temporalisation and 
territorialisation around this problematic because the nation-state and 
the indigenous share a set of vital organs originating in a history that 
pre-dates their emergence even as this history of the present, and in 
the present, continually foregrounds that these organic transplants are 
subject to an intense and complex immunity crisis.15 
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The past is here not merely a prologue to such hubris and counter-
hubris. The incessant mechanisation of death and its staging are going 
hand in hand with the dehumanising techniques of the past, allowing 
for their reintroduction in an updated terrorism format. In expanding its 
dominion, the West has created the conditions of an improvised, updated 
and mutated use of technology by its enemies, which today take the form of 
self-empowered non-state armed groups present abroad and increasingly 
in the West itself. The texturing of the new violence has moved beyond the 
Norman Rockwellisation of the colonial distant to the Instagramisation 
of the metropolitan local. The multiplicity of interlocking conflicts that 
presided over IS’s birth were ultimately transcended by the consequences 
of that violence. The stage was set for the next wave of terrorism, one in 
which past and present would meet in original ways.
Future Pasts of IS
In the face of the resilience of IS, in 2015 analysts started considering 
the possibility of its victory and entertaining the idea of affording it 
diplomatic recognition.16 Such assessments were as hasty as the earlier 
dismissals had been – for example, in January 2014 President Obama 
assessed the rising IS group as ‘a jay-vee [junior varsity] team’ not on 
the level of Al Qaeda.17 IS cannot win in a classical military sense and 
granting it diplomatic recognition is impossible. More important was the 
historical sequence that had played out, framing the global interaction 
and leading to such assessments of what ultimately is but an armed group. 
By the end of the 2010s, the world had lived two full decades dominated 
by the theme of terrorism. Al Qaeda in the 2000s and IS in the 2010s 
were the lead actors of this period. The global scene had de facto been 
coloured ‘terrorism’ for almost 30 uninterrupted years. During this time, 
the movements themselves, as discussed, experienced important and 
accelerated transformations. The Arab Afghans gave birth to Al Qaeda, 
which mutated into a second version that launched regional versions, 
which in turn allowed one of these offshoots, IS, to rise and transcend the 
two initial structures. That entity, IS, then stood complex, multifaceted 
and multilayered, in turn harbouring several different identities (see 
Table 3.3). With none of the different dimensions of IS overtaking the 
others – the local Iraqi and Syrian insurgents and the incoming foreign 
fighters pursued a set of goals, each ascribing priority to different aspects 
of their struggle – it emerged that the mix of that sort of loose terrorist 
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vortex was becoming cemented as a form of violence in and of itself. A 
type of terrorism building and gathering momentum in the periphery, 
but not remaining there and all the time moving back and forth on the 
centre–periphery continuum. As Paul Rogers noted, IS is a window into 
the future: 
[W]e are moving into an era of revolt from the margins … In this global 
context, we should not see ISIS as a specific movement that must be 
confronted and destroyed, believing that, once this is achieved, all will 
be well. This view misses the point. Rather, the way in which ISIS has 
spread and evolved into a transnational movement should be seen as 
an instance of a phenomenon that is likely to be repeated in the future, 
perhaps in very different circumstances that stretch far beyond the 
Middle East … This means that understanding the process of evolution 
as it applies to ISIS has a more general relevance.18
At the core of that geo-spatial evolution stood another determinant back 
and forth, namely the historical relationship between these Western and 
Southern worlds, and the double genesis of the now-merging violence. 
From the Arabian Peninsula’s Ikhwan in the 1910s to the Levantine Jabhat 
al Shaam in the 2010s, armed non-state groups have remained a feature 
of Middle Eastern and North African politics and conflicts for a century. 
Similarly, Islamists have long had a networked presence in the West, 
notably in Europe.19 However, the 40-year Al Qaeda-IS saga was really 
set in motion as interventionism – first in Afghanistan by the Soviets in 
the 1980s, then in Iraq by the US in the 1990s and 2000s, then in Syria by 
the US and Russia in the 2010s – came of age and became a contemporary, 
unrestrained practice. The first part of that exercise ended with 9/11 – a 
momentous event itself constituting a culmination and a beginning. The 
second act was filled with reactions to that attack. We are today at the end 
of a long, convoluted and plot-thickening third act. The circulation of that 
violence produced an inner sequence whereby Afghanistan (1979) led 
to Al Qaeda, Iraq (2003) led to IS – which led to the home-grown do-it-
yourself Western terrorist. Logically, the trend of boomeranged terrorism 
is bound to increase in the next phase. The unceasing conflicts abroad 
and the deepening alienation at home are continuously fuelling rebellious 
violence, and the inventiveness that comes with the current generation 
will provide further possibilities for its constant reimagination, but one 
that also borrows from the past and is influenced by it (as attested to 
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by the recurrence of vehicles ploughing into civilians in 2016–17). The 
back and forth of the metropolis–periphery interface is, in effect, where 
these actors have clashed and met. The global circulation of violence was 
also present in earlier eras, and cases of Southern influence had certainly 
materialised before. For instance, the asymmetrical methods which 
inspired the extreme-left European groups of the 1970s, as a result of 
the writings and actions of the Vietnamese, Chinese and Argentinian 
leaders Ho Chi Minh, Mao Zedong and Che Guevara, had been pioneered 
earlier in northern Morocco by Abdelkrim al Khattabi in 1921 during 
his insurgency against the Spanish occupation.20 Similarly, by looking at 
the 1960s and 1970s as long-gone eras whose violence is not relevant to 
current processes, we miss the sense in which they were the first terrain 
of internationalised, post-colonial violence. The 2010s are a follow-up 
to these ignored, suppressed and marginalised historical memories.21 As 
the United States started ‘monstering’ people in Iraq in 2003, it opened 
the door to the political travesty that would come to fruition 15 years 
later and acquire lethal agency, with IS acting against these histories and 
in turn empowering operators around the world, notably in the heart of 
Western countries.
IS is characterised by extreme violence, performed at levels that Al 
Qaeda had never attempted – with the exception of al Zarqawi, who 
unsurprisingly is the historical leader IS most often refers to. Beheadings 
and other atrocities were regularly committed by the group. Among many 
extreme acts throughout those years, a paroxysm of sorts was reached in 
February 2015 when a video (A Message Signed with Blood to the Nations 
of the Cross) showed the decapitation of 21 Coptic Christians on the shores 
of Libya, and another (Healing the Believers’ Chests) showed a Jordanian 
air force pilot, Muath al Kasasbeh, whose plane had crashed near Raqqa, 
caged and burned alive. On the Western side, the new/old violence 
features Rambo-like returning soldiers carrying trauma and violence from 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but it also features novel profiles of the 
urban insurgent and the corporate military contractor doubling-up the 
constantly expanding militarisation of security. A declassified 2009 report 
by the United States Department of Homeland Security noted the potential 
terrorist threat represented by some returning war veterans, highlighting 
their combat skills: ‘These skills and knowledge have the potential to boost 
the capabilities of extremists – including lone wolves or small terrorist 
cells – to carry out violence. The willingness of a small percentage of 
military personnel to join extremist groups during the 1990s because they 
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were disgruntled, disillusioned or suffering from the psychological effects 
of war is being replicated today.’22 In between, regionally, IS influenced the 
rise of armed groups and confirmed the destatisation playing out across 
the Arab world. In Iraq, a coalition of militias known as Al Hashd al 
Sha’abi (the Popular Mobilisation Forces), comprising 120,000 men, was 
set up in July 2014 to battle the organisation. In Syria, al Baghdadi’s group 
squared off with Hezbollah (in Lebanon itself in the Bekaa Valley in May 
2015) and several other new Syrian groups that had emerged after 2011 
in opposition to Bashar al Assad’s regime. In Libya it spawned offshoots, 
notably Ansar al Shari’a. And in Yemen, the Houthis rode the Iraqi-Syrian 
group’s geostrategic moment according to their own mode and for their 
own purposes as they reactivated their local irredentist struggle in August 
2014, leading within months to a full-scale war with Saudi Arabia (which 
had conducted a first incursion against the Houthis in November 2009). 
Beyond, in West Africa, groups like Boko Haram became attracted to IS, 
carrying their own unresolved colonial history that was now being turned 
on to their own societies.
What has been the overarching net effect of this sequence, and how 
has this political violence transformed the global order? As regards the 
West, this has poisoned the daily life of many Westerners now living amid 
normalised fear and routinised conflict, with an augmented segment 
succumbing to explicit and unapologetic racism towards Muslims, 
including fellow nationals of their countries reflexively associated with 
terrorism. The effects of this siege mentality and of this militarisation of 
life are insidious, and are bound to colour the next phase of modernity, 
as captured by Stephen Graham:
The crossover between the military and the civilian applications 
of advanced technology – between the surveillance and control 
of everyday life in Western cities and the prosecution of aggressive 
colonial and resource wars – is at the heart of a much broader set of 
trends ... Of course, the effects observed in the urban Western setting 
differ wildly from those seen in the war-zone. But, crucially, whatever 
the environment, these hi-tech acts of violence are predicated on a 
set of shared ideas. Fundamental to the new military urbanism is the 
paradigmatic shift that renders cities’ communal and private spaces, 
as well as their infrastructure – along with their civilian population 
– a source of targets and threats. This is manifest in the widespread 
use of war as the dominant metaphor in describing the perpetual and 
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boundless condition of urban societies – at war against drugs, against 
crime, against terror, against insecurity itself. This development 
incorporates the stealthy militarisation of a wide range of policy 
debates, urban landscapes and circuits of urban infrastructure, as well 
as whole realms of popular and urban culture. It leads to the creepy and 
insidious diffusion of militarised debates about ‘security’ in every walk 
of life. Together, once again, these work to bring essentially military 
ideas of the prosecution of, and preparation for, war into the heart of 
ordinary, day-to-day life.23
New discourses about terrorism and practices of war and securitisation 
work today to problematise (urban) life per se. Crucially, this occurs 
in telescopic ways that intimately link cities in the metropolitan and 
capitalist heartlands with those on colonial frontiers and peripheries.24 
A permanent narrative about terrorism and an unrestrained practice of 
war have taken over culturally, socially and politically across the globe. IS 
thus came to occupy a logical place in such a new world, choreographed 
here and there since 9/11 in a way that has the terrorist play the role of 
permanent threat to the megapolis (a role, we should recall, IS assigned 
itself), with surveillance, vigilantism and terrorism interlocked. Again, 
Al Qaeda had influenced that process in real life and in fiction – for 
instance, in the Christopher Nolan-directed The Dark Knight (2008) 
instalment of the popular Batman film series, the Joker character was an 
obvious metaphor for Osama Bin Laden issuing ultimata to the people 
and authorities of Gotham/New York forcing them to make existential 
choices about survival,25 while foreshadowing the more militarised, 
hybrid and post-modern local/foreign terrorism of the Bane character in 
the sequel The Dark Knight Rises (2012). Indeed, just as ‘the battlegrounds 
of colonial order lay as much on African soil as in the publications written 
by the participants in the war once they have returned home’,26 the 
contemporary dynamics of post-colonial terrorism are equally shaped by 
the representations in books and films produced upon ‘return’. In effect, 
the terrorist of the future will increasingly blend fiction and reality and 
be himself or herself the product of the difficulty to distinguish real life 
from its representation. Not merely finding inspiration in it, the future 
terrorist will come to regard fiction as the very terrain to produce his or 
her violence. (On 20 July 2012, a gunman, James Eagan Holmes, dressed 
in military clothing, conducted an attack on a film theatre in Aurora, 
Colorado screening The Dark Knight Rises, detonating grenades and 
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using multiple firearms, killing twelve people.)27 Paradoxically, violence 
is thus celebrated artistically and metaphorically, and denounced and 
feared when displayed too close for comfort. Star Wars filmgoers cheer 
the destruction of the Death Star battle station by a group of rogue ragtag 
insurgent Alliance Rebels led by ancient warriors believing in a mystical 
religion and fighting an asymmetrical war, not seeing the irony that in 
effect the Death Star is the Pentagon, Coruscant is New York, Senator 
Palpatine is Bush and Bin Laden is reminiscent enough of the old and 
reclusive Obi-Wan Ben Kenobi hiding in the desert. The public is in effect 
cheering for the very fictionalised terrorists they will fear upon exiting 
the movieplex – or indeed in popcorn situ, as did a woman in Italy who 
called the police after seeing a veiled Muslim woman filmgoer texting 
‘suspiciously’ during a screening.
The imperial vision has produced its terrorism antidote. The 
emergence of a non-state actor’s absolutist and violently extremist 
opposition, such as the one displayed by IS, took place in the context of 
the consolidation of the early twenty-first century neo-imperial national 
security state. Self-focused linear writing of history has combined with 
state-centred perspectives to render the mapping of the elusive IS political 
phenomenon very difficult. The trends prevalent in non-understanding 
the group – except in terms of its violence (not the interventionist or 
torturing ones that partially birthed it) or in terms of identify and faith 
(rather than politics) is indicative of an intellectual dead end, reached well 
before the organisation materialised. End of History and Coming Anarchy 
narratives holding hands in the 1990s came to frame logically the Road 
Warrior-flavoured imagery discussion on IS 20 years later. In this context, 
the argument about empires advancing in fits of absent-mindedness is 
misleading. In infusing civilian life with military logic and artefacts – 
starting off when the 1991 Gulf War’s Humvee became a fashion and 
status statement as the civilian Hummer car marketed by AM General 
– the US military in effect opened a gate that could be ‘reversed’, literally, 
with the hacking by IS of Centcom’s Twitter account in January 2016. 
The increasingly incestuous relationship between the elements of war 
and those of peace and the incorporation of the former into the private 
lives of citizens – a zeitgeist Nick Turse captured as the militarisation of 
MySpace in the context of a Dolce Vita War on Terror with Starbucks in 
Gitmo and iPods in iRaq28 – facilitated what the so-called lone wolves 
would come to embody. As Karen Dawisha notes: 
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Such an [imperial] expansion may, in the fullness of time, prove to 
have been irrational or unwise, but the original impulse to expand 
has to have been a conscious one on the part of the elites designed 
to serve what elites perceive to be state interests. Moreover, a policy 
of imperialism pursued by the centre is, of course, unlikely to be 
advertised as such, but it is important nevertheless to include in one’s 
conceptualisation of imperialism the effort by one country to wrest 
formal sovereignty by another. 
As Dawisha adds: ‘Discerning intent is particularly important in the case 
of those states which have a heritage of imperial behaviour or which are 
geographically large and economically powerful. Failure to consider the 
motivation of elites in the metropole, therefore, would lead one to blur the 
conceptual distinction between, for example, French policies in Algeria 
before and after independence.’29 To not do this, and link it to an under-
standing of IS, is to continue to foster conceptual limitations as we go into 
the next phase of these issues. 
The new terrorism will be fuelled by the apathetic tolerance and 
acceptance of the securitisation logic, as it became cemented in the first 
20 years of this century under the pretext of putting down the terrorism 
performed successively by Al Qaeda and IS. As surveillance has become 
glamorised and the militarised state popularised through skilful control, 
futuristic fictions with fascist imagery – such as the science-fiction 
film Starship Troopers (1997), featuring soldiers fighting giant bugs in 
desert campaigns – become a narrative whose iconography can now be 
understood at face value, and its second degree lost. The new terrorism 
will thus want to punish its own society – echoing its Anarchist ancestor – 
while equally seeking publicity and one’s Warholesque 15 minutes of fame. 
If Al Qaeda ever resurfaces it will be under the leadership of Bin Laden’s 
son, Hamza (born in 1989) – who has already issued five statements 
since 2015 (on 13 August 2015, on 11 May and 12 July 2016 and on 13 
and 20 May 2017) threatening the West – or someone claiming a direct 
nominal legacy. (Entitled ‘We Are All Osama’, Hamza Bin Laden’s July 
2016 message gave an indication of the anchoring of his project into the 
father figure of the movement and the importance attached to lineage.) 
If, for its part, IS re-emerges in the future, it will be under a logic of 
reappropriation and reinterpretation, with groups possibly leading it from 
anywhere in the world, featuring potential names such as the New Islamic 
State, the Real Islamic State or indeed Islamic State in the United States.
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Pensamiento Nuevo on Terrorism
Paradoxes abounded as IS pursued its project, apparently dictating the 
terms of engagement but gradually losing control of its destiny by virtue 
of its actions – just as Al Qaeda had. It can be maintained that in effect IS 
lost control of its own story the moment it called upon those in the West 
to rise up – that is, at its formal birth on 29 June 2014. The willed incor-
poration of that dimension was not merely about numbers or soldiery; it 
brought with it another, different and unexpected story. The coexistence 
of the middle aged former Ba’athist officer with the youngster from the 
French suburbs could not remain steady and cogent in the coproduction 
of violence, and carried with it the seeds of an inevitable transformation 
of the IS entity – an evolution which would, more importantly, play on the 
international dimension. In that sense, IS was intimately and inherently 
hybrid and Western as much as Oriental, and its statist architecture – for 
all its anchoring in colourful Islamic history – more modern and Western.
Above and beyond its specific history, or the complexity, mutation and 
novelty it has displayed, IS has raised the deeper question of understanding 
terrorism contemporaneously. Slowly, throughout the 1990s and in 
accelerated fashion in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, an internationalised 
‘politicisation of expertise’30 around terrorism has come to frame thinking 
on terrorism in increasingly dogmatic, taboo-filled and self-referential 
terms preventing a proper, clinical social sciences discussion of what has 
been developing as a consequential remaking of international affairs. 
The resulting discussion on terrorism, and the misleading safety of the 
familiar which this debate carries, are the products of a specific historical 
moment and the continuation of an earlier, conceptually incomplete 
construct of international relations. In either mode, this does not help 
the social scientist grasp the meaning of what new violence is playing out, 
and indeed how past violence shaped it. More insidiously, the previous 
offerings prevent that search by avoiding the obvious political questions 
raised by political violence. The discussion on terrorism is similarly stuck 
in a dynamic whereby positions and assumptions confine most analysts to 
Manichean logics of bipolarity; attack and defence, rise and fall, emergence 
and disappearance, us and them. Alongside one-dimensional official 
pronouncements and sensationalistic journalistic stories, the dominant, 
think tank analyses function on a mode that principally documents the 
dangerousness of the terrorists and offers advice as how to combat and 
defeat them. Primarily as a result of such heavy-handed push, another 
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group of analysts, while bringing more context, flesh out the complexity 
of the environments in which these terrorists operate or came into being, 
but also end up discussing the groups themselves atomistically and the 
ways to neutralise them. In either mode, the discussion is excessively 
actor-led (us or them), immediate (the urgency of the policy questions) 
and driven by a desire to close the problem (by terminating, one way or 
the other, the trouble-maker). A third difficulty, noticed earlier in the 
cases of both the nationalist terrorism of the 1950s and the transnational 
Islamist terrorism of the 2000s, is the manner in which the terms of the 
discussion proceed top-down, North-South and centre-periphery, with 
terrorism qualitatively identified as a threat to the former set of (developed 
and democratic) nations proceeding from the (underdeveloped and 
dangerous) lands of the latter. If, in recent years, many in the South – 
among both state and civil society actors – have displayed a discourse 
about terrorism close enough to their partners in the North, it remains 
the fact that terrorism is overwhelmingly associated with the ‘troubled 
spots’ of the South, and specifically with the most recent phase in the 
Middle East and with Islam. In effect, any thinking on what terrorism is 
and what it is today is paralysed by these three anchors. 
Such analytical self-limitation is no longer tenable. Its cementing 
in recent years, as IS vigorously pursued its design and as counter-
terrorism increasingly turned authoritarian, risks producing a new 
generation of researchers that do not even see or entertain the possibility 
of thinking beyond those specific configurations of the discussion. 
Breaking through the current dumbed-down, formulaic, actor-specific, 
politically sanitised, culturalist, commercial, Manichean, racialised and 
a-historical representation of terrorism is an urgent intellectual project. 
Building on the Argentinian philosopher Rodolfo Kusch’s concept and 
the discussion of his work by Walter Mignolo,31 what must be embarked 
on, in such a context, is a form of pensamiento proprio on terrorism – that 
is, independent and comparative critical thinking on political violence 
derived from full, non-culturalised intellectual agency and away from the 
ambient politicisation and securitisation of the topic. Such a project would 
not be a subjective and reactive interpretative framework, but rather an 
attempt at deciphering what terrorism – beyond the sterile and ultimately 
circular debates on its definition or subjectivity – has come to encompass 
two decades into the twenty-first century and several generations after 
the Russian Anarchists linked that violence with modernity. Elaborating 
this new matrix, a pensamiento – not merely proprio but also nuevo – 
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on terrorism implies the articulation of a new ‘regime of knowledge’, 
to use another related concept developed by Hamid Dabashi.32 At the 
heart of this exercise stand the twin challenges of coming to terms with 
the political power of the term itself and the tensions of the dominant 
articulations of ‘terrorism’ and ‘counter-terrorism’.33 The violence of 
IS lays at our feet the responsibility of deciphering and attempting an 
enabling delinking of this sort to help further thinking on violence as it 
mutates before our eyes in the North and in the South. The dominant 
conceptual framework that exists about terrorism is not easy to engage 
with in such a project, as it is resistant, protected by policy, convenient 
for media representations and further anchored in a deeper and more 
problematic construct of international relations. The latter aspect is where 
the intellectual battle must be fought. International affairs, as they are 
taught today, do not adequately take account of their own historical lineage 
and eschew that interrogation as a non-issue, which prevents us from 
identifying newcomers such as IS. Specifically, the spatio-temporalities 
that international relations established historically are Eurocentric and, as 
such, do not allow for a proper representation of time and space as they 
are conceived – particularly as regards conflict – and as they are occupied 
by actors from elsewhere.34 Similarly, the disappearing and erasing of 
colonialism from the contemporary international affairs discussion 
prevents a granular mapping of violence, new and old. The question of 
colonial domination has, for instance, shifted from the moral and political 
field to the study of its diversity and its administrative practices. Current 
developments make it imperative to reintroduce discussion about the 
former, namely the history and ethics behind current policies of the great 
powers and the political dynamics underscoring them, inasmuch as they 
generate counter-violence that is now taking the form of transnational 
militarised terrorism. The mutation of the conflict scene and of terrorism 
itself also explains, in a historicised way, the so-called ‘nexus’ question, 
because the increased interface between terrorism and criminality in 
recent years also has a deeper history. Where terrorism went up in the 
post-9/11 period, the interface similarly increased, notably in the Sahel 
and in the Middle East, with more and more influence on the cartels’ 
modus operandi, as witnessed from Ciudad Juárez to Raqqa by way of 
Marseilles and Kidal.35
Such a proposed episteme is not about (Southern) emancipation or 
independence, it is about inquiry proper and laying an objective claim 
on conceptualisation and codification – an inquiry into terrorism that 
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would seek to decipher its nature, not remain indexical, derivative and 
ultimately compromised by the politics it is meant to study. What, in 
effect, can we ultimately say about the political violence in the South 
beyond its anti-nature? What silences or unexplored knowledges are 
still beyond the reach of the analyst as he or she looks into Algiers 
circa 1957, Munich 1972, New York 2001, Paris 2015 or London 2017, 
beyond the desire to punish through killing? What dwells into those 
clashes? Can a post-post-colonial frame be built beyond the confines of 
an identity and finger-pointing critique, standing on its own? Structural 
racism constitutive of international relations, which also presided 
over the birth of international law,36 had provided context for the 
discussion of the emerging challenge posed by radical violent Islamism 
since the 1980s. In such a context, where critical thought is regarded 
suspiciously – particularly as regards security issues – the mapping 
has proceeded according to a combination of amnesia and absence 
of accountability.37 These two aspects cannot be overstated – and are 
indeed understated, if not invisibilised in technocratic terrorology and 
a-historicised security studies more broadly. In truth, when it comes 
to terrorism generally and IS more specifically, metropolis-centric 
standards remain largely unquestioned. They suffuse this discussion, as 
interaction is still considered to be one way. The travails of Western 
societies, put under pressure by the terrorist violence and by hordes of 
migrants, are carefully considered in analyses that discuss the limits of 
cosmopolitanism, economic imperatives and the evolving rights of a 
citizenry in a democracy – but seldom is attention given to the original 
non-Southern human security impulse of that migration or the deeper 
political sources of that violence. However, in and of itself, and for all 
its urgent need, critique of these problematic limits remains inevitably 
derivative, taking its cue on that most elusive ‘T’ thing from imperial 
politics and securitisation. The fullness of the conceptualisation of the 
terrorism issue and the panorama of its overarching performance must 
lie elsewhere and cannot be limited to their – admittedly legitimate, as 
one prerogative – interpretation by the Western metropolis; or indeed 
confined to a Southern reactive critique of that interpretation (equally 
legitimate, as another’s prerogative). Beyond hubris and paraphernalia, 
the greener pastures of intellectual penetration that comparatively map 
a new socio-historical topography of the political violence conundrum 
lie ahead for the social sciences. Theorising IS, rather than storytelling or 
merely documenting its obvious terrorising violence, can help us make 
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sense of these larger and more important issues. Such efforts can lead 
us beyond, to question the dominant gaze on this group and see in it 
signs of our times, whereby violence moves back and forth, power is 
uncertain, discourse is virtual, meaning is evanescent, strategy is elusive 
and trajectories are uncontrollable. These larger issues stand at the heart 
of the discussion on terrorism and possible ways to understand IS.
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ansar companions
‘asabiyya social solidarity, cohesion, consciousness
ba’ath  renaissance
bay’a oath of allegiance to a leader






emir leader, commander, ruler
fard religious obligation
fatwa religious ruling
fedai, fedayeen combatant(s), usually associated with Palestinians in 
the 1970s




imam (Sunni) worship leader or scholar; no clergy status










madrassa school; often associated with religious or Qur’anic 
schools
maghreb western part of the Arab world; the North African 
states


















salafism conservative reform branch in Sunni Islam
shaqi toughman
shari’a Islamic religious law from the Qur’an and the 
Prophet’s sayings
sharif, shurafa nobleman/men usually associated with descendants 
of the Prophet
shaykh elder, leader, governor; connoting age, wisdom and 
leadership
Shi’a second-largest denomination of Islam
sulta power
Sunna largest denomination of Islam




tawhid effort at religious unity
thawra  revolution
‘ulama Muslim scholars








24 December The Soviet Union invades Afghanistan. 
1984
Abdallah Yusuf al ‘Azzam, later joined by Ayman al Dhawahiri and Osama 
Bin Laden, establishes the Maktab al Khadamat in Peshawar, Pakistan, 
to raise funds and recruit foreign mujahedeen to fight against the Soviet 
Union in Afghanistan.
1988
11 August Osama bin Laden and associates set up Al Qaeda during a 
meeting in Peshawar, Pakistan, with Ayman al Dhawahiri, 
Abdullah al ‘Azzam and Sayyed Imam al Sharif. The stated 
ambition of the group is to keep jihad alive after the defeat 
of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.
1989
15 February The last Soviet Union troops withdraw from Afghanistan. 
December Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi travels to Afghanistan to join the 
mujahedeen. He works initially for an Islamist newspaper, 
Al Bunyan al Marsous, and later receives training at the Sada 
camp, in eastern Afghanistan, run by Mohamed Atef, Al 
Qaeda’s military chief.
1993
January Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi returns to Jordan. 
Autumn Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi, along with cleric Abu Mohammad 
al Maqdisi, establish the militant group Bay’at al Imam in 
Jordan.
1994
29 March Jordanian Security Services arrest Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi 
for his participation in Bay’at al Imam and for possession of 
explosives and weapons. 
1996




18 March King Abdullah II of Jordan releases Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi 
from prison as part of a general amnesty for political 
prisoners.
Summer Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi travels to Pakistan where he is 
briefly imprisoned by the Pakistani authorities and has his 
visa revoked.
October Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi moves to Kabul, Afghanistan, 
following his release from prison. 
12 December Jordanian police arrest 16 Al Qaeda militants planning to 
bomb four tourist locations in Jordan around the time of the 
millennium. Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi is involved in planning 
the attacks.
Late Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi establishes a militant training camp 
in Herat, Afghanistan, reportedly with US$200,000 of seed 
money given by Osama bin Laden. The camp allegedly 
trained fighters for his new militant group Jama’at al Tawhid 
wal Jihad (Organisation of Monotheism and Jihad).
2001
11 September In an Al Qaeda-organised operation conducted by 19 
kamikazes, two hijacked planes destroy New York’s World 
Trade Centre Twin Towers and another plunges into the 
Pentagon. A fourth hijacked plane crashes in Pennsylvania. 
Close to 3,000 people are killed.
7 October The United States and the United Kingdom launch military 
operations in Afghanistan aimed at removing the Taliban 
from power. Al Jazeera airs a taped message by Osama Bin 
Laden: ‘America will no longer be safe’.
2 December A Sudanese national fires a Stinger missile at a US aeroplane 
inside the Prince Sultan airbase in Saudi Arabia.
12 December Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi flees from Afghanistan with a 
number of his followers and establishes himself in Mashad, 
Iran by January 2002. 
22 December A British national of Sri Lankan origin, Richard C. Reid, 
attempts to blow up American Airlines flight 63 from Paris 
to Miami, using C-4 explosives inserted in one of his shoes.
2002
11 February The Jordanian Security Court sentences Abu Mus’ab al 
Zarqawi to 15 years in prison in absentia, for his participa-
tion in the failed millennium attacks on four tourist sites in 
Jordan.
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28 March Abu Zubayda, senior member of Al Qaeda and coordinator 
of the August 1998 attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi 
and Dar es Salaam, is arrested in Faisalabad, Afghanistan.
March Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi arrives in Baghdad to receive 
medical treatment and stays for at least two months to fully 
convalesce.
11 April A truck bomb attack is conducted by Tunisian Islamist 
Nizar Naouar against the Al Ghriba synagogue on the island 
of Jerba in Tunisia, killing 21 individuals, including 14 
German tourists.
8 May In Karachi, Pakistan, a bomb explodes in front of the 
Sheraton Hotel killing 14 individuals, eleven of whom are 
French naval construction engineers.
14 June A bomb explodes in front of the US consulate in Karachi 
killing twelve people and wounding 45.
5 July An Egyptian national opens fire on the offices of the Israeli 
airline El Al at Los Angeles airport killing two individuals.
9 September Al Jazeera airs a videotape in which Bin Laden details the 
11 September 2001 operation and the identity of its 19 
perpetrators.
6 October A bomb attack takes place against a French oil tanker, the 
Limburg, near Sana’a, Yemen.
8 October A group of American soldiers is attacked on the island of 
Failaka near Kuwait City, Kuwait. One US soldier is killed.
12 October A bomb attack takes place at a nightclub in Bali, Indonesia, 
killing 202 people, mostly Australian tourists.
28 October Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi organises the assassination of 
Laurence Foley, an American diplomat, outside his home in 
Amman, Jordan. 
12 November Osama Bin Laden delivers an audio speech in which he 
declares to Western governments: ‘As you kill, you shall be 
killed’.
21 November In Kuwait City, a Kuwaiti policeman fires on two US 
soldiers, gravely wounding them.
28 November In Mombasa, Kenya, two SAM-7 missiles are fired on 
a Boeing 757 of the Israeli charter company Arkia. 
Simultaneously, a car bomb attack takes place outside the 
Paradise Hotel where several Israeli tourists reside. The 
assault kills 18 individuals including three Israelis.
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30 December Three US physicians are killed in Jibla, south of Sana’a in 
Yemen, by a Yemeni university student.
2003
21 January A US citizen is killed and another wounded during an 
ambush near Kuwait City.
1 March Khaled Sheikh Mohammad, planner of the 11 September 
attacks, is arrested in Rawalpindi, near Islamabad, Pakistan.
5 February Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, labels Abu Mus’ab 
al Zarqawi as a link between Al Qaeda and Iraqi President 
Saddam Hussein, during a speech before the United Nations 
Security Council making the case for waging war against 
Iraq. 
20 March The United States and the United Kingdom invade Iraq.
9 April Baghdad falls to the US Army.
12 May In Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, the Al Hamra residential complex, 
housing Americans and Britons, is the target of three bomb 
attacks, which kill 39 individuals including twelve US 
citizens; 149 are wounded.
16 May In Casablanca, Morocco, 14 suicide bombers conduct five 
simultaneous attacks on the Belgian Consulate, the Spanish 
cultural centre (Casa de España), an Italian restaurant 
(housed in the Hotel Farah-Maghreb) and the Israeli Circle 
Alliance; 45 people are killed and 100 wounded.
5 August A car bomb targets the Hotel Marriott in Jakarta, Indonesia, 
killing 15 and wounding 150.
7 August Jama’at al Tawhid wal Jihad detonate a truck bomb outside 
the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad. Seventeen people die 
and at least 40 people are injured. 
19 August A Jama’at al Tawhid wal Jihad suicide bomber drives a 
truck bomb into the headquarters of the United Nations 
Assistance Mission in Iraq. The United Nations’ Special 
Representative in Iraq Sergio Vieira de Mello is killed in the 
attack along with 21 others. 
29 August Jama’at al Tawhid wal Jihad detonate two car bombs outside 
the Shi’a Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf. The attack injures 500 
and kills at least 95 people including Ayatollah Mohammad 
Baqir al Hakim, the leader of the Shi’a political party 
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. 
8 November In Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a bomb attack targets a residential 
building housing foreign diplomats; 17 individuals are 
killed and 120 wounded.
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12 November Jama’at al Tawhid wal Jihad detonates a truck bomb outside 
the Italian paramilitary police headquarters in Nasiriya, 
Iraq. Twenty-two people are killed, including 17 Italian 
soldiers, and more than 100 are injured.
15 November In Istanbul, Turkey, a truck bomb attack takes place against 
two synagogues, killing 24 and wounding 300.
20 November Two car bombs target the British Consulate and the British 
bank HSBC in Istanbul; 27 people are killed and 400 
wounded.
2004
2 March On the day of ‘Ashura, a holy day in Shi’a Islam, nine Jama’at 
al Tawhid wal Jihad suicide bombers blow themselves up 
in Karbala, Iraq, killing 120 people. In Baghdad, three 
Jama’at al Tawhid wal Jihad car bombs are detonated outside 
the Kadhimiya shrine, killing 58 people. Both attacks are 
followed by sustained mortar and rocket fire and more than 
500 people are injured in the two operations. 
6 April Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi releases an audiotape online 
claiming responsibility for a number of attacks, including 
the United Nations’ bombings. A Jordanian court sentences 
Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi and six others to death in absentia, 
for the killing of Laurence Foley in October 2002.
11 March Four simultaneous attacks, claimed by the European wing 
of Al Qaeda, take place in Madrid. Between 7.39 and 7.55 
am, ten bombs planted in four different trains explode at 
the Atocha, El Pozo, Alcalá de Henares and Santa Eugenia 
stations killing 190 and wounding 1,434 individuals.
15 April In an audio message aired by the Arabic satellite channels Al 
Arabiya and Al Jazeera, Bin Laden renews his commitment 
to fight the United States and offers to ‘cease operations’ 
against those European countries that would stop 
‘aggressions against Muslims’. The truce proposal is rejected 
by European leaders.
28 April The American TV show 60 Minutes publishes photos of US 
Army soldiers and CIA personnel committing human rights 
violations, including torture, sodomy and sexual abuse, 
against detainees in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. 
1 May An oil refinery in Yanbu, Saudi Arabia, is attacked by 
gunmen targeting senior executives at the facility, partly 
owned by Exxon Mobil. Five foreigners are killed, including 
two Americans.
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11 May The website Muntada al Ansar airs a video titled Abu Mus’ab 
al Zarqawi Slaughters an American. The five-minute video 
shows al Zarqawi beheading American hostage Nick Berg, 
a freelance radio-tower repairman, and threatening further 
deaths as retaliation for the torture at Abu Ghraib prison. 
17 May A Jama’at al Tawhid wal Jihad car bomb kills Ezzedine 
Salim, the president of the Governing Council of Iraq, in 
Baghdad.
29 May In Khobar, Saudi Arabia, gunmen attack a building housing 
Western companies’ offices killing 22 individuals.
18 June A Jama’at al Tawhid wal Jihad car bomb targets the new 
Iraqi army recruitment centre in Baghdad. Thirty-five 
civilians are killed and 145 wounded. US engineer Paul 
M. Johnson Jr is abducted and beheaded in Jeddah, Saudi 
Arabia.
22 June Al Jazeera receives a video showing Jama’at al Tawhid wal 
Jihad decapitating South Korean hostage Kim Sun-il. The 
group had kidnapped Sun-il in Fallujah, Iraq on 30 May and 
demanded that South Korea withdraw its 660 medics from 
Iraq and cancel plans to send 3,000 more soldiers to Iraq, in 
return for Sun-il’s release.
July The US government increases the bounty for information 
leading to Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi’s capture from US$10 
million to US$25 million. 
1 August Six Jama’at al Tawhid wal Jihad car bombs target Christian 
parishioners as they are leaving evening mass at two 
churches in Mosul and Baghdad. Twelve people are killed 
and 71 injured.
14 September A Jama’at al Tawhid wal Jihad car bomb hits a market in 
Haifa Street, Baghdad, near a police station. The attack kills 
47 people and wounds 114.
7 October  Jama’at al Tawhid wal Jihad posts a video online showing 
the beheading of British hostage Ken Bigley. Jama’at al 
Tawhid wal Jihad had previously released three videos 
showing Bigley directly calling on British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair to intervene and release all Iraqi female prisoners 
held by the International Coalition.
27 October Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi swears a bay’a (pledge of allegiance) 
to Osama bin Laden. Jama’at al Tawhid wal Jihad is renamed 
Tandhim Qaedat al Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn, commonly 
known as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). 
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7 November American and Iraqi troops begin a two-month operation, 
codenamed Operation Fajr, to take control of Fallujah from 
AQI and other insurgent groups. A total of 107 American, 
British and Iraqi soldiers die and 613 are wounded during 
the battle, while around 1,200 militants are killed and 
another 1,500 captured. 
December Abu Bakr al Baghdadi is released from Camp Bucca 
detention centre, where he was held as a civilian detainee 
for eight months. (A different possible date for al Baghdadi’s 
release is September 2009, see below.) 
2005
30 January Elections are held for the National Assembly of Iraq. AQI 
launches over 100 attacks on polling stations, killing over 44 
people. 
2 April AQI attacks the US-run Abu Ghraib prison with two suicide 
car bombs and combined grenade and small arms fire. 
Two American soldiers are killed and approximately 44 are 
wounded in the attack.
7 July Coordinated explosions take place in three underground 
trains and one double-decker bus in central London, killing 
56 people and injuring 700. AQI releases a video stating that 
it had killed Egypt’s ambassador to Iraq, Ihab El-Sharif.
9 July Ayman al Dhawahiri, the deputy leader of Al Qaeda, sends 
a letter to Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi encouraging him to stop 
publicising AQI attacks on the Shi’a and to tone down the 
group’s enforcement of Sharia law.
23 July Three bombs are detonated in the Egyptian resort city of 
Sharm el Sheikh, killing 63 people. Two of the bombs target 
resort hotels housing Western tourists and the third goes off 
in the city’s marketplace.
19 August Attackers fire Katushka rockets in the Jordanian port city 
of Aqaba, narrowly missing a US Navy ship, and killing a 
Jordanian security guard in a dockside warehouse. Two 
rockets are fired into the nearby Israeli port city of Eliat, 
causing minor damage.
14 September Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi releases an audio tape declaring 
an ‘all-out war’ against the Shi’a in Iraq, on the same day 
that AQI launches a dozen attacks on Baghdad, killing 160 
people.
1 October Three suicide bombers strike tourist restaurants in Bali in 
Indonesia, killing 20.
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9 November Three AQI suicide bombers detonate themselves at the 
Radisson SAS, Grand Hyatt and Days Inn hotel in Amman, 
Jordan. Sixty people die and 115 are injured in the attacks. 
29 December AQI militants fire rockets on Israel, killing five soldiers.
2006
7 January Al Jazeera airs a message by Ayman al Dhawahiri in which 
he claims that George W. Bush has lost the war in Iraq.
15 January The website Hanin.net announces the creation of the 
Mujahideen Shura Council, a coalition of six Iraqi Sunni 
insurgent groups, including AQI. Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi is 
appointed the leader of the council.
19 January In an audiotape message aired by Al Jazeera, Osama Bin 
Laden offers a truce to the United States and threatens new 
attacks inside the United States.
22 February AQI detonates two bombs in the al Askari Mosque, the 
third-holiest site in Shi’a Islam, located in Samarra, Iraq. No 
one is injured but the bombings spark sectarian clashes, in 
which over 1,000 people die within the first week after the 
attack.
30 January Al Jazeera airs a video message by Ayman al Dhawahiri in 
which, referring to Bin Laden’s 19 January statement, he 
declares: ‘Osama Bin Laden offered you a decent exit from 
your dilemma but your leaders insist on throwing you in 
battles’.
25 April Al Jazeera airs a half-hour videotape recording of Abu 
Mus’ab al Zarqawi, shown with his men in the Iraqi desert, 
in which he refers to the truce offer made by Bin Laden to 
the United States (‘our leader Osama Ben Laden may Allah 
protect him, had offered you a long truce. It would have 
been better for you and those who are with you if you had 
accepted, but your arrogance pushed you to refuse’). In the 
same message, al Zarqawi also indicates plans to establish 
‘an Islamic State’ (dawla islamiya) in Iraq.
28 April Al Jazeera airs a videotape message by Ayman al Dhawahiri, 
originally posted on a website, in which he claims that AQI 
has conducted 800 operations in three years and that this 
effort has ‘broken the back of the United States’ in Iraq.
20 May Nouri al Maliki is appointed prime minister of Iraq. 
7 June Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi and several of his men are killed by 
a US airstrike on a house near Baquba, Iraq. Abu Hamza 
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al Muhajir is appointed the new leader of the Mujahideen 
Shura Council.
16 June The Mujahideen Shura Council kidnaps two American 
soldiers from a checkpoint in Iraq.
1 July Al Jazeera airs an audiotaped message by Bin Laden in 
which he calls on Abu Hamza al Muhajir to pursue attacks 
on Americans.
12 July The sixth Arab–Israeli war starts. It takes place between 
the state of Israel and the Lebanese non-state, armed group 
Hezbollah and lasts 33 days.
September Thirty Sunni tribes in the Anbar province in Iraq form the 
Anbar Awakening Council in order to fight the Mujahideen 
Shura Council. The group is later integrated into the US 
Army’s surge strategy.
11 September Al Dhawahiri announces that the Algerian Islamist 
organisation originally set up in 1998 and known as the 
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat has joined the 
ranks of Al Qaeda.
15 October The Mujahideen Shura Council announces the creation of 
the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), with Abu Omar al Baghdadi 
as its first Emir. Abu Hamza al Muhajir shortly after 
announces the disbanding of the Mujahideen Shura Council 
in favour of ISI.
December ISI declares Baqubah city, in the Diyala province, as its 
capital.
30 December Saddam Hussein is executed by hanging in Camp Justice, 
a joint Iraqi-American base, on Eid al Adha, the holiest 
celebration day for Sunni Muslims. 
2007
10 January US President George W. Bush announces a new ‘surge’ 
strategy in Iraq, providing 20,000 additional US soldiers to 
Baghdad and Anbar provinces in order to remove Sunni 
insurgents, including ISI.
11 January The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat announces 
that it is formally changing its name to Al Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).
18 June After engagements had started in March, around 8,000 
US and Iraqi troops begin Operation Arrowhead Ripper, a 
five-month operation to rout ISI from Baqubah.
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25 June An ISI suicide bomber attacks a meeting of Anbar tribal 
leaders at the Mansour Hotel, Baghdad. Thirteen people die 
in the attack.
14 September ISI assassinates Sheikh Abdul Satter Abu Risha, the leader 
of the Anbar Awakening Council, and threatens to kill other 
tribal leaders who cooperate with US or Iraqi government 
forces.
22 October Al Qaeda’s media branch, Al Sihab, releases an audio 
message of Osama Bin Laden addressed to the Iraqi people.
2008
8 January Multinational forces launch the seven-month Operation 
Phantom Phoenix in Diyala, Salah al Din, Kirkuk and 
Nineveh provinces to oust remaining elements of ISI from 
these areas. During this operation 890 ISI militants are 
killed and more than 2,500 captured. 
13 January The Iraqi parliament passes legislation allowing former 
members of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party to be employed 
by the state and the military.
25 March Muqtada al Sadr, leader of the Shi’a militia Mahdi Army, 
launches a nationwide civil disobedience campaign, 
following a crackdown by Prime Minister al Maliki and the 
Iraqi security forces.
2 June Al Qaeda claims the bombing of the Danish embassy 
in Pakistan in which six people perish. Al Qaeda in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan leader Mustapha Abu al Yazid 
issue a statement indicating that the attack was in retaliation 
for the publishing in Denmark of cartoons negatively 
depicting the Prophet Mohammad.
29 July A Pashtu-language Pakistani television channel reports that 
deputy Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Dhawahiri was killed 
in a 28 July US airstrike on a madrassa in the Pakistani 
tribal belt along the Afghan border. The information is not 
confirmed.
1 September The US hand control of the Sunni-majority Anbar province 
to the Iraqi government. 
17 November The US and Iraqi governments sign the US-Iraq Status 
of Forces Agreement, stipulating the withdrawal of US 
troops from all Iraqi cities by 30 June 2009 and a complete 
withdrawal of all US troops from Iraq by the end of 2011.
26 November In a series of coordinated attacks lasting three days across 
Mumbai, India, Lashkar-e-Taiba militants landing in 
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speedboats kill 164 people in two hotels, the city’s train 
station, a café, a Jewish centre, a hospital and the port area.
2009
7 January US Army Major Nidal Malik Hassan, who had been in 
contact with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
cleric Anwar al ‘Awlaki, kills 13 people at the US Fort Hood 
military installation in Texas.
19 August ISI launches three coordinated car bombs and mortar 
strikes on the Iraqi Foreign and Finance Ministries in 
Baghdad. At least 101 people die in the attack and 550 are 
injured. 
27 August A suicide bombing by AQAP targeting Saudi Arabia’s 
Assistant Interior Minister is thwarted in Riyadh.
September The US releases Abu Bakr al Baghdadi from Camp Bucca 
prison, when the entire camp is officially closed down. (A 
different possible date for al Baghdadi’s release is December 
2004, see above.) 
25 December A Nigerian national, Umar Farouk Abdulmuttalab, with 
connections with the AQAP, attempts to trigger a bomb on 
board Delta Flight 253 flying from Amsterdam to Detroit.
2010
18 April The US launches an airstrike on an ISI safe house near 
Tikrit, Iraq, killing both Abu Hamza al Muhajir and Abu 
Omar al Baghdadi.
1 May A US national and budget analyst of Pakistani origin, Faisal 
Shahzad, attempts a foiled car bombing in Times Square, 
New York.
16 May Abu Bakr al Baghdadi is named as the new leader of ISI.
27 October Al Jazeera airs a statement attributed to Bin Laden in which 
he threatens to attack France if French troops do not leave 
Afghanistan.
29 October Two mail packages containing explosives are discovered on 
board cargo planes bound from Yemen to the United States. 
AQAP claims the foiled operation.
31 October ISI fighters launch an attack on the Our Lady of Salvation 
Syriac Catholic Church in Baghdad with explosives and 
light weapons, killing 58 people and injuring 78. An ISI 
announcement states that the attack was in revenge for an 
Egyptian Muslim convert who was being held against her 
will in a Coptic Christian church in Egypt. 
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2011
2 March Arid Uka, a Kosovo Albanian living in Germany, shoots 
and kills two United States Air Force airmen at Frankfurt 
airport.
2 May The United States announces that in Abbottabad, Pakistan, 
US Navy SEALs have stormed a compound, killing Osama 
bin Laden and four other people. 
3 June In Hama, Syria, around 50,000 people participate in ‘Friday 
of the Children’ protests against the Syrian regime. The 
protest was sparked by the Syrian army’s killing a number of 
children in Dar’aa for spraying anti-government graffiti on 
the town’s walls. 
16 June Al Qaeda announces formally that Ayman al Dhawahiri has 
been appointed as its new leader. 
August Abu Bakr al Baghdadi sends a cell of ISI fighters to Syria, 
led by Abu Mohammad al Jolani, in order to establish a new 
Syrian branch. 
4 October The US Department of State names Abu Bakr al Baghdadi 
as a ‘specially-designated global terrorist’ and offers a 
reward of US$10 million for information about his location.
18 December The last 500 US troops leave Iraq, completing the 
withdrawal of US combat troops. The next day Shi’a Prime 
Minister Nuri al Maliki issues an arrest warrant for former 
Sunni Vice President Tariq al Hashemi on charges of 
running a death squad that killed Shi’a political opponents. 
The Sunni bloc in parliament begins a boycott that brings 
the government to a standstill. 
2012
23 January In Syria, Abu Mohammad al Jolani formally announces 
the creation of his group Jabhat al Nusra li Ahl al Shaam 
(Support Front for the People of the Levant).
20 March ISI launches a wave of mortar, improvised explosive device, 
car bomb and shooting attacks across ten cities in Iraq, 
including Baghdad, Kirkuk and Ramadi, targeting Shi’a 
civilians and security institutions. Fifty-two people are 
killed and over 250 are injured.
21 July Abu Bakr al Baghdadi announces the launch of ISI’s 
‘Breaking the Walls’ campaign, aiming to both target 
institutions of the Iraqi government and free ISI members 
from government prisons. Over the course of a year, ISI 
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conducts six prison breaks and 24 car bomb attacks against 
government institutions.
28 December Tens of thousands of Sunni Iraqis participate in ‘Friday 
of Honour’ protests across ten cities against the sectarian 
policies and actions of Shi’a Prime Minister Maliki’s 
government.
2013
8 April Abu Bakr al Baghdadi releases an audio statement online 
announcing that Jabhat al Nusra has always been a 
subsidiary of ISI and that the two groups are merging to 
form Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
9 April Abu Mohammad al Jolani rejects the merger and claims that 
Jabhat al Nusra was created by ISI. Al Jolani reconfirms his 
pledge of allegiance to Ayman al Dhawahiri and Jabhat al 
Nusra’s loyalty to Al Qaeda.
9 June Al Jazeera publishes a letter written by Ayman al Dhawahiri 
to the leaders of Jabhat al Nusra and ISIS. Al Dhawahiri 
states that Abu Bakr al Baghdadi was wrong to announce 
the merger without alerting Al Qaeda’s leadership and 
declares the merger between the two groups to be invalid. 
Al Dhawahiri orders ISIS fighters to return to Iraq and 
sends Khaled al Suri to act as a mediator between the two 
groups.
15 June Abu Bakr al Baghdadi releases an audio statement online 
rejecting the orders of Ayman al Dhawahiri to break up 
ISIS and to confine his activities to Iraq, stating that ‘I have 
chosen the command of my lord over the command in that 
letter which contradicts it’.
9 July ISIS gunmen assassinate one of the leaders of the Free 
Syrian Army, Kamal Hamimi, in Lattakia, Syria. 
21 July ISIS launch an attack on Abu Ghraib prison using twelve 
car bombs, in combination with mortar and rocket fire. 
ISIS successfully breaches the prison walls, allowing over 
800 prisoners to escape. Abu Bakr al Baghdadi announces 
the end of the ‘Breaking the Walls’ campaign immediately 
following this attack.
29 July ISIS announces the beginning of its new military campaign, 
‘The Soldiers’ Harvest’. This campaign has the twin aims 
of controlling territory and targeting Iraqi government 
security forces. 
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5 August ISIS fighters overrun government forces and take control of 
the Menagh Air Base outside of Aleppo, Syria.
September ISIS takes control of Azaz city, Syria, from Free Syrian Army 
fighters. 
22 November Seven Sunni Islamist groups, including Jaysh al Islam and 
Ahrar al Shaam, form a new alliance called the Islamic 
Front in order to protect themselves from attacks by both 
ISIS and the Syrian regime.
2014
4 January ISIS takes control of the majority of Fallujah and kills over 
100 people, displacing thousands of residents.
February ISIS ousts rebel groups from the remaining contested 
districts of Raqqa, Syria and subsequently designates Raqqa 
as its capital in Syria.
3 February Ayman al Dhawahiri publishes a letter stating that Al Qaeda 
has severed all links with ISIS and that it does not agree 
with and is not responsible for ISIS’s actions.
23 February ISIS assassinates Khaled al Suri, the cleric sent by Ayman al 
Dhawahiri to mediate between ISIS and Jabhat al Nusra, in 
a suicide bomb attack in Aleppo. 
April ISIS launches a mobile application called ‘Dawn of Glad 
Tidings’ on the Google Play Store. The application allows 
ISIS to send tens of thousands of tweets each day from par-
ticipating Twitter accounts and orchestrate advanced social 
media campaigns on Twitter.
24 May Mehdi Nemmouche, a French national of Algerian origin, 
shoots and kills three people at the Jewish Museum of 
Belgium in Brussels. Nemmouche spent one year fighting in 
Syria and recorded a video prior to the attack pledging his 
allegiance to ISIS.
5 June ISIS forces in Iraq and Syria begin their northern Iraq 
offensive by attacking Samarra, in the Salah al din province, 
and briefly taking control of the university and municipal 
building, before being repelled by the Iraqi government. 
4 June Approximately 1,500 ISIS fighters launch a seven-day 
operation to take control of Mosul, Iraq, from around 
30,000 government forces stationed in the city.
10 June ISIS takes full control of Mosul with the capture of 
Mosul International Airport and the desertion of the last 
remaining Iraqi security forces. ISIS loots the Mosul Central 
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Bank and seizes US$429 million. Around 500,000 Mosul 
residents flee the city during ISIS’s offensive. 
11 June ISIS fighters, travelling in around 60 vehicles, continue their 
advance from Mosul by attacking Tikrit and Baiji simulta-
neously. In Baiji, ISIS takes control of the majority of the 
town, except its oil refinery, before retreating the next day. 
ISIS takes full control of Tikrit, the birthplace of Saddam 
Hussein and capital of the Salah al din province, and 
releases 300 prisoners. 
12 June ISIS continues its advance and seizes ten cities in the Salah 
al din province. ISIS executes 1,500 Shi’a government forces 
based in Camp Speicher, Tikrit.
23 June ISIS captures Tal Afar airport and the town itself. 
24 June ISIS seizes control of the Baiji oil refinery, which produces a 
third of Iraq’s oil output, after ten days of fighting with Iraqi 
security forces and the final desertion of 400 soldiers from 
the Iraqi army 37th Brigade.
29 June ISIS posts an audio recording online declaring that it has 
established an Islamic Caliphate, that Abu Bakr al Baghdadi 
has been appointed as its first Caliph and that it has 
changed its name to the Islamic State (IS). The same day, the 
group releases two videos entitled Breaking the Borders and 
The End of Sykes–Picot, which show its fighters destroying 
several Syrian-Iraqi border posts in Qaim, Waleed and 
Traybil and declaring ‘the end of the colonial 1916 Sykes–
Picot agreement’.
3 July IS takes control of al Omar oilfield, the largest oilfield in 
Syria, from Jabhat al Nusra.
4 July IS publishes a video showing Abu Bakr al Baghdadi 
delivering the sermon at Friday noon prayers in al Nabi 
mosque, Mosul. Baghdadi introduces himself as Caliph, and 
calls on all Muslims around the world to join IS and unite 
behind him as their leader.
5 July IS releases online the first issue of its English-language 
magazine, Dabiq.
25 July IS overruns the 17th Syrian Division Military Base near 
Raqqa, Syria. IS beheads several soldiers and places their 
bodies in a square in central Raqqa. 
3 August IS conquers large parts of the Nineveh province and takes 
control of Sinjar city. The group kills over 5,000 Yazidi 
people during its takeover of Sinjar and takes thousands of 
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Yazidi women into captivity. Approximately 50,000 Yazidis 
flee to the Sinjar mountains where they are surrounded by 
IS fighters. 
7 August US President Barack Obama authorises targeted airstrikes 
against both IS positions threatening the city of Erbil and IS 
positions based around Mount Sinjar. President Obama also 
authorises air operations providing food and water to the 
Yazidis on Mount Sinjar. 
13 August The US announces that IS’s siege of the Yazidis on Mount 
Sinjar has ended with over 50,000 Yazidis escaping due to 
the actions of US airstrikes and Kurdish Peshmerga fighters.
16 August IS massacres 700 members of the Al Shaitat tribe in Deir 
Ezzor province, Syria, over a dispute about two oilfields. 
19 August IS’s Al Hayat Media Centre releases a video showing British 
IS fighter Mohammed Emwazi, nicknamed ‘Jihadi John’ in 
the press, beheading US journalist James Foley in response 
to US airstrikes in Iraq. Emwazi also states in the video that 
kidnapped US journalist Steven Sotloff would be executed if 
the US did not stop its airstrikes against IS. 
2 September IS’s Al Furqan Media releases a video showing Mohammed 
Emwazi beheading Steven Sotloff. The video also shows 
Emwazi threatening to kill British hostage David Haines 
if other foreign governments join the US bombing of IS 
positions. 
10 September US President Obama announces a new international 
coalition, an expansion of US air strikes in Iraq and the 
deployment of 475 military advisors to ‘degrade and 
ultimately destroy ISIS’. 
13 September IS releases a video titled A Message to the Allies of America 
showing ISIS militants beheading Steven Sotloff and 
threatening to execute British hostage Alan Henning next.
14 September Khaled Abu Suleiman, a leader of AQIM, announces that 
he is breaking with Al Qaeda and swearing allegiance to 
Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. He announces the creation of a new 
group called Junud al Khilafa fi Ard al Jazayer (Soldiers of 
the Caliphate in the Land of Algeria).
17 September IS begins a major offensive to capture the Kurdish town of 
Ayn al Arab/Kobani, Syria. 
18 September Abdul Numan Haider injures two policemen in a knife 
attack in Melbourne, Australia. Haider would be later 
profiled in IS’s Dabiq magazine. 
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19 September French President François Hollande authorises airstrikes 
against IS positions in Iraq.
20 September Junud al Khilafa fi Ard al Jazayer beheads French tourist 
Hervé Gourdel, whom they had previously kidnapped from 
the Djurdjura National Park in Kabylia, Algeria.
21 September Abu Mohammed al ‘Adnani, IS’s chief spokesperson, 
delivers a speech calling on all ISIS supporters to attack 
non-Muslims in whichever country they live.
22 September The United States, Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and 
the United Arab Emirates begin airstrikes against IS and 
Jabhat al Nusra positions in Syria. 
26 September The UK Parliament votes to participate in airstrikes against 
IS positions in Iraq.
3 October IS publishes a video online showing Mohammed Emwazi 
beheading Alan Henning in retribution for the UK’s 
bombing of IS positions. US citizen Peter Kassig is named as 
the next potential victim by IS. 
14 October IS captures the city of Hit, Iraq, after it was abandoned by 
the local Iraqi army garrison. 
20 October Martin Rouleau-Couture drives his car into two soldiers, 
killing one, in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec, Canada. 
Rouleau-Couture had expressed support for IS online.
22 October Michael Bibeau shoots and kills a soldier at the Canadian 
Parliament in Ottawa, Canada. Bibeau pledged his 
allegiance to IS in a video posted online. 
29 October IS executes 300 members of the Abu Nimr tribe in al Anbar 
province, Iraq.
31 October The UN releases a report stating that 15,000 foreign fighters 
from 80 countries have travelled to Iraq and Syria to join IS. 
8 November US President Obama orders an additional 1,500 troops to 
Iraq in order to support and train Iraqi government soldiers 
fighting IS.
10 November IS media outlets release five audio and text statements from 
groups of IS supporters in Libya, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, 
as well as from Junud al Khilafa in Algeria and Ansar Beit al 
Maqdis, a radical Islamist militant group based in the Sinai 
peninsula, Egypt. Each group pledges allegiance to IS and to 
Abu Bakr al Baghdadi as their Caliph.
13 November Abu Bakr al Baghdadi issues an online audio statement 
stating that IS has created new wilayat (provinces) in 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Algeria and Yemen. He also 
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acknowledges support from IS followers in Tunisia, the 
Philippines, Indonesia and Nigeria, and promises to 
establish wilayat shortly in those territories. 
16 November IS releases a video showing the decapitated body of Peter 
Kassig, killed in revenge for the US bombing of IS in Syria 
and Iraq. 
15 December Man Haron Monis, an Australian Iranian, takes 18 people 
hostage for 16 hours in a café in Sydney, Australia. Monis 
had previously pledged allegiance to IS. He kills one hostage 
and he and another hostage die in the police raid. 
20 December The Financial Times reports that IS military police executed 
100 foreign fighters who attempted to leave its capital in 
Raqqa, Syria. 
24 December IS fighters capture Jordanian pilot Muath al Kasasbeh 
outside of Raqqa, Syria, whose F-16 fighter aircraft crashed 
during a bombing sortie against IS targets.
2015
7 January Said Kouachi and Chérif Kouachi storm the offices of the 
magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris, France and kill twelve 
people, injuring eleven others. They declare that they ‘have 
avenged the Prophet’, following a series of satirical cartoons 
on Islam published by the magazine since 2006. They 
escape and are killed by French police two days later at an 
industrial-site printing office near Paris, where they hid to 
escape a large-scale manhunt. Chérif Kouachi tells the news 
television channel BFM, on a telephone call that morning, 
that he had been sent by AQAP. 
8–9 January Amedy Coulibaly shoots and kills a police officer in 
Montrouge district, Paris, France. Coulibaly subsequently 
takes 19 people hostage at a Kosher supermarket in Porte 
de Vincennes, Paris for several hours and kills four hostages 
before being shot dead during an assault conducted by 
French police. On 11 January, a video of Coulibaly is posted 
online in which he is seen pledging allegiance to IS and 
indicating that he was an acquaintance of the Charlie Hebdo 
attackers, Said and Chérif Kouachi.
9 January IS publishes an audio message praising the Charlie Hebdo 
magazine attacks in Paris. 
20 January IS releases a video showing kidnapped Japanese hostages 
Kenji Goto and Haruna Yukawa and demand a US$200 
million ransom within 72 hours from the Japanese 
government to secure their release.
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24 January IS publishes an image of Kenji Goto holding the decapitated 
head of Haruna Yukawa. IS demands the release of the 
arrested female Iraqi militant Sajida al Rishawi, detained in 
Jordan, in exchange for Kenji Goto.
26 January Abu Mohammed al ‘Adnani releases an audio statement 
announcing the creation of a new IS wilaya in Khorasan, a 
region historically incorporating parts of Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.
27 January Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPGs) and the Free 
Syrian Army regain control of Kobani from IS. 
31 January IS releases a video showing the beheading of Kenji Goto.
3 February IS’s Al Furqan Media releases a video showing Jordanian 
pilot Muath al Kasasbeh being burned alive in a cage. 
The video also shows the names and addresses of other 
Jordanian pilots that participated in air strikes and places a 
US$2,000 bounty on their heads.
4 February Jordan executes two AQI prisoners, including Sajida al 
Rishawi, in retaliation for the killing of Muath al Kasasbeh. 
King Abdullah of Jordan promises a ‘relentless war’ on IS 
and orders airstrikes against IS in Iraq.
14–15 February Omar Abdel Hamid El-Hussein fires on three locations in 
Copenhagen, including the Great Synagogue and a public 
forum with the Prophet Mohammad cartoonist Lars Vilks 
in attendance, killing two people. El-Hussein pledged 
allegiance to al Baghdadi in a video posted on his Facebook 
page. 
16 February Egypt begins bombing IS targets in Derna and Sirte, Libya, 
in retaliation for the beheading of 21 Egyptian Coptic 
Christian workers by IS in Libya.
2 March 30,000 Iraqi government forces begin an operation to retake 
Tikrit from IS.
12 March IS accepts the pledge of allegiance from Boko Haram, a 
militant group operating in Nigeria, and renames the group 
the West Africa wilaya. 
18 March Three IS gunmen attack the Bardo National Museum, Tunis, 
in a siege lasting more than three hours. Twenty-three 
people die in the attack, including 20 foreign tourists, and 
36 people are injured.
20 March Four IS suicide bombers detonate themselves in the al Badr 
and al Hashoosh Houthi Shi’a-affiliated mosques in Sana’a, 
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Yemen at midday prayers; 142 people die in the attack and 
over 350 are injured.
9 April Hackers claiming allegiance to IS cut transmission to eleven 
channels belonging to the French television international 
network TV5 Monde and take control of its websites and 
social media accounts for several hours. The hackers 
publish pro-ISIS propaganda and the details of the family 
members of French soldiers.
12 April IS publishes a video showing its militants bulldozing and 
destroying monuments in the ancient Assyrian city of 
Nimrud, Iraq, because of their ‘un-Islamic nature’.
3 May In Garland, Texas in the United States, Elton Simpson and 
Nadir Soofi fire on the entrance to an exhibition featuring 
cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad, injuring a police 
officer. Simpson and Soofi pledged their support online to 
IS. 
15 May IS militants take full control of Ramadi, the capital of 
the Anbar province, following the withdrawal of all Iraqi 
government troops. IS releases an audio speech by Abu 
Bakr al Baghdadi, after six months of silence and continued 
rumours about his death. 
22 May An IS suicide bomber detonates himself during Friday 
prayers at the Shi’a Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib Mosque in Qatif, 
Saudi Arabia. The attack kills 21 people and is the first IS 
operation in Saudi Arabia. 
24 May Following an eleven-day offensive, IS captures Palmyra, 
Syria, a UNESCO World Heritage Site, and its surrounding 
towns and villages. IS also seizes control of the Tanf 
Iraqi-Syrian border crossing and two gas fields. 
23 June Abu Muhammad al ‘Adnani announces the establishment of 
a new IS wilaya in the North Caucasus region of Russia. 
23 June IS begins a campaign to take control of Al Hasakah 
city, Syria, by detonating four suicide bombers at Syrian 
government checkpoints. 
26 June Seifeddine Rezgui, an IS militant, attacks the Riu Imperial 
Marhaba tourist beach and hotel resort in Port El Kantaoui, 
Sousse, Tunisia with an AK-47 assault rifle. Thirty-nine 
people die during the mass shooting, including Rezgui – 30 
of the victims are from the United Kingdom. 
26 June Abu Suleiman al Muwahhid, an Islamic State suicide 
bomber, detonates himself during Friday prayers at the Shi’a 
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al Sadiq mosque in Kuwait City. Twenty-seven people die in 
the attack.
16 July IS militants in the Sinai hit an Egyptian Navy frigate with an 
anti-tank missile off the coast of Rafah, Sinai.
20 July A Kurdish IS suicide bomber detonates himself outside the 
Amara culture centre, Suruç, Turkey. Thirty-three people 
die in the attack.
1 August The Syrian army and Kurdish YPG announce that all IS 
militants have been pushed out from Al Hasakah following 
36 days of fighting.
7 August IS militants executes around 300 members of the Mosul 
Electoral Commission.
18 August IS publically beheads Khaled al Assad, the head of 
antiquities in Palmyra.
20 August IS claims responsibility for a car bomb attack on the 
national security agency in north Cairo, Egypt. Twenty-nine 
people die in the attack, including six policemen.
21 August Passengers on a train travelling from Amsterdam to Paris 
subdue Ayoub El Khazzani, a Moroccan national living in 
Belgium with IS sympathies, who was armed with two guns, 
a knife and gasoline.
29 August Turkey conducts its first joint airstrikes against IS positions 
after joining the international US-led coalition.
30 September Russia begins launching airstrikes against IS and other 
opposition groups in Syria, from its base at Hmeimim 
airport, Lattakia, in response to the Syrian government’s 
request for assistance.
5 October IS launches a failed assault on the capital of the Deir 
Ezzor governorate in Syria. The operation is rebuffed by 
Russian airstrikes and the Syrian army who kill over 150 IS 
militants. 
7 October In Aleppo, Syria, IS militants kill Hossein Hamedani, the 
leader of the Iranian Quds Force in Syria.
10 October The Turkish government blames IS for two suicide bomb 
attacks outside Ankara Central Train Station that kill 103 
people. IS does not claim responsibility for the operation.
31 October IS in Sinai, Egypt, smuggles a one-kilogram TNT bomb on 
to Russian Metrojet Flight 9268 travelling from Sharm el 
Sheikh to St Petersburg, Russia. The plane crashes in North 
Sinai killing all 224 people on board. 
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12 November US and UK drones kill Mohammed Emwazi (‘Jihadi 
John’) in an airstrike on Raqqa, Syria. Two IS suicide 
bombers detonate explosives at a commercial district 
in Bourj el-Barajneh, a Shi’a district in Beirut, Lebanon. 
Forty-three people die in the attacks. 
13 November At 9.16 pm, nine IS attackers, working in three teams, 
begin a series of coordinated mass shooting and suicide 
bombings in Paris, France. Three suicide bombers 
detonate themselves outside the Stade de France during a 
football match between France and Germany, attended by 
President Hollande. Between 9.25 pm and 9.40 pm, three 
different assailants fire on three different restaurants and 
one detonates himself at the Comptoir Voltaire café in the 
eleventh arrondissement. At 9.40 pm, the final group of 
militants enters the Bataclan theatre during a concert by the 
US band Eagles of Death Metal and fires on concert-goers 
for 20 minutes, with machine guns and hand grenades. The 
militants take up to 100 concert-goers hostage for two hours 
before an intervention by the French police. In total, 137 
people die in the attacks, including seven IS militants. Two 
escape.
14 November President Hollande orders a state of emergency in France, 
temporarily shuts France’s borders and mobilises an 
additional 1,500 soldiers following the Paris attacks.
21 November The Belgian government begins an unprecedented four-day 
security lockdown of the whole city of Brussels following 
information that IS militants were planning a Paris-style 
attack and that Salah Abdeslam, one of the perpetrators of 
the attack in Paris, was hiding in Brussels. 
24 November An IS suicide bomber in Tunis detonates himself next to a 
bus carrying members of the Tunisian Presidential Security 
guard. Twelve guards are killed in the attack.
2 December The UK Parliament votes to extend its airstrike campaign 
against IS to Syria.
2 December Syed Farook and Tashfeen Malik, a married couple living 
in Redlands, California, shoot and kill 14 people at the San 
Bernardino County Health Department Christmas party. 
FBI officers shoot and kill Farook and Malik four hours 
after the attack; both Farook and Malik were described as 
supporters of IS.
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24 December Two hundred members of the Somali Al Shabaab militant 
group split and declare their allegiance to IS and Abu Bakr 
al Baghdadi.
28 December Iraqi government forces announce that they have captured 
Ramadi from IS following a two-month operation. Prime 
Minister Haider al Abadi declares 30 December to be a 
national holiday in celebration of the victory.
2016
7 January IS militants detonate a truck bomb at a police training camp 
in Zliten, Libya. Sixty police officers are killed in the attack 
and over 200 are injured.
8 January Edward Archer shoots and wounds a police officer in 
Philadelphia in the United States. Archer pledges his 
allegiance to IS when taken into custody. 
12 January A Syrian IS suicide bomber detonates himself near the Blue 
Mosque in Istanbul, Turkey. Thirteen foreign tourists are 
killed in the attack.
31 January IS hits the Shi’a-revered Zaynab mosque in the southern 
suburbs of Damascus, Syria with two car bombs and a 
suicide bomb. Seventy-one people are killed in the attack.
21 February The Syrian government recaptures IS-controlled villages in 
the Al Safira plain outside of Aleppo. 
18 March Belgian police arrest Salah Abdeslam and four other 
suspected IS militants in a series of raids on apartments in 
the Molenbeek district, Brussels.
22 March IS conducts an attack on two sites in Brussels, Belgium, 
killing 32 people and wounding 300. At 7.58 am, two bombs 
are detonated at the opposite ends of the check-in hall (level 
3) of the main terminal of Zaventem International Airport. 
An hour later, at 9.11 am, an explosion hits the middle of 
a three-carriage train at the Maelbeek metro station in the 
city centre, close to several European Union institutions. 
Two brothers, Khalid and Brahim el-Bakraoui, and a third 
participant, Najim Laachraoui, conduct the operation and 
are killed during it.
25 March United States Defence Secretary Ashton Carter announces 
that the US has killed the alleged IS second-in-command, 
Iraqi-born Abdul Rahman Mustafa al Qaduli, in an 
airstrike. IS releases two videos – respectively entitled An 
Appropriate Recompense and They Are Suffering As You Are 
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Suffering – in which it claims the 22 March operations on 
targets in Brussels, Belgium.
26 March The Syrian army recaptures the city of Palmyra from IS.
18 May The Iraqi army recaptures Rutbah city, Anbar province, 
from IS. 
22 May Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi announces the 
beginning of an operation to retake control of Fallujah from 
IS. 
12 June Omar Mateen shoots and kills 49 people at the Pulse gay 
nightclub in Orlando, Florida. Mateen took nightclubbers 
hostage before eventually being killed by the police. Mateen 
swore allegiance to IS in a telephone call to the police 
during the shooting. 
13 June Larossi Abbala, a French national claiming allegiance to 
IS, stabs to death Jean-Baptiste Salvaing, a French police 
commander, outside his house and kills his wife, Jessica 
Schneider, in Magnanville, north-west of Paris. Abballa 
films himself live on Facebook during the situation.
26 June The Iraqi army announces that Fallujah is under its control. 
28 June Two IS militants throw a hand grenade into a bar in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia. Eight people are injured in the attack. 
28 June The Turkish government blames IS for an attack by three 
militants on Istanbul’s Atatürk Airport that killed 45 people. 
IS does not claim responsibility for the attack.
1 July Five IS militants attack the Holy Artisan Bakery with 
firearms and explosives in Dhaka, Bangladesh and take 
people hostage. Twenty-nine people, including the five 
perpetrators, die in the attack. 
13 July IS confirms that Omar al Shishani, the group’s military 
commander in Syria, was killed in Mosul, Iraq. 
14 July Mohamed Lahouaij Bouhlel drives a truck through crowds 
celebrating Bastille Day on the Promenade des Anglais in 
Nice, France. Eighty-six people are killed in the attack and 
IS claimed that Bouhlel was one of its soldiers. 
19 July Muhammad Riyad attacks and injures five people on a train 
in Wuerzburg, Germany, with an axe. IS publishes a video of 
Riyad pledging his allegiance to ISIS. 
24 July Mohammed Daleel, a Syrian refugee suicide bomber, 
detonates himself outside a bar in Ansbach, Germany, 
injuring 15 people. Daleel had previously recorded a video 
of himself pledging allegiance to IS. 
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26 July Two IS supporters, Abdelmalik Petitjean and Adel 
Kermiche, take a priest, three nuns and two parishioners 
hostage in a Catholic church in Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray, 
Normandy, France. The two militants filmed themselves 
killing the priest at the church’s altar before being eventually 
killed by the police. 
13 August Kurdish forces capture Manbij city, Syria, from IS fighters. 
20 August A suicide bomber detonates himself at a wedding ceremony 
in Gaziantep, Turkey, killing 57 people.
30 August A US airstrike kills Abu Mohammed al ‘Adnani in Aleppo, 
Syria.
17 September Dahir Adan stabs and injures ten people in a knife attack 
at the Crossroads Centre shopping mall in St Cloud, 
Minnesota, United States. IS claims responsibility for the 
attack and states that Adan was a soldier of the Caliphate.
17 September Ahmad Khan Rahami detonates three bombs and plants 
several others in New York and New Jersey, United 
States, injuring 29 people. Rahami had cited IS and Abu 
Mohammed al ‘Adnani in his personal journal. 
5 October Hicham Diop attacks police officers in Brussels, Belgium, 
with a machete, injuring two people. Diop had been in 
contact with IS operatives in Syria.
16 October Syrian opposition fighters announce they have taken control 
of Dabiq, Syria, from IS. 
19 October Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi announces the launch 
of an operation to retake Mosul from IS.
24 October Three ISIS militants attack a police training college in 
Quetta, Baluchistan, Pakistan. Sixty-two people die in the 
attack. 
31 October Amina al Almaniyya attacks police officers in Mulheim, 
Germany, with a knife, injuring two. An IS flag is found in 
Almaniyya’s belongings. 
1 November Iraqi forces enter Mosul city for the first time and begin 
operations to retake the city from IS by launching an assault 
on Mosul’s eastern bank. 
7 November Kurdish Peshmerga forces announce they have gained 
control of the IS-held city of Bashiqa, Iraq.
24 November An IS truck bomb detonates at a gas station filled with Shi’a 
pilgrims in Hillah, Iraq, killing 125 people. 
28 November Abdul Razak Ali Artan drives a car into and stabs 
pedestrians at Ohio State University, Ohio, United States. 
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Thirteen people are injured in the attack, which is claimed 
by IS.
10 December IS suicide bombers attack a military base in Aden, Yemen, 
killing 50 soldiers.
11 December IS regains control of Palmyra, Syria, following a three-day 
battle with the Syrian army. An IS suicide bomber detonates 
himself at St Peters and St Paul’s Church in Cairo, Egypt, 
killing 29 people. 
18 December IS fighters conduct a series of mass shootings in Al Kerak, 
Jordan, before seeking refuge in an ancient Crusader castle. 
Thirteen people die in the combined attacks. 
19 December Anin Amri drives a truck into a Christmas market on 
Breitsheidplatz in Berlin, Germany. Twelve people die in 
the attack and IS publishes a video showing Amri pledging 
allegiance to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi.
2017
1 January Abdulkadir Masharipov fires on nightclubbers at the Reina 
nightclub in Istanbul, Turkey. Thirty-six people die in the 
attack and IS releases a statement claiming responsibility.
2 January Three IS car bombs detonate in a Shi’a district of Sadr City, 
Iraq, killing 56 people. 
24 January Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi announces that Iraqi 
forces have captured the eastern bank of Mosul from IS and 
will begin a new phase to retake the IS-held western bank.
3 February Abdallah el-Hamahmy attacks and injures a guard with a 
machete at the Louvre Museum, Paris, France. El-Hamahmy 
pledges his allegiance to IS on Twitter immediately prior to 
the attack.
16 February An IS suicide bomber detonates himself during a Sufi ritual 
at the Shrine of Lal Shabaz Qalandar in Sehwan, Pakistan. 
Ninety people die in the attack.
23 February Syrian opposition forces announce that they have taken full 
control of Al Bab, Syria, from IS. 
4 March The Syrian army retakes control of Palmyra from IS. 
22 March Khalid Masood drives a car into pedestrians in front of the 
Palace of Westminster and fatally stabs a police officer. Five 
people die in the attack, which IS later claims responsibility 
for.
3 April Akbarzhon Jalilov detonates an explosive device on the 
subway in St Petersburg, Russia, killing 15 people. Jalilov 
had reportedly trained with IS militants in Syria in 2014. 
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7 April Rakhmat Alikov drives a truck into a department store in 
Stockholm, Sweden, killing four people. Alikov pledged his 
support to IS and had allegedly attempted to travel to Syria 
in 2015.
9 April Two IS suicide bombers detonate themselves at two Coptic 
Christian churches in Alexandria and Tanta, Egypt, during 
services celebrating Palm Sunday. Forty-five people die in 
the attacks.
18 April Kori Ali Mohammad kills three people in a series of 
shootings in four different locations in Fresno, California 
shouting ‘Allahu Akbar’ and his ‘hatred for white people’, 
before being apprehended by Fresno police officers.
20 April Karim Cheurfi fires on a police bus parked on the Avenue 
des Champs-Élysées in Paris, France. One police officer is 
killed and IS claims responsibility for the attack.
24 May The 22-year-old Salman Abedi detonates a suicide bomb 
at a music concert by singer Ariana Grande in Manchester, 
England, killing 22 people, including several children, and 
injuring 59.
3 June In London, three men drive a van into pedestrians on 
London Bridge, then run into Borough Market and stab 
people sitting at restaurants, killing seven and wounding 48. 
IS claims the attack.
16 June The Russian Defence Ministry releases a statement in which 
they announce that air strikes their forces conducted over 
Raqqa, Syria on 28 May might have killed Abu Bakr al 
Baghdadi.
19 June In London, 47-year-old Darren Osborn drives a van into a 
crowd near the Finsbury Mosque, killing one person and 
injuring eleven.
21 June In Brussels, 36-year-old Oussama Zariouh is caught 
attempting an attack with explosives in the Central Station.
22 June The Iraqi authorities circulate video footage showing the 
destruction of the Great Mosque of Mosul, which they 
blame on IS. IS accuses the United States of destroying the 
mosque, a claim denied by the US.
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